Published by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) President of the Publisher, Editor of the Planning and Coordination Department of the Korean Institute for National Unification. Peacekeeping on the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions / Gabriel Jonsson - Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009.
Acronyms
Purpose
Great emphasis is placed on the influence of the Cold War on the work of the commissions. 3_Foster-Carter, “The Democratic People's Republic of Korea: A History”, in The Far East and Australia 2008 (London: Europa Publications, 2007).
Theoretical Framework
He says: "The more that the articles in play can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost the other, and goods valued more by the other party than they cost the first, the greater the chances of results successful." Negotiations are also influenced by hardness and softness, which is patience and surrender. Neither party to a deal can be completely trustworthy as this would place him at the mercy of the other's deception.
Method
In the case of repeated cases raised in the MAC, the basic arguments are recorded in the text during each relevant period. The author mainly applies a qualitative method to discover the main characteristics of each topic raised, but in the case of recurring issues this method is combined with a quantitative method to discover trends both over a decade and over decades.
Sources
Data on armistice violations are supplemented mainly by publications by South Koreans who served in the MAC, reports by the Swedish NNSC delegation and publications by the Swiss NNSC delegation, most of which are in German. The books issued by the South Korean Ministry of Defense also contain data about the NNSC, but it is more important for information about the work by the MAC.
Organization and Scope
Much attention has been devoted to North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 as one of the most notorious armistice violations. The importance of the work of the MAC and NNSC is assessed, followed by a discussion of peacekeeping on the Korean Peninsula, which includes the question of how to officially end the Korean War.
Korean Names and Terminology
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)” and “The Republic of Korea (ROK)” are used in the literature as well as in this work.
Introduction
The following section focuses on the UNC's 1957 decision to abrogate the non-rearmament agreement, how the decision was implemented, and how it affected the work of the commissions. Finally, attention is paid to the North's demand for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, placed in the MAC and sides.
The Foundation and Organization of the MAC and the NNSC the NNSC
When the Military Ceasefire Commission finds that a violation of this Ceasefire Agreement has occurred, it will immediately report to the commanders of the opposing parties about this violation." Finally,. As a non-signatory to the Armistice Agreement, South Korea did not immediately participate in the MAC.
NNSC Inspections Fail
He points out that "..in the beginning it was very unclear exactly what and where we were going to inspect." The team usually informed one of the helpers that they wanted to make an inspection at a certain time. Försvarets Läromedelscentral (Textbook Center for the [Swedish] National Defense Force) writes (1985): "The southern side reported quickly and probably fairly." On the other hand, it also points out that the Syngman Rhee government from the beginning had a negative attitude towards the NNSC, which it did not consider a neutral organization.
Violations of the Armistice Agreement
When the 81st meeting was held on 27 October, the North argued that the South's claim at the 58th meeting on 29 September that the guard had crossed the MDL. When the 96th meeting was held on December 16, the South denied the North's protest at the 89th meeting of incursions into its airspace. At the 108th meeting on April 16, the South rejected the North's protest against the airstrikes.
At the 143rd meeting held on 18 October, the North refuted the South's protest against airspace violations made during the 139th meeting convened on 6 September.
The NNSC between the Two Camps: “A Mission Impossible”Impossible”
The NNSC ".. was neither neutral (because communist Poland and Czechoslovakia together had half the votes), nor supervisory (because the North Koreans could easily block all relevant access)." On April 15, 1954, the UN commander emphasized in a letter to the KKSHB that the most serious violations of the Armistice Agreement. In contrast, according to Lidin (2007), since NNSC members in the South "..couldn't take a step unsupervised", the situation became the same as in the North.
The opinion was that the "useless northern troops" should withdraw at the same time, but she wanted to preserve the Armistice Agreement.73.
NNSC Inspections End in 1956
General Gard claimed that the NNSC had failed to do its job because of the non-cooperative attitude of the KPA/CPV in the north and the abnormal activities of the Czech and Polish forces in the south. The South responded that the North had obstructed the work of the NNSC and pointed out that it had used the Commission as a measure to cover its ceasefire violations. The withdrawal of the inspection teams both from the north and the south are temporary measures.
The NNSC delegation was not informed of the subsequent talks that took place between Stockholm and Bern.
The UNC Cancels Paragraph 13(d) in 1957
The South pointed out that the North had not reported the introduction of combat assets to the NNSC from the beginning. Eventually the letter was forwarded to the MAC without comment – it said only that the NNSC had “taken note” of the letter received.90. When the KPA/CPV proposed on March 14 that the NNSC should "..monitor and review.." the withdrawal, the Czech member was positive, but the Swedish and Swiss members rejected the proposal.
