Acronyms
2.5 The NNSC between the Two Camps: “A Mission Impossible”Impossible”
Besides the inspection issue, internal tension within the NNSC and armistice violations, developments after the Korean War were also affected by the negative American opinion of the Commission. Unsur-
52_Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea, in For Immediate Release, Sept- ember 5, 1955, (n. p.), pp. 1-26. Considering the massive destruction caused by the war, imports of combat materials from the Soviet Union must have been of the utmost importance for North Korea to strengthen its military power.
53_Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 279, 280.
prisingly, the US expressed immediately after the Armistice Agree- ment had been signed a sceptical opinion of the Commission’s com- position: Czechoslovakia and Poland, as satellite states of the Soviet Union, were just obstacles to the United States’ military activities.
Notably, Mohn (1961) writes: “The Cold War got a new front straight through our Commission.” Also, “We should have shown the world that cooperation was possible. Instead, we had entangled in sterile discussions...” He laments this “profound fiasco.”
According to the American scholar Fred Charles Iklé (1999), the US had placed great hopes on the NNSC during the armistice negotiations: “In their eyes it was an essential element of the armistice agreement that they had to win in order to prevent North Korea from violating the prohibitions against an arms build-up.” Also, “The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was meant to make sure that the hard-won peace in Korea would last.” But the NNSC soon turned out to be for the Americans “worse than useless.” “It could do nothing about North Korea’s arms build-up in violation of the truce agreement, but it inhibited the U.S. response.” The NNSC “...was neither neutral (because Communist Poland and Czechoslovakia together had half the votes), nor supervisory (because the North Koreans could easily block all relevant access).” On December 2, 1954, the Swedish represen- tative pointed out in the UN General Assembly the disadvantage for the Commission of having an even number of members but with no result (cf. p. 39).54
54_Iklé, “The Role of Emotions in International Negotiations,” in Berton et al., Inter- national Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 337-8; Mohn, op. cit., p. 375, 388-9; Pak, op. cit., 2003, pp. 43-4;
Petitpierre, op. cit., p. 61.
According to Weilenmann (2004), since the Czech and Polish guides in the southern ports of entry took photos of UNC troops and units, they kept a good record of all troops in the area. Since Czech and Polish officers, while waiting for the neutral nations’ inspection teams’
(NNIT) jeeps at military sites, recorded the inscriptions on military limousines, they could easily conclude which large units generals who took part in the work and departed from there belonged to. Through the normal work of the NNIT:s, the Czech and Polish officers received from the UNC copies of all documents of imports and exports as well as of arriving and departing ships and airplanes.
The American scholar Chuck Downs (1999) records that the Swiss member had reported at the 107th NNSC meeting held on February 23, 1954 that the Czechs and Poles “were all too eager to inspect all sorts of goods which did not even remotely have any connections with combat materials.” They requested “time-tables, manifests, and other documents relating not only to combat materiel, but to all shipments in the South.”
The conclusion was that the NNSC gave the Communists “an insight into the movement of all cargo in the South’s ports of entry.”
Mohn (1961) records that in Pusan he had observed both on land and on board the port’s captain’s motor cruiser that the Polish freely took photos of warships as well as of merchant ships without being admonished by the accompanying American military police. Rembe (1956) concurs with Iklé’s view by writing that “...the Commission now, at the turn of the year 1953-54, is more a tool for the Communists’ interests than an impartial body between the two sides.” In contrast, “...the Swedish and Swiss came here to represent objectivity.”55 While this study confirms that Czech and Polish
55_Downs, op. cit., pp. 107, 302: fn. 41; Mohn, ibid., p. 381; Rembe, op. cit., p. 31;
officers sided with North Korea, it is at present virtually impossible to prove whether the Swedish and Swiss actually were objective or not.
Iklé’s view also concurs with that of Lee (2001b), who writes: “...
the NNSC from its inception has never been a truly neutral body.”
Another weakness has been the absence of a “... referee for any decision making.” Lee writes:
“The Czech/Polish delegations openly supported the North Korean and Chinese communists side, doing everything in their power to hamper proper function and operation of the NNSC. They regularly vetoed pro- posals for inspections and investigations in North Korea, whereas they often conducted intelligence collection activities in the ROK which is completely outside the purview of the NNSC.”56
Lee also refers to the 68th MAC meeting called by the South held on February 14, 1956, when the UNC/MAC Senior Member said:
“...the evidence accumulated by our side over a period of more than 29 months indicated clearly, and without dispute, that the value of the inspections teams (NNITs/MITs) has been completely, willfully and systematically destroyed by the Czech/Pole delegations...” He quoted Major General Mohn who, when the 87th NNSC meeting took place on January 15, 1954, had expressed the opinion that the NNSC
“...should apply one system of inspection in North Korea and another in South Korea.”
