Acronyms
2.9 The Parties’ Views of the NNSC following the 1956-57 Events 1956-57 Events
As we have seen, South Korea had originally showed a negative attitude towards the NNSC. However, Colonel Bo Benckert, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, wrote in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from November 1956-March 1957 that at a reception he had spoken with the South Korean Defence Minister who was very positive towards the Swedish contribution. Colonel Tore Wigforss wrote in his report from March-November 1957 that in July 1957, the South Korean Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Jae Hung Yu, had expressed his appreciation of Sweden’s contribution to the NNSC to the Swedish delegate. In his view, a probable contributory factor to the changed opinion was the Swedish-Swiss joint policy to oppose the Czech-Polish attempts to make the NNSC condemn the South’s cancellation of Paragraph 13(d), as described above.
Previously, there had been hardly any contacts between the Swedish NNSC delegation and South Korean officers, but in July 1957 the whole Swedish and Swiss delegations were invited to a dinner held in Seoul by the South Korean Chief of Army. In October the same year, the Heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations were invited to Taegu as guests of the South Korean government and army. Besides writing that both parties wanted the NNSC to remain, not least since its presence symbolised that the Armistice Agreement was still in force, Wigforss pointed out that the knowledge that there is a neutral commission within the area that would become the first war zone if hostilities were renewed was a restraining factor for any aggressor. He also notes that a reason for the North to maintain the Commission may
have been that it could be used as a propaganda platform to reach out to world opinion.
His successor, Brigadier-General Sven Tilly, wrote in his report to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from November 1957-May 1958 that on December 27, 1957, President Syngman Rhee’s organ The Korean Republic officially confirmed South Korea’s positive attitude towards the Swedish and Swiss work in the NNSC through the editorial headline “Friends of Freedom.”96 This re-evaluation of the NNSC is striking.
Tilly also wrote that KPA/CPV members unofficially on several occasions had expressed their appreciation of the NNSC and said that it was the only obstacle to the outbreak of a new war. The UNC had roughly the same opinion but restrained itself to mentioning the Swedish-Swiss contribution as a peace-keeping factor and an obstacle to using the NNSC as a propaganda platform. Both sides often invited each other to parties and entertainment. Study tours and excursions were made in both Koreas, but some official and semi-official visits had already taken place between March-November 1957. Considering the writing “Contacts away from the bargaining table in a relaxed atmosphere may contribute to the creation of good working relations”
quoted in the Introduction (p. 6), such contacts were probably im- portant to ease tension and secure peace.
In 1958, visits to South Korea by the Swedish and Swiss dele- gations included Ihwa Women’s University, Seoul National University, art exhibitions and palaces and temples in Seoul. Swedish members
96_Benckert, op. cit., p. 8; Tilly, op. cit., pp. 0, 8; Wigforss, op. cit., pp. 0, 7, 9-10. Tilly records the editorial in Swedish on pp. 8-9.
were also invited to get some orientation about the military. In South Korea it was possible to travel freely without permission and escort, but in North Korea NNSC representatives were always escorted by armed personnel and could only talk with official people. Tilly noted that it was evident in P’yôngyang, particularly at the War Museum which stressed American soldiers’ atrocities, that the propaganda created hatred. He pointed out that the impression from the museum was very depressing, but also that at present both sides considered the NNSC to be the major factor contributing to peace. In his words, “The NNSC work is not burdensome, but very responsible.”
In his report to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from May-October 1958, Brigadier-General Carl Reuterswärd wrote that the KPA/CPV, the Czech and Polish NNSC members whenever possible emphasized the Commission’s contributions to secure peace and stability. Even the UNC/MAC and South Korean authorities, despite realizing that the NNSC had no real function, presumably considered that the Commission, through its mere presence, was a sign that the Armistice Agreement remained in force and wanted it to remain. He expresses the opinion that the NNSC as a symbol probably still fulfilled a task. In his report from October 1958-March 1959, Brigadier- General Allan Edebäck expressed the same view.97 The repeated positive evaluations imply that the NNSC enjoyed trust and credibility that
97_Edebäck, op. cit., p. 10; Reuterswärd, op. cit., pp. 7, 8; Tilly, ibid., pp. 7, 9, 10;
Wigforss, ibid., p. 8. It is clear from consecutive reports by the Swedish NNSC delegation that Swedish and Swiss members regularly continued to make rather similar tours to both Koreas until the early 1990s but Czech and Polish members did not visit South Korea outside the DMZ until the 1980s. The tours almost certainly promoted peace by enhancing understanding and developing working personal relationships.
were lacking in the MAC (cf. p. 97).
While positive notions of the NNSC were expressed, during May-October 1958 infiltration attempts over the MDL by agents from both sides reportedly took place at least twice a week. These incidents were investigated by Joint Observer Teams (JOT:s) dispatched by the MAC. [Non-defined] acts of violence and shooting within the DMZ investigated by the JOTs were estimated to take place on average once a month, but the investigations rarely brought any results; the North’s team members denied the most obvious facts. They often claimed that an act of violence which the South on good grounds had accused the North of being responsible for was an act of provocation from the South.
