understood and sustained public participation in both higher-level policy and operational management;
• flexibility to balance persistence and purposefulness, and to ensure that they do not develop into rigidity, but allow adaptation and learning.
These attributes may seem obvious; but it is not apparent that they are always considered or achieved in the assessment or design of institutional settings.
Importantly, they are not strict ‘rules’ and need to be balanced against each other – for example, persistence versus flexibility. In addition, their interpretation and application will vary greatly across different contexts, involving a level of detail not possible here.
Another interesting principle is the suitability of ‘goodness of fit’ in institu- tional design: a feature of influential long-lived institutions is that they fit in their operating environment (Goodin, 1996). This is an obvious element of accepted functioning institutions. Yet, in the case of disasters, the ‘operating environment’
during and after events will, by definition, be abnormal and in complex events, at least, will change rapidly – thus, an institutional setting for disasters will likely be at odds with ‘normal’ expectations of institutions, as well as the criteria against which public institutions are usually judged. While an institution may eventually acquit its disaster-related functions splendidly in the abnormal operating environment of an event, it may also be assessed and judged, even attacked, under normal conditions – a time when it may appear strange and even at odds with economic develop- ment or government ideology, for example, by attempting to restrict floodplain development or to provide information on industrial hazards. This means that the differences between a disaster-competent institution and other institutions must be identified and justified.
One way of exploring this tension is to consider the stability or changeability of an institution through a coarse-scale categorization of different forms of institu- tional resilience, which is the way in which it responds to external change and stimuli (Handmer and Dovers, 1996):
• Type 1 resilience: Resistance and maintenance. This strategy is characterized positively by purpose and stability, optimization of resource use and a low risk of ill-considered change. Negatively, it is characterized by denial of, or resist- ance to, change, appeals to ignorance, awaiting crisis before reforming operat- ing assumptions and practices, and unlikely to be effective in prevention and preparedness activities or at achieving cross-government or multiple-sector commitment to emergency management. Nevertheless, it is probably effective for routine events.
• Type 2 resilience: Change at the margins. This resilience is positively characterized by the admission of a need for change, well-considered reactions to outside pressures and new situations, and manageable incremental responses. It is nega- tively characterized by the inability to cope with major shifts in the operating environment or by new knowledge, addressing symptoms rather than causes; by the lack of a long-term strategy; and by the danger of masking the continuation of a problem through the veneer of change. This is a common approach that
provides a sense of stability, while paying some attention to needed change, and may often be the best that can be achieved.
• Type 3 resilience: Openness and adaptability. This strategy is positively characterized by recognition of uncertainty and imperatives for change (including addressing underlying causes) and by preparedness to adapt quickly. It is negatively char- acterized by inefficiency and possible maladaptation through poorly considered change. This is a very important attribute when faced with a complex unbounded problem and limited resources. In prevention and preparedness, it may be very useful in gaining support and working across different sectors.
All three forms of resilience are appropriate in different circumstances: the problem faced, the state of knowledge and the implications of not taking action. Different institutions and individuals tend to favour one form and to criticize the adequacy of other strategies. The nature of emergencies and disasters, especially pervasive uncertainty, suggests that a disaster-competent institution must have the capacity to be able to entertain – often in haste – and adopt a suitable strategy according to the situation confronting it. In a threatening and fluid operating environment,
‘resistance and maintenance’ would generally be regarded as a dangerous propensity;
however, in routine emergencies, it may be optimal. Likewise, ‘change at the margin’
may be successful in the face of non-routine or meso events, but serve to develop an assumed level of safety – designed-in disasters. ‘Openness and adaptability’ may seem the obvious strategy in disaster situations, but does carry the risk of maladaptation.
What emerges here is that for emergency management institutions, a single insti- tution or set of institutions should assess what resilience strategies are best suited to specific aspects of their structure and function, rather than favouring one strategy as a general rule.
Emergency management institutions in practice
Mechanisms to achieve or improve institutional function include attempts at changing structure through unifying the major emergency management type agencies, and the use of coordinating authorities superimposed on the existing institutional structure.
Distinct agencies may, nevertheless, function cooperatively in some areas through networks of personal contacts or shared personnel. In many countries, attempts are being made to reduce the importance of such networks through training, operating procedures and technology. However, personal networks help to provide the flexibility and adaptability needed to make emergency management work, especially for problems outside the ‘routine’. The reality in most of the world is that informal networks will remain important, in part, because the institutions are not conducive to the changes needed to find substitutes. The informal provides the flexibility denied by the obvious structures.
Often, institutional failures, and opportunities for reform, exist at the bounda- ries of spatial and administrative scale. Most pronounced in federal systems, this is frequently apparent between the formal levels of government: local, provincial and national. However, issues of scale can arise within a level of government, such as when different policy sectors (health, communications, defence, etc.) are organized
within different regional boundaries. In civil society, issues of uncoordinated or well-coordinated scale may arise between international, national and local NGOs, and in the commercial world between international headquarters and local offices and franchises.
Disasters rarely respect administrative boundaries, and so the boundaries of government and administration may be barriers to understanding disasters and to effective preparation and response. The spatial boundaries of emergency management policy may be, for most other policy concerns, strange and illogical – vegetation type for wildfires, river corridors for flooding, demographic groups for epidemics – and difficult to support or reconcile administratively. Yet, should administrative boundaries be considered sacrosanct, then vulnerability to events will likely increase.
Whatever the formal structure, emergency management is expected to encom- pass an increasing variety of agencies, sectors and interests: this is much more than
‘whole of government’ – it approaches ‘whole of society’. Failure to engage with the wider range of groups is likely to see formal emergency management organizations reduced to playing a part role, with essential work left undone.