Risk-based approaches are increasingly applied in all areas of society as part of regulatory, commercial and management processes, including emergency
management. Are such approaches adequate across the range of types of policy problems? Disagreements about even the most well-documented risks such as smoking and climate change are normal, with many risks offering much more scope for debate, such as flood recurrence intervals or management of landscape-scale wildfire risk. A leading international model, the Australian–New Zealand Risk Management Standard, sees risk in terms of the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives (Standards Australia, 2004; see Chapter 3). Many scientists and engineers define risk strictly in terms of the event size by frequency of occurrence using numerical probabilities, and the assumption that risk can be measured objectively underlies much contemporary risk management. But those at risk – the public – emphasize elements of fairness and trust rather than numerical probabilities, while cultural researchers argue that ‘it seems more appropriate to view risk as the embodiment of deeply held cultural values and beliefs’ (Jasanoff et al, 1995).
Even where there is agreement on the approach taken to risk analysis, it is likely that those involved will have different priorities – for example, commercial establishments in a small tourist town amidst forested mountains may see wildfire as a threat to business income, rather than as a threat to life and property or to wildlife.
This suggests that as the risk management process moves from the routine to grapple with more complex problems, it is properly seen as the subject of negotiation between stakeholders, rather than simply as a definitive, quantified practice. The Australian–New Zealand Risk Management Standard and other risk management protocols (often subdi- vided into risk assessment, analysis and management) set out a structured process for stakeholders to negotiate what the objectives of emergency management are, the criteria for assessing the risk and what should be done about it (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 3. 1(b) in Chapter 3). To its advocates, it is a powerful tool that greatly broadens the scope of the more traditional approaches of emergency management based on hazard analysis, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (the terms vary, but the basic steps are the same). The process in most risk analysis and management frameworks is designed to be expansive and inclusive, and can accommodate multiple problem framings through negotiation. The Australian–New Zealand framework has similarities to the frameworks frequently used in policy analysis and development, and is compatible with the policy framework developed for this book, as shown in Chapter 3. It can be used with either quantitative or qualitative information on the risk, although the tendency is to use quantitative data (often implying a greater degree of certainty and knowledge than actually exists, especially where non-routine and complex problems are concerned).
In practice, however, the risk management process is often applied in a mechanistic fashion, thereby potentially subverting some of its advantages. Unfortunately, some variants of this process do not make objective-setting – also known as ‘desired outcomes’
– fully explicit. This is closely connected with problem definition and framing. In the absence of clear objectives, it may be difficult to develop risk management options that actually deal with the problem; as a result, and importantly, it may not be possible to assess progress. Philosophically, it is unlikely that we can ‘manage’ everything. Never- theless, the approach appears to work well with routine and even many non-routine problems, as described earlier. Complex unbounded problems pose much more of a challenge for risk management approaches as generally practised, in part, because of the different types of uncertainties that such problems introduce.
Residual risk
The need to acknowledge and attend to the residual risk is too often downplayed in risk management. This highlights a major weakness from an emergency management perspective, even though the weakness may be viewed as positive from the perspective of land development and other interests. In addition, aspects of the risk can be traded away against emergency management, allowing the risk to be taken. Development may occur in areas subject to floods or other periodic and predictable hazards because emergency management procedures are relied on to facilitate appropriate safety and damage-reducing behaviour. Buildings can be constructed to certain standards and warning systems can be installed to take care of the residual risk. This is not to deny the utility of such negotiated approaches; but it should be recognized that the result will often be residential and critical utility development in what (to emergency management) are high-risk areas, and that symptoms rather than causes of vulnerability are being addressed.
There are other categories of residual risk that are less obvious and are frequently overlooked in policy. Some of these exist now and more will emerge in the future.
Figure 5.1: The Australian/New Zealand risk management process from AS/NZS 4360: 2004.
Most effective use of this process requires explicit objective setting, recognition of residual risk and incorporation of multiple problem framing.
ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT
IDENTIFY RISKS
ANALYSE RISKS
EVALUATE RISKS
TREAT RISKS
C O M M U N IC A T E & C O N S U L T
MONITOR AND REVIEWFigure 5.1 The Australian–New Zealand risk management process Note: Most effective use of this process requires explicit objective-setting, recognition of residual risk and incorporation of multiple problem framing.
Source: Standards Australia (2004)
Much effort in the risk management arena, understandably, deals only with the risk that is reasonably obvious and which exists today, although increasing acknowledge- ment is made of global environmental change, with its orientation towards less visible future risks. For most major policy problems, a significant component of residual risk is unknown or highly uncertain (Dovers, 1995). Failure to appreciate and plan for this ‘unknown zone’ of residual risk is one reason why the consequences of some disasters – generally in the complex class – continue to worsen long after impact. Examples can be found among the case studies in Chapter 1, such as Hurri- cane Katrina and the refugee challenge in Goma (see Boxes 1.1 and 1.8). There are many other examples, such as contamination episodes and the destruction of water supplies by wildfire, and consequent erosion and water quality impacts in supply catchments.