Between October 1958 and March 1959 [non-defined] acts of violations and shootings within the DMZ that were investigated by JOTs were estimated to occur on average once a month, but again investigations seldom brought any results since the North’s team members often denied the most evident facts. From March-December 1959 South Korean agents were reportedly active in the North. The South accused the North of having built fortifications in a certain defined area within the DMZ, but the South was not allowed to inspect it. It also accused the North of having fired at an American military airplane over the East Sea and of having placed floating mines along the South Korean coast, but the North denied any knowledge in both cases.98 Clearly, the zero-sum game continued. That incidents were repeatedly raised reconfirms that the war had only been replaced by
98_Edebäck, ibid., p. 7; Reuterswärd, ibid., p. 4; Ångström, op. cit., p. 3. Original quotation marks.
negative peace.
The defection from North Korea in the vicinity of Panmunjom on October 17, 1958, by a guard, Kim Yông-ch’ôl, who fled after having shot his superior officer with a pistol caused a dispute. The South’s suggestion in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 27, to dispatch a JOT was rejected. At the 185th MAC se- cretary meeting held on October 20, North Korea remained silent. On October 21, it confessed that its investigation had shown that the guard during ordinary service had shot three times at ‘a moving body that could not be confirmed’ and said that guards had been requested to pay appropriate attention to prevent a recurrence. Consequently, the North asked why a joint investigation should be needed. No reference was made to the defection. The South’s proposal in ac- cordance with the Armistice Agreement to jointly report to the MAC was rejected; there was no obligation to jointly convey the findings made by one side.
Although an article published on April 20, 1959 in The Korea Times contained critical statements about North Korea made by a Swiss NNSC member after a study tour to P’yôngyang, no con- troversial issues were discussed within the NNSC during March- December; meetings were routine. Czechoslovakia and Poland pointed out the negative views expressed at one meeting. The Swiss member explained that his delegation rejected the article and that the member had to take his own responsibility: the statement should not harm the whole group. The Swedish member briefly regretted the incident.
Another incident took place when a Czech professor in an article in the North Korean press had “cited” statements which the Swedish and Swiss delegates he had met at a party arranged by the Czech NNSC
delegation had not made. The statements were rejected as groundless.
Both sides regretted that the article had been published. Owing to these two incidents, North Korea cancelled study tours to P’yôngyang.
Meanwhile, the NNSC continued to send monthly reports to the MAC based on data provided by both sides on the rotation of personnel and, in the case of the KPA/CPV, also on combat material.99
Between May-October 1958, the KPA/CPV as well as the Czech and Polish NNSC members repeatedly emphasized the role of the Commission to preserve peace and stability in the Korean peninsula (cf. pp. 29-30, 68, 87, 97, 105). Even the UNC/MAC and the South Korean government, in spite of the opinion that the Commission hardly had any real function, probably considered that its mere existence emphasized that the Armistice Agreement remained in force and that continuation of its work was desirable. Since the NNSC, following the suspension of Paragraph 13(d) on June 21, 1957, was no longer a stumbling block for rearmaments by the UNC and the South Korean government, the South came to regard the Commission as a useful body. In addition, the South feared that a dissolution would be a propaganda victory for the North. The NNSC became a symbol of peace and its presence a stabilizing factor between two armies ready to fight. Remarkably, in spring 1959, President Syngman Rhee recognized in an interview with Radio Lausanne the work of Sweden and Switzerland in the NNSC.
Ångström wrote (1959) that the UNC, the KPA/CPV and the Czech and Polish NNSC members “emphasized that the mere
99_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 27; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op.
cit., p. 31; Lee, op. cit., 2001 (a), pp. 205-206; Ångström, ibid., pp. 4, 5, 6. Original quotation marks.
existence of a neutral commission within the demilitarized zone is a factor promoting peace.” Without the NNSC, hostilities between the parties could cause open violations over the border far more serious than the armistice violations that did take place. In other words, the Commission still had a task to fulfill. That the NNSC had little to do was a good sign and evidence that the degree of tension should not be overvalued. During September-December 1959, Swedish and Swiss members made around ten study tours arranged by the South Korean liaison officer to, for instance, the High Court, National Museum and universities as well as to cement and textile factories. In contrast, contacts with North Korea were limited to the KPA/CPV Senior Member and his staff. Such contacts had gradually decreased and were in the autumn of 1959 limited to official welcome and farewell parties.
Owing to the reorganization of the Swedish delegation, it was further reduced in November 1959 to nine men. The other NNSC delegations were also reduced whereas the Swiss delegation had nine members in December, and Czechoslovakia and Poland had ten each (cf. pp. 26, 81, 88).100