Acronyms
2.4 Violations of the Armistice Agreement
North Korea clearly violated the Armistice Agreement by severely restricting the inspection teams’ work, but the UNC also violated it.
Already at the third MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 30, it was agreed that military police should be used in the DMZ instead of civilian police who in contrast, are, as we have seen, per- mitted according to Paragraph 10. At the fourth meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on July 31, it was agreed “... that civil police would be armed only with rifles and pistols” but automatic rifles were not included. Subsequently, both sides began continuously to bring in so-called DMZ police to the zone. They were not police but combat personnel wearing armbands; in the end, the DMZ came to lose its real meaning. Later, combat soldiers also entered the zone. According to the South Korean scholar Seong Ho Jhe (1997), immediately after the
32_Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999), p. 106; Lee, ibid., 1998(a), p. 7.
armistice North Korea began to build a second iron railing fence south of the zone’s northern boundary to gain even an inch of land and to occupy favourable heights in case of sudden attacks. This was done in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 3 that defines the northern and southern boundaries of the zone.33
Militarization could not be legally prevented; whereas the Armistice Agreement defines the obligation of general demilitarization, there are no concrete provisions prohibiting the installation of military facilities in the DMZ. The borderline between what is allowed and what is forbidden is thus unclear: many combat campsites, concrete barriers and the like have been established. Both parties claimed at the July 31 fourth MAC meeting that the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(a), requiring the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from the DMZ, except as otherwise provided, within 72 hours after the agreement became effective was followed. However, according to Jhe (2000), such hazards to the safe movement of MAC personnel as demolitions, minefields and barbed-wire entanglements were not, as stipulated, removed from the DMZ within 45 days after the 72-hour period had ended. In contrast, Lee (2001b) writes that both sides withdrew all the hazards.
33_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 3, 10; Jhe, “Pimujang chidaenae-ûi p’yônghwa kujo pangan,” Kukpang nonjip 38 (Summer 1997), p. 136: op. cit., 2000, p. 78; Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2001, pp. 271, 272; Lee, ibid., 1998(a), p. 15. The agreements reached at the July 30 and July 31, 1953, MAC meetings are recorded in Korean by Kim (op. cit., 2006, p. 33). The only comparable reference to the DMZ the author has seen is in Mueller-Lhotska and Millett (op. cit., p. vi). Professor (and Colonel) Allan R. Millett writes that the only similar border he had seen after the
“Iron Curtain” between the two Germanys disappeared, was on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel.
Mohn (1961) records, although without giving any details, that hundreds of violations of the Armistice Agreement, almost exclusively flights over the other side’s territory, took place during his time in office in July 1953-May 1954 but hardly any were admitted. The absence of an impartial referee in the MAC contributed to this pattern.
The retired South Korean General Lee Sanghee (2007) points out the absence of an institutional mechanism in the Armistice Agreement to determine violations and to deter or rectify them as a limitation of the agreement. Yet Mohn emphasizes in the first evaluation the author has seen of the MAC that it has succeeded better than expected in main- taining peace, mainly thanks to the DMZ that reduced the possibilities for frictions and misunderstandings.34
Unlike Mohn, studies by the South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1993) and Joint Intelligence Headquarters (1999) record that other kinds of violations also took place. Already at the second MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 29, the North pro- tested that immediately after the armistice had entered into force on July 27, the South had fired automatic weapons and cannons against the North. On July 28, military airplanes had intruded into the North’s airspace three times. At the third meeting convened on July 30, the North protested that a military airplane had violated its airspace and pursued reconnaissance activities on July 29. Also when the fourth meeting was held on July 31, the North complained about the South’s
34_Columbia University, ibid., Paragraph 13(a); Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 9; Jhe, ibid., 2000, pp. 79-80, 82: “Chôngjôn hyôpchông-e kwanhan yôn’gu - kinûng chôngsanghwa-mith silhyosông hwakbo pangan-ûl chungsim-ûro,”
Chôllyak yôn’gu 11, no. 1 (2004), p. 100; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), p. 100; Lee, op. cit., May 2, 2007, p. 6; Mohn, op. cit., p. 328.
reconnaissance flights by one airplane in the DMZ on two occasions.
Later, at the seventh meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 4, the South submitted a written reply of its investigations of the protests against armistice violations up to July 31. That neither of the studies record the contents should indicate that the accusations were refuted. On the other hand, at the eighth meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on August 5, the South for the first time admitted a violation, apologized and promised to punish those responsible after the North had complained that 34 cleaners had crossed the MDL (no.
