authority in emergency situations, compared to many other policy domains.
The critical question is whether the mixture is appropriate to the situation and whether the different components are implemented in a coordinated fashion. Three simple questions, if closely considered, will enhance the prospects of successful
and to take possession of an adequate legal framework. The funding aspect is often overplayed as information or human resources may be just as (if not more) critical, and organizations may lack the ability to absorb substantial increases in resources.
Requirements for planning and the existence of plans have been found to enhance local capacity and to build constituencies (Burby and Dalton, 1994). One issue is whether capacity is weakened or strengthened by the commercialization of government activities, introducing complexity in information transactions and a greater number of players (e.g. consultancies and out-sourced firms) (Hood and Jackson, 1992). In summary, capable organizations are forward thinking, learning, adaptive, networked with other organizations, politically astute, and able to solve problems. And such organizations will have an adequately accepted mandate to undertake their function, whether that mandate is stated in law or based on more informal understanding.
Potential indicators of capacity by local government include:
• size relative to population;
• legal power or authority;
• process for implementation.
Potential indicators for both those at risk and local entities include:
• personal networks and access to technical expertise;
• availability of money; and
• adequacy of the information base.
Commitment
Local implementing authorities may have the capacity to implement emergency management programmes but see them as a low priority for a variety of reasons.
They may believe that there is not a local problem, or they may be unwilling to cooperate because of perceived difficulties with the policy or with other organizations or individuals involved. For example, they may believe that they lack the necessary legal authority; be fully absorbed dealing with other local problems; be under pressure to allow development to proceed unheeded in, for instance, flood-prone areas; or have no support from their constituents. Maintaining commitment for emergency management-related policy is especially difficult during lengthy quiet periods – suggesting that attention to commitment cannot be ignored except when events are frequent and dramatic enough to maintain high levels of attention.
Lack of commitment is a serious problem that can undermine otherwise excel- lent policies and perhaps even lead to total failure. The cooperative-type policies tend to assume that commitment to the policy objectives exists. When it does not exist, performance will be poor. In contrast, the coercive approach assumes that commitment is lacking and works to create it. An obvious way of encouraging commitment is to make emergency management a legal requirement, with penal- ties for non-compliance, building what is known as calculated commitment (May
et al, 1996). Commitment may also emerge through the professional standards or expectations placed on relevant staff, such as local government officials. It may seem appropriate that local priorities and risk perceptions should be respected. Unfortu- nately, the risk with this approach is that a major problem may evolve in the absence of appropriate hazard management if, for example, substantial unconstrained devel- opment occurs in hazardous areas.
Information targeted at government officials or the public may help to build commitment. Some people may use the information to lobby for emergency manage- ment action, thereby prompting political commitment. Another way of incorporat- ing information is to draw it into a formal planning process, ensuring a greater level of formal recognition and likely a longer life span of relevance.
Potential measures of commitment by local governments include:
• commitment by elected officials;
• commitment by senior professional local staff;
• codification in plans and procedures;
• influence of emergency management staff.
Potential measures of commitment by those at risk and other local entities include:
• regular discourse with community institutions;
• legal requirements recognized and acted on;
• established local practices.
When local governments and local-scale community and private organizations lack commitment to higher-level policy objectives, a coercive approach produces better results, as measured by local effort and compliance with specified procedures (May et al, 1996). But where commitment already exists, a cooperative approach leads to results equal to or better than those achieved under coercion. In addition, it appears that cooperative policies may be superior in maintaining local government commitment, especially where processes that include stakeholders are used to spread and maintain shared understanding.
Conclusion
Selection of policy instruments should be guided by what will most likely achieve the desired results, but also by what is acceptable and what can be implemented – it is more important that policy instruments work well in practice than in theory.
The benefits of hazard specific measures are usually evident in that they are about the detail of managing a particular risk in a particular place. But their costs and limitations are also clear. Generic measures that target vulnerability more broadly are often closely connected with community development and may therefore be assumed to be mainstream parts of a government’s agenda. However, often they are not. All options should be considered and, if possible, used in concert since both are needed:
the specific measures will often not work properly without the robust institutions
and level of human development promised by more generic approaches. Any measure must take account of, and sit comfortably with, the ‘universal’ instruments of policy – economics, law, institutions and communication.
The three policy styles of coercion, cooperation and exhortation that are set out here all require a commitment to implementation and the capacity to do so. These three styles are one construction of the range of policy choices. Other construc- tions are possible; but the key challenge remains to maintain a wide menu of policy instruments and to choose according to the challenges faced, rather than rely on unthinking predisposition.
Not Forgetting: Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
It may seem commonsense to emphasize the importance of learning from experience in order to improve future policy responses and institutional capacities. Surely this is normal practice? Ideally, as policies are implemented, routines for capturing the necessary data are put in place, the effectiveness of policy interventions are monitored, and formal evaluations feed into the redesign of polices. However, in the emergencies area and elsewhere in public policy, careful harvesting of insights from past and current experience and purposeful application of the knowledge thus gained to adapt and improve capacities are too often not evident. This chapter identifies key issues that, if addressed, will enable policy learning and improvement, allowing for the design and maintenance of adaptive policy processes and institutional settings. It goes beyond the more familiar and well-documented practice of monitoring and evaluation, considering the nature of policy learning, conducive institutional characteristics, basic forms of information and their routine capture, and the development of human capacities.
The point of ‘not forgetting’ is to learn and improve. The usual language describ- ing this activity is monitoring and evaluation (M&E), representing an ever-growing enterprise in government and associated consultancies, and targeted at operational project and programme evaluation. Consequently, our coverage of M&E is a brief summary later in this chapter, with most space devoted to the broader concept of policy learning, since this is more relevant to the themes of this book.