Despite the difficulties the NNSC had in carrying out its work, when the Commission celebrated its fifth anniversary on August 1, the Polish president emphasized "the important contribution of the Commission.
At the 166th meeting held on November 27, the North claimed that personnel from the South crossed the MDL on November 17 and 20 to conduct espionage. At the 192nd meeting convened on April 21, 1959, the North claimed that on April 4, spies from the South invaded its part of the DMZ, where they were arrested, but the South denied this claim. At the 194th meeting on June 20, the North claimed that spies from the South invaded its territory on June 13, but the South denied the allegations.
Finally, at the 199th meeting held on December 23, the North claimed that on November 29 its civilian police had arrested personnel from the South who were carrying out espionage, but the South denied the claim.95.
The Parties’ Views of the NNSC following the 1956-57 Events 1956-57 Events
In his report to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from May–October 1958, Brigadier General Carl Reuterswärd wrote that the KPA/CPV, Czech and Polish members of the NNSC whenever possible emphasized the Commission's contributions to ensuring peace and stability. Both the UNC/MAC and the South Korean government, despite the view that the Commission had almost no real function, probably felt that its mere existence indicated that the Armistice Agreement remained in force and that its continued work was desirable. Ångström wrote (1959) that the UNC, the KPA/CPV and the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC “pointed out that simply .
That the NNSC had little to do was a good sign and proof that the level of tension should not be overstated.
Conclusions
The South viewed the NNSC as an obstacle to rearmament, making it militarily inferior to the North. The Commission's work was often hampered by the internal divisions between Czechoslovakia and Poland in the north and Sweden and Switzerland in the south. Due to the difficulties for the NNSC to carry out its work, the South had proposed dissolution as early as 1954.
From 1957 onwards, South Korea, which had not signed the armistice agreement for fear that it would perpetuate national divisions but had agreed to comply with it, viewed the NNSC as a body contributing to securing peace, like the So did UNC.
Introduction
Data on ceasefire violations are also recorded in the analysis of the NNSC's work, although in more general terms than in Sections 3.3-3.5. The account mainly analyzes how these events were handled in the MAC and, in the Pueblo case, through negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Since the Pueblo incident is one of the most studied ceasefire violations, the account focuses on its main characteristics, but places more emphasis than usual on the role of the NNSC during the crisis.
The impact on US-North Korea, US-South Korea, and inter-Korean relations is included in the analysis.
Rearmaments and Withdrawal of American Troops raised in the MACraised in the MAC
North Korea's harsh policy towards South Korea, the strengthening of the US-South Korean alliance due to the South Korean army's participation in the Vietnam War, and the modernization of the South's armed forces caused increasing military tension on the Korean Peninsula. At the 131st meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on November 29, the North claimed that they had been working for a peaceful solution to the Korean problem. The South claimed that the North had begun to rearm immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement in the form of entirely new weapons as well as offensive weapons and referred to its annulment of Article 13(d) in 1957.
At the 122nd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV on July 19, 1960, the North requested an immediate withdrawal of troops.
Armistice Violations on Land
At the 252nd meeting on December 11, the South denied the North's protest against a shooting incident in the DMZ made at the 251st meeting on October 27. When the 179th Plenary Assembly proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on November 16, 1963, the South accused the North. At the 318th Secretary Meeting on August 12, the South refuted the North's protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ.
UNC/MAC described subversion, terrorism, kidnappings, thefts and murders by North Korean commandos.
Repatriation of Military Personnel
UNC/MAC demanded the return of the pilots and North Korea wanted an apology. At the 160th MAC meeting convened by the UNC/MAC and held on November 29, 1962, the South presented hand grenade fragments as evidence of the attack and protested the action. The UNC rejected the North Korean version and stated that it would unilaterally submit its evidence to the MAC.
The UNC allowed a North Korean task force to cross the MDL to retrieve the soldiers' bodies and the North Korean JOT to monitor the work.
Armistice Violations at Sea and in the Air
The North criticized South Korea at the 124th meeting at the request of the KPA/CPV that met on August 3 over an incident on July 30 when the South Navy ship K.E. KPA/CPV met on August 5, 1966, and the North claimed that on July 29, the Confederate naval destroyer No. The South stated that the incident was being investigated and that the North would do so as well.
At the 155th meeting convened by the KPA/CPV convened on August 29, the North claimed that the South had hijacked fishing boats on August 7, but the South denied the claim.
