Framing the Problem: Identifying and Analysing Risk
To create effective policy we need to be clear about what problem or issues the policy is intended to address. Even an apparently straightforward risk will invite many ways of thinking about the problem. Fundamental differences and gaps in risk comprehension have long been documented across communities at risk, the broader public, scientists analysing the risk, and politicians and emergency managers who have to find workable solutions. Underlying these different perspectives will be distinct ways of framing the problem. While all might agree that there is a problem (e.g. a flood threat) and even on the symptoms, there is likely to be conflict over the causes and on what to do. To some extent, and sometimes to a large extent, this conflict will emerge from the way in which the problem is framed. The simple question: ‘What is the problem?’ will elicit a range of views that must be negotiated as policy is developed drawing on the approaches set out in Chapters 4 and 6.
Here we clarify concepts and provide an overview of proximate and underlying causes, problem definition (generally and through risk assessment), social, environ- mental and economic costs estimation, and institutional implications.
advantage, and so on. Framing can occur at a number of levels from the generic to policy dealing with a single hazard. Here we touch on both levels.
Some reasons for rethinking policy problems in emergency management include:
• a desire to put emergency management into the policy mainstream, not as a marginal activity;
• dealing with causes rather than symptoms, leading to the need for strategic thinking;
• shifting responsibility or blame (e.g. institutional issues versus natural hazard agents, or human error versus malevolence);
• the need for appropriate institutional structures to deliver long-term solutions;
• sharing ownership of the problem with those at risk and working to reduce vulnerability through education and other programmes.
Drivers for different ways of framing problems include:
• disciplinary perspectives and worldviews (see below);
• legal requirements and the need to avoid liability and legal risk;
• political considerations, where disasters create political risk, cause political oppor- tunities that favour specific groups or result in the blaming of identifiable groups or nature;
• government legitimacy, where in addition to the politics of blame and generosity, disasters and disaster management provide opportunities for politicians to show their power, control and leadership;
• economic and commercial imperatives, when disaster management may be seen as too expensive and conflicting with local economic goals; alternatively, commercial interest may see advantages in promoting concern, such as Y2K (the millennium computer bug), the security industry or sensationalist media;
• fear and perceptions that disaster is likely to stigmatize an area; alternatively, there may be fear of the mitigation effort, such as prescribed burning to reduce wildfire risk, provision of flood-related information with implications for property prices, or circulation of emergency plans to those living near hazardous industrial or storage sites;
• a common view that the availability of insurance is an important factor in risk- taking, discounting the need for other actions.
If we consider strategies for emergency management we can see that they might change depending on how the problem is defined. Take the example of flooding:
• The problem is the hazard (the physical phenomenon). With floodwater, the objec- tive might be to manage the water, and the approach would logically be flood walls and other engineering works. Traditionally, The Netherlands epitomizes this approach, and New Orleans shows its limits. Applying the same objective, another approach, now finding favour with planning authorities, might be to hold water in catchments where it falls, or to retain it in natural or artificial
features – which, although not intended for floodwater control, can be turned to that function. These different approaches to the same objective highlight the varying approaches between engineering agencies, land management agencies and planners.
• The problem is one of exposure to the hazard. The objective would be to reduce expo- sure of people and activities to floodwater, achieved through planning regulations that prohibit development in flood-prone areas. But this is often difficult in areas with strong development pressure, areas that are often likely to also be prone to flooding (e.g. near rivers or the sea) or where unplanned informal settlements are the only places for people to establish dwellings. There are many options for defining flood prone land. Similarly, planners might limit development of coastal locations because of storm surge hazard, or put in place exclusion zones around hazardous industries and storage sites.
• The problem is that some communities are especially vulnerable to flooding, and the objective will be to reduce that. The problem may be related to exposure, as above, but may also be that flooding affects the community’s livelihoods – so the emphasis could be on local economic security. Perhaps flooding would impact on health, so the policy could target health and housing quality, and so on. The vulnerability issue can be framed in many ways, including culturally, historically and politically. In any case, the focus is on reducing the consequences of flooding on the people affected. Many people in poorer areas prefer this type of approach as it helps to improve their day-to-day condition.
• Another approach would be to treat the problem as a purely economic one. Thus, properly functioning markets could solve the problem, and to the extent that there is actually a problem, this indicates that some aspect of the market is not working well. In essence, the logic is that people will buy where they want to live and will take measures, such as insurance, to offset any hazard. The objec- tive might be to make sure that the markets worked through, for example, the provision of information and the availability of appropriate products. This can be challenging as information often fails to inform (see Chapter 7), important values are not catered for in markets, and insurance is not always available (as with flood insurance in much of Australia, or hurricane and wildfire insurance in parts of the US) or is too expensive for those at risk. This approach is similar to one that places responsibility onto those at risk.
Recognition of multiple framings and, hence, multiple policy options is not new, and was fundamental to Gilbert White’s initial analysis of US flood policy (White, 1945).
White argued that the flood problem had to be defined broadly so that the full range of strategies would be considered, rather than the partial approach dominated by major engineering works that resulted from considering flooding purely as a problem of water control.
Each way of framing the problem leads to different objectives and will be at least partially correct in certain circumstances, but may also miss important aspects of the risk. Multiple problem framings may help to ensure that such aspects can be incorporated. In each case, the protection offered is subject to debate: should it be from all threat of the hazard; to some set level (such as the 1:100 or 1 per cent flood);
to some measure related to human safety, such as floodwater depth and velocity; to economic criteria; or simply to levels of awareness among those at risk?
The use of risk management processes may encourage broader approaches; but such processes do not, by themselves, encourage multiple problem framings, although they can accommodate them. This is examined in more detail later in the chapter.