Acronyms
3.4 Repatriation of Military Personnel
As mentioned on p. 55, repatriation of military personnel who had crossed the MDL first took place in 1954, when a precedent for the return was established. The issue became far more complicated after September 5, 1962, when a fight broke out during a Ch’usôk (fall
126_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, p. 261; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, p. 154; Sergel, ibid., March 31, 1969, pp. 3, 15-16: ibid., April 30, 1969, pp.
11-12.
harvest holiday) celebration. According to Downs (1999) and Lee (2001a), six North Korean soldiers approached South Korean soldiers at the MDL and asked them to join their party. This experiment in fraternal commemoration by drinking led to an exchange of gunfire in which three North Koreans were killed and two wounded. A few South Korean soldiers were also injured. North Korea requested the return of the two wounded officers and the bodies of the three soldiers, but the UNC only returned the bodies after an investigation by Joint Observer Teams (JOT) on September 7. Instead, it informed North Korea that the two officers had chosen to remain in South Korea.
On September 27, when the 156th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC was held the South claimed that six armed soldiers had crossed the MDL and intruded into its territory. When they approached the South’s soldiers who were weeding, fighting and shooting broke out. After one South Korean was wounded, an exchange of fire occurred in which three North Koreans were killed and three wounded. One had escaped while the other two received medical treatment. The South referred to the joint investigation which had proved the North’s illegal act. The North claimed that the South’s guards had crossed the MDL and kidnapped and killed its guards who were on patrol. This was in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 6, prohibiting hostile acts within the DMZ, Paragraph 12, requiring “... a complete cessation of all hostilities..,” Paragraph 14, urging that “...ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side...”
and Paragraph 17, giving responsibility for complying with and enforcing the agreement to the respective Commanders. The South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1993) records the North’s
opinion that this serious incident could have led to war.127 It is the first incident the author has noted about which the opinion was expressed that it could have led to war, but this was only from one source, making it hard to assess.
At the 157th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 5, the North requested the immediate return of its officers, but the UNC/MAC repeated that they would be kept detained and that they had requested to live in South Korea. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Chang Chung Hwan, then reminded the UNC/MAC of the promise made during the JOT investigation to return the officers as soon as treatment was over, repeated the request for their return and, following a new refusal, angrily warned them:
“I declare to you that if your side continues to behave in such a manner instead of returning our personnel at an early date, such lenient treatment as was given to 2nd Lt. Bumpas who could go back to your side after being shot down through our self-defence measures when he intruded into our territorial airspace will no longer be accorded to your side, which in- cessantly commits provocative acts in violation of the Armistice Agree- ment. Our side will call your side to account for [those two North Korean officers] until your side returns our personnel.”128
At the 158th meeting held on October 17, the North repeated its request for the return of the two detainees, but the South refused since they had deliberately intruded into its territory as trained spies. The
127_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 6, 12, 14, 17; Downs, op. cit., pp.
111-112; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 129-130; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 91-2; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 119-120.
128_Downs, ibid., p. 112; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 130, 131; Lee, ibid., 2001(a), p. 120. Original quotation marks. Lee records the statement in Korean.
demand was repeated at the following meetings, but only one who wanted to meet his family was returned after the UNC at the 177th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 20, 1963, had suggested that he should be returned the following day.
The threat made at the 157th meeting was implemented on May 17, 1963. Captain Ben W. Stutts and Captain Carleton W. Voltz, who were flying an inspection tour with an unarmed US Army helicopter OH-23, became disoriented, flew over the Han River estuary and were forced down in North Korea around 9 a.m. At the 168th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held the same day, Major General Chang claimed on the basis of incoming reports that “a US military aircraft had intruded into North Korea’s airspace and received necessary punishment,” referred to a possible trial of the pilots as “criminals” and refused to discuss the incident further. The UNC/MAC demanded the return of the pilots, but North Korea wanted an apology. No progress was made at the eight meetings held up to August 20, six of which were called by the UNC/MAC. On November 6, the UNC Commander, General Hamilton H. Howze, wrote to the KPA Commander Kim Il Sung, asking him to cooperate in the early settlement of the incident.
In his reply on February 17, 1964, Kim alleged that the pilots were engaged in “military espionage.” To obtain North Korea’s leniency, the UNC would have to admit the “grave criminal acts,” guarantee that no such “criminal acts” would be perpetrated in the future and strictly abide the Armistice Agreement.129
On March 5, General Howze sent a letter to Kim Il Sung and
129_Downs, ibid., p. 112; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 146, 148;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 92-3, 97, 98, 99, 100; Lee, ibid, 2001(a), pp. 122, 123.
formally apologized for the incident, guaranteeing that the UNC would act to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, and promised to adhere to the terms of the Armistice Agreement. On March 23, Kim noted Howze’s apology and told the KPA/CPV Senior Member to settle the issue. Since no further action had been taken by May 5, the UNC/MAC Senior Member proposed a private meeting to be convened in Panmunjom. The first private MAC meeting held on May 8 did not bring a positive result. Major General Chang just repeated the conditions for the release of the crew. At the second meeting convened on May 15, he insisted that the UNC/MAC Senior Member, Major General Cecil E.
