Acronyms
2.2 The Foundation and Organization of the MAC and the NNSC the NNSC
The Korean War ended with an Armistice Agreement signed by General Nam Il for both the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) and Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr. for the UNC on July 27, 1953. The UNC was founded on July 24, 1950, on the basis of the July 7 UN Security Council re- solution to integrate the UN combat units into one organization. Pre- viously, on July 15, South Korea had transferred operational com- mand to the US. While North Korea argues that it is an agreement signed with the US which had capitulated to the North, it is in reality an agreement signed by military commanders.10
10_Columbia University, Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement; Frisk, “NNSC:s arbete på gränsen mellan Nordoch Sydkorea,” lecture at Stockholm University, November 22, 2006; Kim, “Yuengun saryôngbu (UNC),” in Hapch’am chôngbo
Although the signing of the Armistice Agreement should have caused joy and optimism, the author has found two cautious state- ments made by high-ranking American officers at this time. Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor; Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, declared: “There is no occasion for celebration or boisterous conduct. We are faced with the same enemy, only a short distance away, and must be ready for any move he makes.” General Mark Clark, one of the cosigners, stated after having signed:
“I cannot find it in me to exalt in this hour. Rather, it is a time for prayer, that we may succeed in our difficult endeavor to turn this Armistice to the advantage of mankind. If we extract hope from this occasion, it must be diluted with recognition that our salvation requires unrelaxing vigilance and effort.”11
The South Korean President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) had opposed any armistice which would leave Chinese Communists in northern Korea. The Swiss Colonel Urs Alfred Mueller-Lhotska, who served in the Swiss NNSC Delegation 1994-96, writes (1997): “If necessary, he was even ready to continue fighting alone against North Korea.” Since the South Korean government regarded the Armistice Agreement as a perpetuation of national division, it refused to sign.
ponbu, Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p’yôllam: che 7 chip (2004-2006), 2006, p. 3; Pak,
“Nambuk p’yônghwa hyôpchông-gwa Hanbando p’yônghwa,” in Han’guk inkwôn chaedan, Hanbando p’yônghwa-nûn kanûnghan ga?: Hanbando anbo chilsô-ûi chônhwan-gwa p’yônghwa ch’eje-ûi mosaek (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an arûk’e, 2004), pp.
226, 231-2. The July 7, 1950, UN Security Council resolution is recorded in Jhe, Hanbando p’yônghwa ch’eje-ûi mosaek, 2000, p. 458 (English) and p. 459 (Korean).
11_Kirkbride, Panmunjom: Facts About the Korean DMZ (New Jersey and Seoul: Hollym International Corp., 2006), p. 87; TI & E Office of the Support Group, UNC MAC, APO 72, The Team Behind the Armistice: the story of The Support Group, UNC MAC (Tokyo: Daito Art Printing Co., n.d.).
However, following strong pressure from the US, South Korea de- clared that it would agree to the agreement and observe it on condition of signing a mutual defence treaty and the provision of economic and military assistance. According to Mr. Sven Julin, Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation March 1998-June 1999 (2000), it was a major mis- take by South Korea not to sign since it led North Korea to believe that the South was unwilling to bring the war completely to an end.12
The Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 1, stipulates the establish- ment of a Military Demarcation Line (MDL). A Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) would be established through the withdrawal of both sides two kilometres from this line which, in 2003, was marked with 1,292 signs at intervals of 500 metres along the 250-kilometre-long zone. The DMZ shall serve “...as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.” Paragraph 6 states: “Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone.” Paragraph 10 does not allow more than 1,000 persons to enter either side of the zone at any one time “...for the conduct of civil administration and relief...” Also, “The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission.”13
A Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was set up “...to super-
12_Jhe, Hanbando p’yônghwa ch’eje-ûi mosaek, 2000, p. 33: fn. 21; Julin, “NNSC och dess förändrade roll under 1990-talet,” lecture at Stockholm University, March 22, 2000; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, Swiss Mission to Korea in the Change of Times 1953-1997 (Zurich and Prague: Transslawia, 1997), pp. vii, 17-18. The Heads of the NNSC delegations are recorded in pp. 689-695.
13_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 1, 6, 10; Ha, “Chôngjôn hyôpchông ch’eje-wa yuensa-ûi yôkhal,” Chônsa 5 (2003.6), no. 5, p. 2; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, ibid., p. 54.
vise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.” The MAC shall “supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary” through its ten Joint Observer Teams. The teams “... shall be composed of not less than four nor more than six officers of field grade...,” half of which shall be appointed by the Commanders of each side. The MAC “...is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone and in the Han River Estuary” on condition that “...not more than half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.”
The MAC “...is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and in- spections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.” Also,
“When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.” Finally,
“When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.”
The MAC shall have ten senior officers, five of whom to be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC and five jointly by the Supreme Commander of the KPA and the Commander of the CPV.
Three of the five members from each side should “...be of general of
flag rank.” The other two “... members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.” As a Com- mission comprised of hostile parties, the MAC does not have a chair- man. The UNC established its headquarter in Tokyo on July 24, 1950, but it was moved to Seoul on July 1, 1957, to be able to implement its tasks more efficiently.14
Between December 1953 and 1964, the UNC/MAC consisted of two American generals and one each from South Korea, the United Kingdom and Thailand. As a non-signatory of the Armistice Agree- ment, South Korea did not immediately participate in the MAC.