1). The North also protested that an airplane from the South had flown in the vicinity of Kaesông on August 3.35
At the ninth meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on August 8, the North complained that four military airplanes between August 4 and 6 on seven occasions had violated its airspace. The North made its first admission of a violation; the South asserted that on August 6 two of seven unarmed workers, while removing communication lines, had by mistake crossed the MDL (no. 1). The North expressed regret but also pointed out that on August 7 two jeeps from the South had entered into its territory close to Panmunjom. The South admitted the incident (no. 2). It also stated that the cleaners who had crossed the MDL had received “appropriate punishment” [but how is not recorded]. In fact, the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13, prescribes
35_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 7, 8, 9, 11; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 21, 22, 23, 24, 478. For the sake of convenience, admissions made are onwards recorded by (no. ). Violations claimed by both parties against the Armistice Agreement, 1953-1994, types of violations against the Armistice Agreement claimed by the KPA/CPV against the UNC 1953-1993, and types of violations against the Armistice Agreement claimed by the UNC against the KPA/CPV, 1953-1991, are recorded in Appendix V-VII, pp. 664-671.
that “...the Commanders of the opposing sides shall...” (e): “Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this armistice agreement are adequately punished.”
When the eleventh meeting requested by the UNC/MAC took place on August 13, the South announced that the outcome of its investigation was that the claims made by the North at the July 29 and August 5 meetings of shootings and violating airspace, respectively, were groundless. At the 12th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 19, the South admitted the introduction of two M-1 guns into the DMZ raised by the North at the previous meeting (no. 3). [Non-exemplified] punishment had been enforced. At the 15th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on August 28, the South, with regard to the August 8 meeting, admitted that one of its planes had violated the North’s airspace (no. 4).36 Within a month after the armistice had been signed, the North had admitted one violation and the South four violations.
In 1953, incidents were also raised at MAC secretary meetings.
At the 29th meeting held on August 25, the South admitted the protests made by the North on August 13 and 21 at the 17th and 25th meetings against crossings over the MDL and noted that the per- petrators had been imprisoned (no. 5). In contrast, the North denied the South’s accusation of crossings over the MDL raised on August 20 at the 24th meeting. When the 31st meeting took place on August 27, the North denied the South’s protest against border crossings from August 25. At the 43rd meeting convened on September 10, the South
36_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(e); Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 11-12, 13, 14; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 24, 25, 478.
asserted that its investigation of the North’s accusation of intrusions by fighter planes of its airspace at the 34th meeting held on August 31 had concluded that they were untrue, but it admitted the crossings of the MDL by military personnel raised at the 42nd meeting convened on September 9 (no. 6). When the 53rd meeting took place on September 23, the South admitted the North’s protest made at the 42nd meeting convened on September 9 that guards had crossed the MDL (no. 7). At the 54th meeting held on September 24, the South claimed that its investigation of the North’s protest against intrusions by fighter planes at the 19th meeting convened on August 15 had shown that they were false.
When the 57th meeting was held on September 28, the South admitted the North’s protest against an intrusion of its airspace by a fighter plane made at the 17th MAC plenary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on September 7 (no. 8). At the 65th secretary meeting held on October 8, the South asserted that its investigation of the North’s claim at the 45th meeting convened on September 12 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace had concluded that it was false. When the 74th meeting took place on October 19, the South claimed that its investigation of the North’s claim at the 66th meeting held on October 9 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace showed that it was incorrect. At the 79th meeting convened on October 24, the South asserted that its investigation of the North’s claim at the 69th meeting held on October 13 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace concluded that it was false. When the 81st meeting took place on October 27, the North asserted that the South’s claim at the 58th meeting held on September 29 that a guard had crossed the MDL
showed that it was not correct.37 Although there were many denials, the South again admitted four violations. The number indicates that Mohn’s evaluation was not entirely correct.
Airspace intrusions were repeatedly raised in late 1953. At the 84th meeting held on October 30, the South asserted that its investi- gation of the North’s claim at the 69th and 74th meetings convened on October 13 and 17, respectively, that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace showed that it was false. When the 86th meeting took place on November 3, the South claimed that its investigation of the North’s protest at the 73rd meeting held on October 17 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace concluded that it was incorrect.
At the 89th meeting held on November 16, the South asserted that its investigation of the North’s protest at the 77th meeting held on October 22 of intrusions into its airspace showed that it was not correct. When the 92nd meeting took place on November 23, the South claimed that its investigation of the North’s protest at the 76th meeting convened on October 21 of intrusions into its airspace concluded that it was false.
At the 93rd meeting held on November 30, the UNC/MAC asserted that its investigation of the North’s protest at the 89th meeting of intrusions into its airspace by a military fighter plane showed that it was incorrect. When the 96th meeting took place on December 16, the South denied the North’s protest made at the 89th meeting of intrusions into its airspace. The North admitted at the 97th meeting convened on December 23 the South’s protest made at the 29th MAC plenary meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 21 (no.2).
37_Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 27, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259. What party called the meetings is not recorded.
On November 16, a North Korean company officer equipped with a pistol had crossed the MDL into the camp of India’s contingent of the custodian forces, where weapons were prohibited.38 The South asserted that its investigation of the North’s protest made at the 88th meeting convened on November 11 that a military plane had intruded into its airspace showed that it was incorrect. At the 98th meeting held on December 30, the South denied the North’s protest at the 93rd meeting convened on November 30 against airspace intrusions.39 In contrast to the above, only one admission was made in late 1953.