Combs, sign a “receipt document” before discussing procedures to release the pilots. Prior to their release at the 269th MAC secretary meeting held on May 16, Major General Chang proffered a prepared receipt that had been prepared by North Korea in Korean and English which was a confession that General Combs signed (no. 22):
“Admitting the crimes of espionage and illegal intrusion by Captain Ben Weakley Stutts and Captain Carleton William Voltz, the U.S. pilots, who were captured by the self-defence measure of the Korean People’s Army while they were committing espionage act, after illegally intruding into the air over the northern part of the Democratic Republic of Korea across the Military Demarcation Line in violation of the Armistice Agreement upon the orders of the 8th U.S. Army headquarters on May 17, 1963, and guaranteeing that it will not commit such criminal acts and will strictly abide by the Korean Armistice Agreement in the future, the United Nations Command hereby receives Captain Ben Weakley Stutts and Captain Carleton William Voltz, U.S. Army pilots, from the Korean People’s Army side.”130
130_Downs, ibid., pp. 112-113; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, p. 313; Lee, ibid., 2001(a), p. 127. Original quotation marks. Lee records in Korean the letters of November 5, 1963, February 17, March 5 and March 23 on pp. 123-7 and the May 15 “receipt” on p. 129.
As we have seen, in 1958 Joint Observer Teams (JOT:s) had been dispatched by the MAC to investigate infiltration attempts across the MDL. On November 20, 1962, the North Korean Army attacked a UNC observation post on the western front of the DMZ with Soviet- made hand grenades. One American soldier was killed and another wounded. The UNC did not suggest dispatching a JOT investigation but started its own. Since the UNC had not originally suggested a JOT investigation, the incident became an occasion for North Korea to in- capacitate the JOTs. At the 160th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on November 29, 1962, the South presented splin- ters of hand grenades as evidence of the attack and protested against the act. The North Koreans argued that the claim was completely manipulated and that the incident took place among South Korean enlisted men. When the South protested again, the North Koreans argued “When there are JOTs, why did you not suggest a joint investigation but unilaterally drew your own conclusion?” The South responded that there was clear evidence of the North Korean attack and asked why a JOT investigation was needed, arguing that it would only delay the holding of a MAC meeting.
By 1967, JOT meetings had become infrequent because the North Koreans did not usually consent to investigations of UNC alle- gations; of 40 suggestions to meet, only one was accepted. Prior to the meeting held on April 6-7, 52 meetings had been held to investigate incidents that reportedly had occurred in the DMZ (the previous one took place in 1965). North Korea had proposed 45, 22 of them to investigate alleged South Korean espionage infiltration to the north across the MDL that all were denied by the UNC.131
131_Downs, ibid., pp. 104, 302: fn. 31; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, p. 94;
The April 1967 meeting was held because North Korea de- manded an investigation of the “diabolical atrocities” the UNC had allegedly committed on April 5. The task for the JOTs was to find out the facts behind an incident in which three North Korean guards (of five) who by mistake had crossed the MDL located under an American guard post had been killed on the UNC side of the DMZ, 900 metres from the Joint Security Area. According to the UNC JOT, three Army soldiers had crossed the MDL and proceeded to a point 20 metres south where an alert UNC work party doing routine work had fired on the soldiers who were killed. From concealed positions along the MDL, North Korean army soldiers fired automatic weapons at the UNC when it attempted to withdraw to its assigned guard post. The soldiers retrieved one of three soldiers killed and dragged him to a point 7-8 metres north of the MDL. A fourth North Korean soldier had been killed in the exchange of fire that ensued and another was wounded. No UNC soldier was killed. The North Korean JOT could not accept the UNC version. Like the NNSC, the JOT did not have an umpire who could break the deadlock and give his judgement when investigation results differed, hampering the work of both organs. The UNC JOT Senior Member was willing to meet his North Korean counterpart to work on a joint report but added that the UNC would file its report with the MAC unilaterally if the North Koreans did not wish to meet again.
On April 7, North Korea’s JOT Senior Member claimed that the UNC had fired on and killed North Korean Army “civil police” who were on a routine patrol north of the MDL. The UNC had sub-
Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), pp. 3-4: op. cit., 2004, p. 133.
sequently removed the bodies from the north to the south in an attempt to prove that North Korean army personnel had intruded across the MDL. The UNC rejected the North Korean version and declared that it would submit its evidence to the MAC unilaterally. The North Koreans stated that they would do so too. The UNC allowed a North Korean work party to cross the MDL to retrieve the bodies of the soldiers and the North Korean JOT to supervise the work. No receipt was asked for returning the killed North Koreans. A few days later, North Korea held a state funeral in P’yôngyang for the soldiers. The North’s media accused US forces of “murdering” North Korean DMZ
“civil police.” At the 243rd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on April 8, North Korea accused the South of the April 5 attack and the South the North in accordance with established practice.132