The monthly reports differed between Czechoslovakia and Poland versus Sweden and Switzerland. The Polish interpreter Jan Hajdukiewiz, who had sought asylum in the US on September 9,
Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, p. 30. Original quotation marks from Downs.
56_Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), p. 6: op. cit., 2001(b), p. 117.
1953, was the first man to point out the intelligence work by the Czech and Polish officers at a time when the American opinion was that both delegations carried out activities, including espionage, which harmed the UN. The American opinion became even stronger after the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956 had ended that crisis.57
In addition to the difficulties the NNSC experienced in con- ducting its work, throughout 1954-1955 North Korea’s military build- up was the major factor affecting developments, although the North asserted that it had followed Paragraph 13 (d) prohibiting rearmaments and that no material had been brought in from abroad. At the 39th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 18, 1954, the North protested that the South had brought in operational airplanes and armored vehicles etc. to establish four new divisions in violation of Paragraph 13(d). The South responded that the establishment of new divisions is not included in the Armistice Agreement. It argued that it had reported on the introduction of operational materials and military personnel more than 700 times but the North had only sub- mitted three correct reports. Both sides accused each other of obstructing the inspection teams’ work.
At the 41st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 20, 1954, the North claimed, on the basis of reports from Czech and Polish NNSC members, that the South had brought in combat materials and had obstructed the inspection teams’ work. The South asserted that it had followed the Armistice Agreement by not bringing in combat
57_Downs, op. cit., pp. 107, 302: fn. 39; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 50; Lee, ibid., 2001(b), p. 117; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 44; Rembe, op. cit.,p. 87;
Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, p. 30. The first quotation has original quotation marks.
materials. It protested against the one-sided reports of the Czech and Polish members who were accused of having obstructed the Com- mission’s work by deliberately interrupting investigations and assisting the North to bring in weapons.58 Clearly, the internal conflicts of the NNSC also affected the MAC, where the zero-sum game continued.
In 1954, the South Korean government accused North Korea that, since the NNSC had been unable to conduct inspections in the North, the risk that rearmaments would destroy the power balance was high. Prime Minister Pyun Yung Tai wrote to the UNC Com- mander, General John E. Hull, on September 2, 1954:
“We expected Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea in advance of UN forces, but what is actually happening is the reverse: U.S. divisions departing from Korea are leaving a huge gap hardly to be filled by ROK units which, in fact, do not exist even in paper-planning. While North Korea is bristling with airfields that did not either exist or operate during hostilities, but are now in full trim with jet fighters and bombers, ready on them, the few airfields in South Korea will soon go to weeds if they fail to get proper attention.”59
Due to the North’s rearmaments, South Korea and the US wanted to dissolve the NNSC and cancel the Armistice Agreement in order to be free to modernize the combat forces and restore the military balance. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution that supported a dissolution. However, in the author’s opinion, the South Korean-American position was con- tradictory; on October 1, 1953, they had signed a Mutual Defence
58_Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 599; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 29, 30;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 36, 37-8.
59_Bailey, op. cit., p. 174; Downs, op. cit., pp. 107-108; Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), p. 7.
Original quotation marks.
Treaty that obligated the US to come to South Korea’s defence only in the event of an external armed attack and guaranteed the permanent stationing of American troops (cf. p. 19). Weapons and equipment were also brought in; the South Korean scholar Choi Cheol-Young (2004) points out that both sides thoroughly neglected Paragraph 13(d). The Defence Agreement entered into force on November 17, 1954 and has since remained unaltered.60 Considering Paragraph 13(d), rearmaments must be regarded as the most serious armistice violation committed by both sides after the armistice had been signed.
However, the paragraph is unrealistic; how is it possible to make a distinction between replacements and rearmaments and without taking technological developments into consideration? The paragraph was doomed to fail.
