Institutional Settings for Emergencies and Disasters: Form, Function and Coordination
Human societies achieve common goals and reconcile differences through the institutions that they create or inherit, whether those institutions are effective or not, constructive or destructive, democratic or autocratic, well informed or ignorant, formal or informal. Emergency managers and organizations charged with preparing for and managing disasters largely do an admirable and crucially important job.
However, this task can only be performed as well as the institutional system within which these people and organizations are embedded, enabled and constrained allows it to be. We argue that insufficient attention has been paid to higher-order policy and institutional settings for emergencies and disasters, and note how the issue of institutions has emerged consistently throughout previous chapters.
This penultimate chapter gathers together issues and arguments about institu- tional settings for emergencies and disasters. It focuses mainly on the higher levels of those components of the governing state summarized in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, but with reference to how these influence the crucial operational components and outcomes – institutions are a means to those ends. The chapter first revisits the concept of institution before summarily reviewing the common institutional settings in the field and some key problems and challenges experienced with those settings.
Principles are then developed to inform the process of matching institutions with their purpose. A brief discussion of the role of law – an overlooked but critical factor in disasters policy – follows before concluding with an emphasis on the idea of coor- dination within the institutional system.
include political, social, cultural, economic, personal, legal and administrative matters. Institutions may be informal or formal, legal or customary, and in terms of function may be economic, cultural or informational, highly visible and regu- latory, or, alternatively, difficult to discern and relying on tacit understanding and adherence. Institutions allow organized, collective efforts around common concerns, and reduce the need for constant negotiation of expectations and behavioural contracts. Although persistent, institutions constantly evolve and adapt.
• The concept of an institutional system conveys the reality that concentrating on single institutions will often limit understanding. Institutions operate within complex interactive systems comprising multiple institutions, organizations and actors. Describing, analysing or prescribing policy change must take this interde- pendency into account.
Often, there is the apparent and recognized institutional system, but also a shadow system or less apparent institutions that need to be understood in order to expose how things really work. These multiple levels bedevil much risk management as the formal or official system may give a misleading picture of what the risk is. Often, emergency and risk management succeeds despite its institutional setting, where those responsible use their personal networks and informal or unofficial strategies to get the job done. Strategic planning and policy typically ignore this reality, but can acknowledge and incorporate such network capacities and become more flexible and robust as a result.
In emergency management theory and practice, most attention is paid to the role and functioning of organizations, the more tangible manifestations of underlying institutions. Similarly, attention is paid to management prescriptions and regula- tions, rather than to strategic policy directions. Differentiating between these is, at times, difficult: for example, management activities are influenced by policy and vice versa. An organization or even individual may be sufficiently long lived, recognized and influential to be regarded as an institution – consider the seven-term mayor or the long-standing local volunteer fire brigade. The colloquial understanding of
‘institution’, implying consistency and visibility of a presence and influence, is not that different from the theoretical understanding mirrored in the first sentence of the definition above.
The second definition – institutional system – defines a core theme of this chap- ter and of the challenge of coping with disasters. The precise form and quality of any one institutional component responsible for an aspect of disaster policy and response is only as important as the form and quality of the interactions with other components. It is precisely this institutional interdependency and coordination, and the strategic policy processes and settings that shape them (and, therefore, the capac- ity to persist, learn and improve) that are the big challenge. The prompt arrival of military services for evacuation in a disaster is crucial, but is determined not only by the preparedness and professionalism of the military units, but by the clear defini- tion of decision-making in government, the quality of transport infrastructure and other factors. However, a number of institutions are needed for effective emergency management: those dedicated to community safety and resilience are often poorly
resourced compared with response, perhaps not surprisingly given the political imperative of sound response.
A fine-resolution local government planning scheme that accounts for commu- nity resilience and vulnerability to disasters and that may minimize exposure and maintain livelihoods is a good thing, but is not effective if under constant legal challenge, unimplemented due to lack of resources or unenforceable due to weak regulatory capacities and illegal land use. A well-designed long-term aid programme to diversify livelihoods and enhance resilience will not achieve its desired outcomes in the face of weak or corrupt local institutions (or local institutions with different priorities), and serviceable institutions in a very poor community can do little with- out positive contributions from outside. In terms of emergency management, this argues for a uniform approach across jurisdictions rather than an approach entirely dependent on local resources and capacities. For example, such communities may not have the resources for basic fire protection, with the result that each fire leaves the community even poorer (Lynn, 2003).
As whole-of-society and whole-of-government problems, emergencies and disasters require connected institutional elements to be linked to policy processes.
Consider some of the case studies from Chapter 1 (see Boxes 1.1 to 1.9).
Dedicated institutions are inadequate: Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans
The emergency management system had rehearsed the event well, but somehow it just did not connect with local realities and vulnerabilities; neither was there adequate information flow for decision-making in the context of the existing system. In practice, there was very limited cooperation between agencies, the three levels of government and major NGO relief groups. Informal connections – the shadow system – did not fill the gap. Some commentators have observed that there was a serious inability to adapt to exceptionally complex circumstances. There is also the issue of what the aim of much of the emergency management system was directed towards – security or relief – and the extent to which this is embedded in the American approach. The US Coast Guard operated effectively in this environment and may provide a useful guide.
Institution of economic recovery leaves many out: The South Asian tsunami
In southern Thailand, the central government’s strategic recovery plan paid special attention to local businesses and to the flows of money that make the local economy vibrant. It did this rather than emphasize highly visible actions, such as the reconstruction of buildings. In doing so, however, it was trapped within the normal institution of economic thinking and ignored the informal or undocumented economy. The informal economy provides employment for some one third to half of the people of southern Thailand, and is how the economy really works for many people. Their livelihood recovery hinges on it.
Changing a fundamental institution: Wildfire safety in Australia The fact that responsibility for many risks is shared is almost orthodoxy in policy documents; however, certain key aspects of emergency management institutions suggest that it may be otherwise. Australian fire authorities have worked to make shared responsibility real through the ‘Stay or Go’ approach (or, more fully, ‘prepare, stay and defend, or leave early’), in which able-bodied residents are encouraged to consider staying with their homes as a wildfire front passes. The approach is based on research showing that most fatalities were due to people being caught in the fire when evacuating late. This is contradictory to the traditional ethos of the emergency service, which is immediate evacuation. It has taken several decades; but the development of a national, more evidence-based, approach to fire management and community safety has led to all fire agencies endorsing ‘prepare, stay and defend, or leave early’.
The current institutional challenge concerns bringing other agencies on board and achieving full implementation.
Incorporating multiple objectives: Flood management in The Netherlands
In The Netherlands, societal institutions dedicated – as the centuries-old dominant national priority – to keeping water out have evolved to accommodate the idea that there could be ‘space for rivers’ and even the sea, on occasions. This reflects changing attitudes and a strong belief reflected in politics that environmental imperatives should be accommodated along with safety. There are substantial financial savings to be derived from this approach as well. It may also be partly a result of the time that has elapsed since the last serious sea flooding during the early 1950s, although the standards of protection are in legislation.