However, since the US government and the UNC requested South Korea to take part in the MAC at a time when it handled such post-war issues as dealing with displaced people and excavating corpses, a South Korean representative was dispatched on December 20, 1953.
An army general took part in the Commission on March 3, 1954, replacing one of the original three American generals.
In order to reduce the American dominance and to respond to North Korean criticism of the US in the MAC, since June 1964 the UNC/MAC has had one American major general as Senior Member, one major general and one brigadier general each from South Korea, one British brigadier and one colonel from the UNC Liaison Group consisting of the Philippines and Thailand. The KPA/CPV originally had three North Korean and two Chinese officers, but since late 1954 there have been four North Korean officers and one Chinese officer. In 1985, the KPA/CPV consisted of one KPA major general as Senior
14_Columbia University, ibid., Paragraph 19, 20, 23(a), (b), 24, 25(b), (d), (e), 26, 27, 28, 29, 30; Kim, “1960 nyôndae kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe-wa ‘chôngjôn ch’eje,’”
Yôksa-wa hyônsil 50 (2003), p. 169; Kim, op. cit., 2006, p. 3.
Member, one KPA and one CPV major general each and two KPA senior colonels. In 2000, the UNC/MAC consisted of two American and two South Korean officers each, one British national and on a rotation basis one representative from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Philli- pines or Thailand. In 2006, New Zealand and Turkey also supplied representatives to the MAC on a rotation basis.15
A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was esta- blished “...to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.” The MAC shall in turn “Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.” The NNSC shall also:
“Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections pro- vided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any
15_Försvarets Läromedelscentral, Historik över de neutrala ländernas övervakning- skommission i Korea (Försvarets Läromedelscentral, n.p.,1985), p. 19; Ha, op. cit., pp. 41, 43; Julin, op. cit.; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 171; Kim, op. cit., 2006, p. 4; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 220.
secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.”16
Paragraph 13(c) prohibits “...the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel ...” But “...replacements of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea...” are permitted. “Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis.” The rotation policy permits “...no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service...” to enter into either North or South Korea in any month. In addition:
“Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.”17
The ports of entry are in the North, Sinûiju, Ch’ôngjin, Hûngnam, Manp’o and Sinanju and in the South, Inch’ôn, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnûng and Kunsan. Paragraph 43 states that the teams “shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).”
According to Time (March 1955), during the armistice talks a much debated issue was how to enforce the truce terms that banned any rearmaments. The UN proposed “...that neutral truce teams have
16_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 25(g), 36, 41, 42(c).
17_Columbia University, ibid., Paragraph 13(c).
the right to inspect any place in Korea at any time by land or air.”
However, since the Communists refused to permit free inspection, truce teams could only operate at five check points on each side which the parties chose themselves.
Paragraph 13(d) prohibits:
“...the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are dest- royed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.”18
In order to justify such replacements, “...reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC and the NNSC; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced.” The NNSC shall through its Inspection Teams “...conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition auth- orized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.”
The NNSC shall have four senior officers, two to be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the UNC, that is, Sweden and Switzer- land, and two by the neutral nations nominated by the KPA/CPV, that is, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term “neutral nations” refers to
“...those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea” (but Sweden had supported the South with a field
18_Columbia University, ibid., Paragraph 13(d), 43; Time, “End of a Farce,” March 14, 1955 (http://www. time.com/time/magazine/article/article/0.9171.807074.00.html);
Mohn, Krumelur i tidens marginal (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1961), p. 330.
hospital). To implement its tasks, the NNSC shall be “...provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams...”
Each team would have four officers, half of which from each side.19 The MAC shall “Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of Pan- munjom...” whereas the NNSC shall “Locate its headquarters in pro- ximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.”
Panmunjom had been the name of a village, located along the main highway to Kaesông and P’yôngyang, where the armistice was negotiated (reportedly due to the Chinese participation, the original name Nôlmulli became in Chinese characters Panmunjom). It was located in North Korea’s part of the DMZ when the MDL was drawn and the building where the armistice was signed remains. Since the UNC repeatedly requested a relocation of the MAC conference site on the MDL, North Korea finally agreed to relocate it 800 metres away to Kanman-dong village, located astride the MDL.
The official name of the MAC conference area is the Joint Security Area (JSA). It is about 800 metres in diameter but is far better known as Panmunjom (as it is generally called in this book). The JSA was established on the basis of “The Agreement of the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Area, Its Security and Its Con- struction” approved at the 25th MAC meeting called by the UNC/
MAC, held on October 19, 1953. Security of the JSA shall be guarded by both sides but “...the total number of security personnel from each side” shall “...not exceed five (5) officers and thirty (30) enlisted men at any time.” The MDL runs across the JSA, including the buildings of the MAC and the NNSC where the conference tables are symbolically
19_Columbia University, ibid., Paragraph 13(d), 37, 40(a), (b); Julin, op. cit.
divided into two halves by the borderline, that is, microphone cables.
Panmunjom is often referred to as “the symbol of national division.” As Panmunjom has served since 1953 as a place for contacts between North and South Korea, it is also labelled “a spot for dialogue.”20 In the author’s experience from visits in 1984 and 2006, Panmunjom is the only place in South Korea where it is possible to feel the tension created by the division.