Acronyms
3.2 Rearmaments and Withdrawal of American Troops raised in the MACraised in the MAC
According to the South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003), the most serious violation of the Armistice Agreement during the 1960s was that of Paragraph 13(c) and (d): both personnel and weapons were brought in. In the author’s opinion, such a situation reflects
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s statement: “Peace can only succeed in a place where there is will to observe peace and effective power to enforce peace” quoted in the Introduction (p. 3). North Korea’s hard- line policies towards South Korea, the strengthening of the US-South Korea alliance due to the South Korean Army’s participation in the Vietnam War and the modernization of the South’s armed forces caused rising military tension in the Korean peninsula. Due to the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea launched the principle ‘Self-Defence in National Defence.’ North Korea’s opinion was that the signing of The 1960 US-Japan Military Defence Treaty and the normalization of South Korea-Japan relations in 1965 would cause a serious threat through the formation of a military alliance between South Korea, the US and Japan.101
Tension between North Korea and the Soviet Union due to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Russians were criticized for having compromised peace, are one reason for the hard-line policy towards South Korea. Another reason was the direct intervention of the US in the Vietnam War. Consequently, the North introduced the four military lines in 1962 and the three revolution theories in 1965 that together led to a hard-line policy towards South Korea.102 The
101_Hasselrot, Bilaga: Generalmajor B Hasselrots slutrapport efter tjänstgöring som chef för svenska delegationen i neutrala övervakningskommissionen i Korea och member i NNSC (n. p., September 24, 1965), p. 9; Kim, “1960nyôndae: kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe- wa ’chôngjôn ch’eje,” 2003, pp. 178-9, 191.
102_Kim (ibid., 2003, pp. 191-2) does not say what the three revolutions refer to.
However, Foster-Carter writes in “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea:
History” (p. 548) that the Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in February 1974 launched the “Three Great Revolutions”: Ideological, technical and cultural.
There can hardly be any doubt that the three revolutions had the same meaning before, although the author has seen no previous reference. Original quotation marks.
four military lines that were implemented from 1963 onwards refer to a) armament of the whole population both ideologically and militarily, b) fortification of the whole territory by installing military facilities, c) elevation of the quality of the entire military forces through ideo- logical and technical training and d) modernization of the armed forces by introducing brand-new weapons and modern technology.
Subsequently, North Korea’s military expenditures in the officially announced national budget were raised from 12.5 percent in 1966 to 30.4 percent in 1967. As in the late 1950s, in winter 1961-62 the main target of the North Koreans was apparently, according to the Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Major General Åke Wikland, a with- drawal of the American forces from South Korea. The opinion was that an American troop withdrawal would solve all problems.
In South Korea, Brigadier General Park Chung Hee seized power through a coup d’état on May 16, 1961. North Korea interpreted the coup as an act encouraged and engineered by the US and therefore perceived the new military government as a potential threat to its security; it signed Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union on July 6 and China on July 11 the same year. South Korea recognized the strengthening of the northern alliance through the signing of these treaties as well as the reinforce- ment of the North’s national defence power after the Cuba crisis as a direct threat. Therefore, South Korea aimed to simultaneously pursue economic development and national security by normalizing relations with Japan and dispatching troops to Vietnam.103
103_Ch’oe, “P’anmunjôm-ûl t’onghan Nambukhan kyoryu,” pp. 88-9; Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 48, 50; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 191-2; Ko, “Pukhankun-ûi ‘hwaryôk unban
Kim (2003) notes that since the supervisory task of the NNSC had become paralyzed there were no longer any systemic measures to prevent reinforcements of military power that were speeded up through- out the 1960s. Rearmaments were the main reason for military tension in the Korean peninsula during the latter half of the 1960s. On the other hand, Major General Wikland wrote in his report for winter 1961-62 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the task of the NNSC, without any exaggeration, could be labelled an “impartial eye” at the border line between the Eastern and the Western blocks at a point so infected that violations against the armistice could be brought to the fore very rapidly. Authoritative observers had certified that the significance of the NNSC as an “observation agency” at the front could not be questioned; through its mere presence in the DMZ, the NNSC reduced tension. The similarity with the positive evaluations in Chapter 2 is striking.
