of the chosen instrument will be more apparent than they otherwise would. Impor- tantly, the limits of the choice will be a matter of record that may lay the basis for later, more informed, redesign of the policy programme.
Policy styles and attributes required for
Table 6.3 Coercive, cooperative and exhortative policy designs
Coercive policy Cooperative policy
Exhortation
Policy objective Adherence to
prescribed standards Achievement of
policy goals Partial achievement of policy goals Role of
implementing authority
Regulatory agents:
enforce rules or regulations prescribed by higher-level governments
Regulatory partners: develop and apply rules that are consistent with higher-level goals
Responsible authority: uses persuasion to achieve compliance
Emphasis of higher-level government policy
Prescribe regulatory actions and plans, along with a required process
Prescribe process and goals:
specify planning considerations, along with performance standards
Specify desirable actions
Control of implementing authority
Monitoring for procedural compliance:
enforcement and penalties for failing to meet deadlines or for not adhering to the prescribed process
Monitoring for substantive compliance: financial inducements to develop plans;
advice; no penalties
Monitoring for compliance and targeting advice;
no penalties;
inducements may be possible
Assumptions about
implementation
Commitment of implementing authority is a potential problem;
need for uniform application of policies
Commitment is not a problem;
local discretion is important in implementation
Awareness builds commitment;
information helps capacity; expertise and material may support capacity
Implementation emphasis
Adherence to detailed policy prescriptions and regulatory standards Building ‘calculated’
commitment
Building capacity of local government to reach policy goals Enhancing
‘normative’
commitment
Changing attitudes to build strong commitment
policy Potential
problems
Weak monitoring of performance and unwillingness to use penalties
Gaps in local commitment and insufficient resources to build capacity
Possibility of
‘capture’
High level of non- compliance; may raise commitment without capacity
Ideological orientation
Central government can prescribe local ideology
Emphasis on performance and accountability means choice of ideology at the local level
People/local entities have responsibility for their risks
Source: adapted from May and Handmer (1992)
In both forms of communication, it is assumed that the capacity to implement the policy exists or can be easily acquired, and the exhortation concentrates on building commitment. It is entirely voluntary, so it has the disadvantage that compliance would usually be partial, but generally has the great advantage of low costs for the responsible officials, and lesser risks of political or community backlash.
Cooperation
The cooperative approach to policy design attempts to make those at risk (or lower levels of government) partners in achieving emergency management or policy goals (see Table 6.3). It places the responsibility for risk management onto those at risk or their local governments or community institutions, and concentrates on enhancing their ability or capacity to reach these goals. Implicit are the assumptions that those at risk are committed to the same goals and that they will cooperate with higher level government. Emphasis is usually placed on regulatory or performance goals (e.g. public safety and decreased flood damage potential), rather than prescribed standards (e.g.
prohibiting floodplain development), under the presumption that local governments or community members will devise the best means within their communities to reach such goals. Such local goal-setting is viewed as less politically confrontational and/or more effective because of local commitment and knowledge.
Typically, incentives are offered by higher levels of government for cooperation by lower levels, in contrast to the penalties used in coercive policy design. Among other things, incentives may be money, technical assistance or even immunity from legal liability (on this last point, see, for example, NSW, 2001, p30). Cash or technical advice for retrofitting buildings, making gardens more fire resistant, the installation of smoke alarms or the provision of a facilitator to help those at risk reach decisions on what to do are typical examples. A cooperative approach is inherently flexible and
recognizes that the achievement of one goal involves trade-offs with other goals, such as economic development, and must have the cooperation of local government or other key entities. It has the ability to retreat in the face of strong opposition, while remaining ready to make progress as opportunities arise. Inevitably, this orientation requires increased use of negotiation and conflict resolution skills, which requires a framework within which negotiation can occur.
Potential difficulties with this approach are the need for adequate resources of funds and expertise to build capacity; the possibility that the flexibility may result in change that is incremental and too slow; that sectoral interests might ‘capture’ the process; the extended time period required to build trust and establish programmes;
and lack of penalties to use against those who are recalcitrant.
Coercion
In a coercive approach, governments set out detailed regulatory standards and procedures to be implemented by local entities or those at risk in order to achieve policy goals. In effect, where local governments are involved, they may become an agent following specific instructions from above. Coercion comes from mechanisms for monitoring the actions of local entities and others required to implement the policy, and in the form of penalties for failure to comply. In Florida, for example, local jurisdictions can be, and are, fined for failure to comply with a coercive hazard management regime (May et al, 1996). The approach presumes conflicts between the various levels of government over goals, or over the means to meet these goals. It concentrates on building (or, rather, forcing) commitment instead of capacity.
Limitations with coercion stem from the need for adequate monitoring and penalties to force compliance, which often do not exist or are very difficult or costly to apply. One reason for this difficulty is the potential for a political backlash that may threaten the whole policy, as occurred in New South Wales, Australia (Hand- mer, 1986). In reality, strong opposition will often lead to negotiated solutions.
Mixed policy programmes
In practice, it is rare for any one of these three general classes of policy approach to be used in isolation. Policy programmes utilizing multiple approaches and instruments are common, if not always successful, in emergency management. For example, a flood preparedness strategy may include hard rules on land development, a cooperative, ongoing planning process, and public education campaigns backed up by mandatory evacuations in crisis periods. Mixed instrument packages fit with changes in thinking around policy and regulation generally, arguing for, and commenting on, a more flexible approach that includes self-regulation and incentive- based policy mechanisms as well as, or in place of, straight ‘command’ regulation (see Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Often, a hierarchy of instruments is advocated, starting with the ‘softer’ instruments of information provision and self-regulation, through to fallback ‘harder’ instruments, where necessary, to correct non-compliance. However, the life and property costs of disasters imply a quite different threshold between using persuasion and exercising
authority in emergency situations, compared to many other policy domains.
The critical question is whether the mixture is appropriate to the situation and whether the different components are implemented in a coordinated fashion. Three simple questions, if closely considered, will enhance the prospects of successful