The NNSC could not prevent rearmaments. Weilenmann (2004) notes that it was outside the mandate to prove the state of munitions and points out that the NNSC had to rely on data provided by the UNC and the KPA/CPV. Yet, the inspection teams fulfilled their tasks correctly. In his opinion (2006), since the inspection teams did not check what he labels as “losses” in terms of destroyed, damaged,
60_Bruzelius, op. cit., pp. 599-600; Lee, ibid., 1998(a), p. 7; Choi, “Nambuk kunsajôk habûi-wa Han’guk chôngjôn hyôpchông-ûi hyoryôk,” Sônggyungwan pôphak 16 (no. 2), 2004,p. 495; Quinones, “South Korea’s Approaches to North Korea,” in Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (Park, Kyung-Ae and Kim, Dalchoong, eds, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 22. The Defence Treaty is recorded in Korean by Jhe, op. cit., 2000, pp. 492-3. Pak (op. cit., 2004, pp. 244-5: fn. 32) argues that the treaty from a legal point of view is an armistice violation since the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(c) prohibits troop enforcements and Paragraph 13(d) prohibits rearmaments and the treaty, Paragraph 2 stating “The parties will independently or jointly or on the basis of self-reliance and mutual assistance continuously undertake and strengthen appropriate measures to prevent military attack” collide with each other.
worn-out or used-up munitions, inspections were meaningless. The American Lieutenant Colonel, William T. Harrison, (2002) also ex- presses a negative view of inspections:
“The difficult inspection language in the Armistice was doomed from the start because of the equal number of inspectors and the veto power each belligerent had. That portion of the Armistice cannot be seen as a success.
However, it is hard to imagine an alternative that would have worked any better.”61
A difficulty recorded by Mohn (1961) was reports of spare parts that the Armistice Agreement had excluded. Consequently, the KPA/CPV and the UNC quarrelled about how to count them. Weilenmann (2004) makes the important point that the Armistice Agreement did not prohibit manufacturing munitions (it did not include dual-use products such as explosives and fuses either). In spite of these limi- tations, he wrote in 2001 that the NNSC, during 1953-54, had contri- buted to the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement by creating a sense among the war combatants that someone was supervising them and by serving as a legal instance, in spite of the absence of a referee (cf.
Schön, pp. 29-30). The latter task was performed by investigating violations of the Armistice Agreement but, as we have seen, such cases very extremely few. The inspection acted by their mere presence as policemen or border guards.
On April 15, 1954, the UNC Commander stressed in a letter to the NNSC that the most serious violations of the Armistice Agreement
61_Harrison, Military Armistice in Korea: A Case Study for Strategic Leaders (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, April 9, 2002), p. 28; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, pp. 10, 11: “Korea, der degradierte Auslandeinsatz,” ASMZ, no. 6 (2006), p. 15. Original quotation marks from Weilenmann, ibid., 2006.
were committed by North Korea and the Czech and Polish dele- gations, in particular in their refusal to dispatch mobile inspection teams to the North. The Swedish and Swiss NNSC members did not oppose the content but the Czech and Polish rejected it. On April 16, the Commander delivered a message to the US Ministry of Defence stating that implementing the Armistice Agreement in North Korea was impossible, that since the NNSC could not conduct its work in the North there were sufficient grounds to dissolve the Commission and, finally, that if the two parties do not want a new war, a dissolution would not cause much harm to the agreement. The Armistice Agree- ment, Paragraph 13(d), Paragraph 17 regarding cooperation and support by MAC with the NNSC, Paragraph 28 concerning violations outside the DMZ and, finally, Paragraph 41 on the responsibilities and power of the NNSC were declared invalid. An end to NNSC activities in South Korea was requested.62
The US Ministry of Defence responded to the April message by stating, first, that if there were progress at the Geneva Conference, an amendment of the Armistice Agreement’s provisions on the NNSC would be considered. Second, at a time when Sweden and Switzerland requested a dissolution of the NNSC and if North Korea and China did not have an intent to reorganize the NNSC as a more productive and efficient organization, a dissolution would also be considered. Third, as long as the Geneva Conference continues, an expulsion of the NNITs from South Korea should be deferred.
Immediately before the message had been sent, on April 14-15,
62_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(d), 17, 28, 41; Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), pp. 7-8; Mohn, op. cit., pp. 359-360; Petitpierre, op. cit., pp. 36-7; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2001, pp. 25, 35: ibid., 2004, pp. 10, 11, 44.