In 1961, the Swedish officer Bror-Johan Geijer wrote that the NNSC was one of the few remaining signs that the Armistice Agree- ment remained in force. He argued that a neutral commission ready to act had a role to play due to the severe tension between the two Koreas.
However, on October 16, 1961, relations between the NNSC and the KPA/CPV deteriorated for the first time due to conflicts with North Korean drivers in the Swiss Camp. Consequently, the UNC prohibited North Korean drivers from driving to the Swedish-Swiss camp.
sudan’ hyônhwang-gwa kwaje,” in Kim (ed.), DMZ IV - ch’ôn kûrigo, cho, hang, t’an, chôn (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Sohwa, 2001), p. 154; Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 109; Wikland, Slutrapport efter tjänst som kontingentschef för Swedish Group Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (N.N.S.C), Underbilaga H 1, p. 2 (n.p., March 1, 1962). Original quotation marks.
Instead, visitors should be brought by vehicles from the southern side of the Joint Security Area. Subsequently, there were no visitors by KPA/CPV members to the Swedish-Swiss camp. The KPA/CPV did not accept any further invitations and social activities across the demar- cation line were frozen until the 1980s. Not until January 24, 1989 did the Deputy Head of the Swedish delegation succeed in bringing both parties’ MAC secretaries, colonels from the CPV and the Republic of Korea and the NNSC alternates to a luncheon in the Swedish camp.
For the first time since 1961, North Korean and Chinese officers then crossed the border.
Major General Sven Uggla, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, wrote in his report for September 1963-March 1964 to the Chief of the Army that both parties of the MAC pointed out the Commission’s great importance. That representants of four countries were on both sides of the border and could meet and socialize over the border as well as attend MAC meetings probably somewhat lowered tension. This was important not least since the North regarded the US forces not as UN troops but as American invaders. However, in the case of a major conflict, the NNSC would not be helpful.104 The evaluation supports the author’s opinion that the Commission’s significance should not be overvalued.
104_Försvarets Läromedelscentral, Historik över de neutrala ländernas övevakning- skommission i Korea, pp. 31, 42; Geijer, “Något om svenskarna i Panmunjom,”
Joboseyo (1961), no. 1, p. 30; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 181; Mueller-Lhotska, Swiss Mission to Korea in the Changes of Tim: 1953-1997, pp. 66-7; NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997 Uggla, Till: Chefen för armén, Stockholm 90 (Panmunjom, March 26, 1964), pp. 0, 1; Werner, Månadsrapport januari 1989 (n.
p., January 31, 1989), p. 3; Wikland, ibid., bilaga 1,pp. 1-2, 6. Original quotation marks.
The military build-up repeatedly caused tension at MAC meetings.
At the 114th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 11, 1960, the North criticized “the US imperialists for bringing nuclear and guided weapons into South Korea” and urged a withdrawal of them. The military build-up was a severe challenge for peace. The UNC/MAC referred to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) at the 75th MAC meeting held on June 21, 1957; the South had rearmed only to maintain relative military balance and the weapons brought in were only for defence purposes. The same arguments were basically repeated six times in 1960. At the 116th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 15, the North urged the South to cancel war preparations.
At the 131st meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on November 29, the North asserted that it had worked for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. On the other hand, the American troops obstructed reunification by rearming South Korea and by making it an outpost for nuclear war planned for a second war. Accusations of war pre- parations were made altogether five times in 1960-1961.
When the 134th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 24, 1961, the North criticized the South “for bringing in each kind of new weapons and setting up them in the DMZ and for implementing the exercise Sôrho Operation for a nuclear attack.” The South claimed that from the very beginning it had fully observed Paragraph 13(d) and pointed out that the North had on numerous occasions violated it. It refuted protests against the exercise and claimed that military exercises were an issue not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement and should not be raised in the MAC.105 That the
105_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p’yôllan, che 4 chip, 1999,
North had accused the South of war preparations five times supports the opinion that tension had risen and indicates that the level of
“negative peace” had increased greatly.