Armistice violations continued to be raised at MAC plenary meetings. At the 30th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on November 28, the North protested that the South, on November 16, had fired trench mortars into the northern part of the DMZ. The South refuted the protest by claiming that the joint investigation had shown that shells had exploded by the forces of water and air, which was not an armistice violation. At the 33rd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on December 18, the South refuted the North’s claim that three KPA soldiers who had defected through Panmunjom three months after the armistice was signed were detained by force. On November 19, when the 91st MAC secretary meeting took place, the soldiers had requested protection, which they were provided with.
38_India was chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in charge of repatriating prisoners of war in which also Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland participated. Repatriation of 22,000 prisoners began in September 1953. The NNRC was dissolved on February 22, 1954. From Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 51(b); Downs, op. cit., p. 90; Reuterswärd, “NNRC - Vad var det?: Repatrieringskommissionen i Korea 1953-54,” Yoboseyo (December 1975), no. 4, pp. 13, 15, 17.
39_Downs, op. cit., p. 103; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 32, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 479.
The North claimed that they had defected due to being absent without leave and requested their return, but the South refused; the soldiers had participated on the South Korean side in the war but had been imprisoned and forced to join the KPA.
The South admitted the North’s protest against the crossing of the MDL on December 12 by a soldier equipped with a camera and mentioned that the violator had been reprehended [but how is not recorded; no. 9]. The North pointed out that this intrusion violated the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 7, which states that no one is allowed to cross the MDL without permission from the MAC. It also violated Paragraph 9, which only permits persons working in “...civil administration and relief” and who are “...specifically authorized...” by the MAC to enter the DMZ. At the 35th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 10, 1954, the North protested that 302 planes had violated the North’s airspace up to the end of 1953. The South claimed that among the 116 cases raised up to January 3, 12 took place due to non-attention, 95 were groundless and nine were under investigation. When the 37th meeting called by the UNC/MAC took place on January 23, the South claimed that among 130 cases of airspace violations, 116 were false while 14 were admitted.40 Although the level of admissions was only ten percent, the fact that the South made incomparably more admissions than the North remained.
At the 42nd meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on May 13, 1954, the North protested that three officers from Colombia had crossed the MDL on May 11 in violation of Paragraph 7 and 9 and
40_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 7, 9; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 24, 25, 26, 27; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 32, 33-5, 479;
Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 206.
taken photos.41 The South admitted the violation at the 43rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 22 and claimed that [non- identified] “appropriate measures” had been taken against the officers, who had crossed due to non-attention (no. 10). At the 44th meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on July 14, the South protested against the North having fired automatic weapons at a civilian police patrol boat in the DMZ on the Han River estuary on July 7. The North asserted that a first joint observation team (JOT) had concluded that the accusation was groundless. The South rejected, on the basis of a JOT investigation, the claim that two members of the Counter Intelligence Corps had on June 1 intruded into the North’s territory.
When the 45th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on August 3, the North claimed that on July 29 two armed soldiers had crossed the MDL, shot at its civilian police and wounded one, but the South claimed that investigations made by a second JOT showed that there was insufficient evidence. At the 48th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on October 6, the North claimed that three American intelligence officers had on August 11 made an armed attack across the MDL. One of them was killed. The South claimed that a JOT investigation had concluded that there was insufficient evidence.42 Clearly, the meetings increasingly developed into a “zero-sum game”
41_Colombia was one of the 16 allied nations that contributed troops to the UNC during the war. The other were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. From Kim, op. cit., 2006, pp. 3, 6. For data on their contributions see Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu,
“Purok III. Han’gukchôn ch’amjônguk sogae,” in Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op.
cit., 2006, pp. 52-60.
42_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 31-2, 33, 34, 36; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 38, 39, 40, 41.
and the number of admissions fell markedly.
Also in 1954, violations were raised at MAC secretary meetings.
At the 99th meeting held on January 5, the South declared that the North’s protest at the 96th meeting convened on December 16 against airspace intrusions was groundless. At the 108th meeting held on April 16, the South denied the North’s protest against air intrusions. In contrast, when the 110th meeting took place on May 4, the South admitted the North’s protest at the 106th meeting held on March 19 against border crossings by military police (no. 11). At the 113th meeting held on June 18, the North criticized the South for denying the intrusion into its airspace on May 18 which had been protested at the 111th meeting held on May 19. But when the 116th meeting took place on September 15, the South admitted protests from the North against violations of its airspace on three occasions (no. 12).
At the 117th meeting held on September 29, the South denied the North’s charge that its civilian police had kidnapped and detained personnel working with border markers along the MDL. In contrast, at the 119th meeting convened on November 1, the South admitted one of the 16 cases of airspace violations that the North had charged at the 116th meeting held on September 15 (no. 13). At the 122nd meeting held on December 21, the North denied the South’s protest at the 121st meeting convened on December 15 that civilian police had threatened personnel from the South’s joint observer teams. At the 123rd, 124th and 127th meetings convened on January 3, January 21 and February 14, 1955, the parties accused each other of airspace violations.43 Notably, more admissions were made at the secretary
43_Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272.