1954, “the Swiss Federal Council approached, in agreement with the Swedish government, the US and Red China governments, asking them whether the NNSC could not be dissolved with regard to the utterly inadequate conditions under which the mandate had to be fulfilled”, but there was no direct answer. Previously, on March 29 the Swedish and Swiss representatives had formally expressed their dissatisfaction to the UN. On April 5, they announced that inspections had been completely ruined. Later, on June 11, 1954, the UNC Com- mander, General John E. Hull, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the NNSC be abolished since it was used by the Czech and Polish members “to compile detailed intelligence data” and was harassing the UNC with “unfounded accusations and Communist propaganda exercises.” Due to the opinion that the NNSC inspections severely obstructed the UNC’s military activities, from this time onwards the US government worked to suspend the inspection teams by persuading the Swedish and Swiss delegations to end their work.63
On June 12, on the occasion of the Geneva Conference on Korea, during a courtesy visit to the Swiss Federal Council, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai “... stressed the importance of the NNSC as a significant body that maintained armistice in Korea and could not be dissolved since it constituted ‘an island of contacts in a sea without contacts’” In contrast, the American General and Head of the US Dele- gation in Geneva, Bedell Smith, declared on June 18 to the Council “...
his unambiguous conviction that the NNSC could be dissolved
63_Downs, op. cit., pp. 107, 302: fn. 40; Ha, op. cit., p. 45; Lee, ibid., 1998(a), p. 8;
Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 29; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 44. The statement of the Swiss Federal Council appears in Petitpierre, op. cit., p. 58.
Original quotation marks from Downs.
without any harm to the armistice cause” at a time when the South suspected the North of secret armaments (air force). The North wanted to use the freedom of the NNSC inspection teams in the South as much as possible to its own advantage; it attached great importance to the Commission. The South did not want uncontrolled North Korean armament without NNSC inspections. On the other hand, a dissolution of the NNSC would give a free hand to its own rearmament at a time when the Americans, on the basis of aerial observations, accused the North of importing military equipment at other places than the de- signated ones.
Considering the different American and Chinese views of the NNSC and the Council’s own wish “...to help preserve peace, the Federal Council decided to leave the Swiss NNSC Delegation in Korea but to adjust its staff to the topical requirements.” On September 13, 1954, Mao Zedong declared to the Swiss Minister when the latter presented his credentials that “...he hoped Switzerland would not withdraw its Delegation but that he considered a reduction in the number of its members feasible.” In contrast, in July the South Korean Prime Minister, Pyun Yung Tai, had told the United Nations Com- mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea that his government “no longer regarded the armistice as binding.” The South Korean government organized violent anti-NNSC demonstrations during August, above all in Pusan. At this time, popular opinion had been aroused against in particular the Czech and Polish NNSC members.
On August 1, shots were fired by unknown people at the Czech delegation in Pusan. A few days later explosives detonated in the barracks of the Communists’ inspection teams in Kunsan. In Inch’ôn, several hundred people demonstrated and marched towards the in-
spection teams’ site. In another act of opposition, protest letters addressed by pupils were sent to the NNSC headquarters in Panmun- jom. As large-scale, popular anti-NNSC demonstrations took place in all large cities in August 1954, the Commission’s relative freedom of movement ended in the South at a time when, as we have seen, restric- tions similar to those implemented in the North had been imposed in April the same year. At the NNSC’s request, the Americans streng- thened their protection of the inspection teams. According to Rembe (1956), since freedom of movement was curtailed inspection team members were put in quarantine. For security reasons, NNSC per- sonnel were moved in helicopters instead of jeeps and buses.64
At the 45th MAC meeting held on August 3, 1954, the North protested against the anti-NNSC demonstrations and attacks on barracks and requested punishment of those responsible. The South responded that it had actively supported the NNSC and its inspection teams. At this time, in response the North implemented some re- laxations for the inspection teams to emphasize the differences between the two sides. Members were invited to attend various events such as the almost weekly bus tour to Kaesông to go to the theatre, cinema or parties. In contrast, according to Lidin (2007), since NNSC members in the South “...could not take a step without being supervised,” the situation became the same as in the North. “Supervision and control became restricted because security had to come first. The control at the
64_Bailey, op. cit., p. 174; Bettex, op. cit., pp. 18-19, 20; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 23; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, ibid., pp. 29-30, 32; Petitpierre, ibid., p. 60; Rembe, op. cit., p. 100; Sandoz, “La Délégation Suisse dans la NNSC et son environnement géopolitique,” in Kyung Hee University, op. cit., p. 216. The second quotation has original quotation marks.