Rearmaments were raised four times in 1962, once in1963, twice in 1964 and twice in January 1965. When the 151st meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on April 28, 1962, the North criticized the South, for having recently introduced six naval vessels, including four landing craft despite its protests at the previous meeting it had called on April 3. The UNC/MAC referred to the statement made by the North Korean General Chief of Staff, Kim Ch’ang-pong, on February 7: “The Korean People’s Army is incomparably stronger than it was during the Korean War.” The statement was regarded as clear evidence of the North’s disregard of the Armistice Agreement by rearming. When the 158th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on October 17 the same year, the North again asserted that the US Army was creating an outpost for nuclear war in South Korea and planning for a second war.
At the 199th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 22, 1965, the North asserted, regarding South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War: “The UN side is enlarging warfare in the whole of Asia and as a reward for sending 2,000 Korean troops to death to inter- nationalize the war plans has provided the Korean Army with 27 new patrol vessels and military equipment,” thus violating Paragraph 13(d).
The UNC/MAC responded that the troop dispatches was not an issue to be dealt with in the MAC. Thanks to the dispatch of South Korean troops, US military aid rose from $350 million in 1966 to $1,750
pp. 94-8, 109, 112-113, 123; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 179; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p’yôllam, che 2 chip, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 87. Original quotation marks.
billion in 1967.106 This extraordinary increase confirms that the US regarded South Korea as an increasingly important ally.
The KPA/CPV had accused the UNC of war preparations once in 1964, but in 1965-66 such accusations were raised seven times. In 1965-66, the parties raised rearmaments at eleven meetings. At the 215th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 8, 1965, the South claimed that the North had from the beginning violated Para- graph 13(d) and submitted its first report on operational materials on October 6, 1953, but the South on July 28. There had been no fighter planes on July 27 but, according to defecting pilots, up to September 20, 80 MIG planes had been brought in.
When the 236th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV took place on December 16, 1966, the North criticized the South for bringing in fighter planes, including nine F-5A fighters, and naval destroyers from the US. The South claimed that they were for defence purposes in accordance with the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d). Also, “If your side had not first violated Paragraph 13(d) and then continued to do so for four years, our side would not have needed to bring in any brand-new weapons at all.”107 Obviously, no side wished to admit any responsibility for rearmaments but only wanted to discredit the other side: mutual distrust continued unabated throughout the 1960s.
106_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 126, 158, 163, 164; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 88-90, 92, 93, 99, 110, 111, 112. Original quotation marks. In 1966, North Korea dispatched about 50 pilots and almost 300 advisers to Vietnam and increased material support (Lerner, op.
cit., p. 117).
107_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 165, 179, 186, 187-8, 189, 197;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 112, 114, 120, 121, 124-5, 126, 130, 131.
In 1967-69, rearmaments were raised at seven meetings and accusations of war preparations at five (the issues concurred three times). When the 277th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on September 5, 1968, the North criticized the South for rearm- ing by introducing hundreds of military airplanes. The South claimed that the North had begun to rearm immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement in the form of brand-new weapons as well as offensive weapons and referred to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957. The South’s opinion was that North Korea had not signed the Armistice Agreement to guarantee peace but only as a planned poli- tical and economic strategy to get a period of grace so as not to face obstruction from military opposition by the UNC troops. Whether it is true or not, this opinion confirms that the war was followed only by distrust, supporting the cautious evaluations made when the armistice was signed (cf. p. 18).
At the 284th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 28, 1969, the North protested against the US introducing large quantities of weapons into South Korea to train for war. The South criticized the North for rearmaments that led to the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d).
The KPA and three per cent of the population were rearmed. The military was rearmed with Soviet-made AK-47 machine-guns and large-calibre cannons. The North possessed submarines and over 500 MIG-planes that it did not have when the armistice was signed.108
108_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 222. 223, 237-8, 246, 259; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 133, 134, 139, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 153, 156. Original quotation marks. Data presented at the 284th MAC meeting is another indication that imports pf combat materials from the Soviet Union were of the utmost importance to raise North Korea’s military power (cf. p. 61: fn. 52).
