We also need to be cognizant of the key themes that were identified in Chapter 1, such as the:
• whole-of-society and whole-of-government nature of emergencies and disasters, when considering causes, impacts and responsibilities;
• critical role that community vulnerability and, conversely, resilience play in defining the possibility and impacts of emergencies and disasters;
• importance of how emergencies and disasters are framed as policy and institu- tional problems, not only as ‘events’;
• necessity of incorporating explicit consideration of residual risk and uncertainty in framing policy and designing institutions;
• need for long-term (strategic) policy development, as well as event- and response- focused policy settings;
• need for more structured and detailed processes for policy instrument choice and policy implementation;
• importance of learning across time and place, and the connection of this to adap- tive processes;
• necessity of considering redundancy and non-optimized capacities in the face of large-scale potential impacts;
• crucial role that broader institutional factors play in all of the above.
These key challenges, which represent more cross-cutting issues, together with the frameworks depicted in Figure 3.1, provide the basis for the integrated framework presented in the next section.
• Problem framing (stage 1). This stage emphasizes the importance of how we arrive at an understanding of policy and institutional problems in emergencies and disasters. Damaging events or natural phenomena such as floods are not policy or institutional problems, but they serve to define such problems, along with the characteristics of human systems. Problem framing can simply involve the decisions of elites and experts, or other subsets of the community. But we argue that it is better to construe problem framing as including episodes of social debate and ongoing discourse between parts of the community; ongoing monitoring and knowledge generation; the identification of direct and indi- rect causes of vulnerability and resilience; assessment of other supportive or constraining policy and institutional settings; and the open assessment of risk and uncertainty. A more realistic, tractable and widely understood definition of the policy problem emerges from the combination of those elements.
• Policy framing and strategic policy choice (stage 2). The policy response of a society or a government can be reactive and not openly informed by multiple perspec- tives. Or it can be more proactive, involving the clear choice of general policy styles (coercive, community oriented, market based, etc.), based on clearly understood principles and aimed at achieving agreed and clear objectives.
Policy styles and goals in the disasters field should explicitly address conflicting or minority concerns and the situations of marginalized groups. Strategic policy choice defines the parameters and directions within which later policy design and implementation occur – that is, what and who is included and excluded – and thus is a crucial point in the policy process.
• Policy design and implementation (stage 3). Ideally, achieving policy objectives involves the choice of specific policy instruments chosen transparently from a wide menu of options. To implement these instruments, resources are required (financial, informational, human, administrative, statutory, etc.). Some degree of enforcement or compliance will often be necessary, and mechanisms for ongoing monitoring should be put in place to allow later evaluation, learning and adaptation.
• Policy monitoring and learning (stage 4). In an uncertain and changing world, learning from experience and ongoing adaptation and improvement are demanded, and this stage requires attention to policy monitoring well after initial policy design and implementation. This stage, which may last for many years, involves continuing observation and routine collection of requisite data.
The link between this and stage 1 (monitoring of human and natural systems) begs the integration of policy and basic monitoring to enable separation of the impact of policy interventions and other variables. It involves a mandated ability to react to and learn from unexpected events, as well as to mount formal evaluation exercises and act upon the findings.
Above and beyond the four stages above, and the subsidiary elements within them, there are principles and imperatives, identified in Figure 3.2, that need to be constantly accounted for throughout any exercise of policy or institutional analysis or design:
Social debate and wide ownership of problems Ongoing monitoring, research and development, and inclusive discourse
Identification of direct and underlying causes Identification of vulnerability/resilience, allowing multiple definitions and perceptions
Assessment of uncertainty, including residual uncertainty
And risk assessment procedures
Definition of policy and institutional problems, including multiple interpretations
Choice of broad policy style/s
Identification of relevant policy principles Definition of desired outcomes/policy goals Communication of policy statement/direction Assess other policies and institutional environment
Policy instrument choice Implementation planning
Provision of resources (multiple forms) Communication and information strategies Enforcement and compliance provisions
Establishment of monitoring and adaptive learning mechanisms
Ongoing monitoring and routine data capture Structured and adaptive learning from events Rigorous and mandated evaluation
Adaptation, cessation, problem redefinition, etc.
1 Problem framing discourse
2 Policy framing and strategic policy choice
3 Policy design and implementation
4 Policy
monitoring and learning
Whole-of-government coordination Transparency and accountability Appropriate public participation Cross-cutting
policy principles
Coordination of actors and organizations Use of legal systems and instruments Clarity of roles and responsibilities Purposefulness and persistence over time Inclusion, especially of the less powerful Information richness and sensitivity Flexibility and adaptability
Institutional design imperatives
Figure 3.2 Framework for policy and institutional analysis for emergencies and disasters
• Cross-cutting policy principles. This element emphasizes that policy processes and choices should be informed at all stages by three principles: the need to coor- dinate or integrate activities across the sectors and portfolios of government;
transparency and accountability to improve policy formulation and trust; and appropriate and genuine forms of public participation.
• Institutional design imperatives. All that occurs in policy processes, and all that actors and organizations do, will be enabled or constrained by the institutional system within which they operate. This part of the framework proposes core attributes of institutional arrangements that will be more likely to enable.
Recognizing the whole-of-government and whole-of-society nature of emer- gencies and disasters, institutional arrangements should allow coordination across organizations. Institutions should reflect agreed principles and direc- tions (purpose), and balance longevity of efforts (persistence) with the ability to adapt (flexibility). Institutions will create the conditions for a high priority to be placed on the acquisition and communication of information, and encourage wide inclusion in social debate, and policy-making and implementation. The fundamental institutional mechanism of the law should be used effectively.
The framework may appear overly complex – in total, it comprises 30 elements;
but an honest and shared appreciation of the many things that contribute to policy and institutional response is valuable as any one or several elements may be crucial and too easily overlooked in a particular situation. A score of 90 per cent – getting 27 things right out of the 30 elements – usually gets an ‘A’ grade; but in the complex and challenging world of anticipating, preparing and responding to disasters, getting one thing wrong can cause terrible failure. That maxim is widely accepted in operational emergency management and is one reason why emergency managers are careful, thorough and competent, adhering to strict procedures, fail- safe measures and lines of responsibilities. But the maxim is certainly nowhere as widely perceived or acted on in terms of the policy and institutional settings within which operational activities are embedded. An inadequate statutory setting, poor communication or failure to identify a vulnerable group will turn the ‘A’ grade into policy or institutional failure, and quite possibly a human and political disaster. The framework presented here is a checklist, an attempt to guard against such failure.