As in the late 1950s, the KPA/CPV urged a withdrawal of American troops from South Korea in the MAC. At the 120th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 25, 1960, the North claimed that the troops obstructed re-unification. By bringing in combat materials, the South was preparing for war. The South claimed that it was a waste of time to discuss these stereotype assertions. The KPA/CPV repeated the first argument at the 129th meeting it had called held on October 25, 1960.
When the 121st meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV took place on July 8, the North claimed that, to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula, the American troops who obstructed reunification should imme- diately be withdrawn. Later, at the 260th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on January 20, 1968, the North claimed that, due to the
“American imperialists,” there was no re-unification.
At the 122nd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on July 19, 1960, the North requested an immediate withdrawal of the troops;
their presence increased tension and the risk of war. The South responded that a troop withdrawal was not an issue for the MAC, an argument that was repeated at the 129th, 137th and 138th meetings.
On the last occasion, the UNC/MAC referred to the Armistice Agree- ment, Paragraph 60, recommending holding a high-level political conference to settle the issue. A troop withdrawal was urged once more in 1960.
At the 136th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on March 2, 1961, the North argued that the American troops created a war atmosphere by rearming South Korea. When the 137th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on March 8, the North claimed that foreign troops must be withdrawn in order to peacefully resolve the Korean issue, but instead South Korea was rearming in preparation for new
war provocations. At the 138th meeting called by the KPA/CPV con- vened on March 21, the North asserted that if the American troops were withdrawn, peaceful re-unification would be achieved. At the 142nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on June 24, the North accused the UNC of making “... new war preparations...” by bringing in brand-new weapons and combat units and urged an end of these policies.
A withdrawal of US troops was requested, but the UNC responded that they were stationed in South Korea to prevent a new invasion.
When the 149th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 26, 1962, the South claimed that the UN troops would remain in South Korea as long as there was an invasion threat. Finally, at the 285th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 11, 1969, the UNC/MAC asserted that the UN troops protected South Korea and repeated the opinion expressed at the 149th meeting.109 Obviously, the parties’ positions on American troops were, as with the rearma- ments issue, diametrically opposed, perpetuating the zero-sum game.
On the other hand, the North only raised the demand for a withdrawal five times in comparison with 14 times from 1957-59. War pre- parations were raised along with the troops issue five times.
Kim (2003) points to the militarization of the DMZ as another main point of dispute throughout the 1960s (cf. p. 19). Previously, as Lee writes (2001b): “Both sides generally complied with the major provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the DMZ for the first ten years, from 1953 to 1963.” The DMZ was “a real buffer zone”
109_Columbia University, Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 60;
Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 102-103, 114, 115, 222, 223; Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 74, 75, 78, 80-81, 84, 88, 154.
for about ten years but from the summer of 1959 North Korea began to fortify its checkpoints in the DMZ. These checkpoints were built to provide early warnings of attacks from the enemy, to supervise violations of the armistice and to observe the South’s movements. In addition, “From 1963-1965, the North Koreans constructed extensive fortifications and introduced well-armed military forces armed with heavy and automatic weapons into their part of the DMZ in gross violation of the pertinent provisions of the Armistice Agreement” that only allowed single-shot rifles or pistols. Between 1963 and 1965, North Korea built strategic military camp sites to connect the check- points. They were connected by underground tunnels and covered with planted trees. As of 1965, most checkpoints had become fortifi- cations. Combat troops equipped with heavy and automatic weapons and even tanks were occasionally brought into the zone.
The South responded by reinforcing its bunkers and trenches and from 1965 stationing military troops armed with heavy and auto- matic weapons in self-defence. However, the former international relations advisor of the UNC/MAC, James M. Lee (2000), points out that while the North Korean fortifications and camp sites were well camouflaged, the South’s defence camps were situated above ground with the South Korean flag and UN flag flying above them. In order to prepare for North Korean intrusions, from the early 1960s South Korea began to build iron railing fences in connection with the Southern Boundary Line, depending on the topography, that were far to the north of the line (cf. p. 41). Consequently, according to the above Seong-Ho Jhe (1997), the two kilometres of the DMZ north and south of the MDL, as it had been defined in the Armistice Agreement, hardly existed any longer in 1997. The distance between the two