Acronyms
3.5 Armistice Violations at Sea and in the Air
sequently removed the bodies from the north to the south in an attempt to prove that North Korean army personnel had intruded across the MDL. The UNC rejected the North Korean version and declared that it would submit its evidence to the MAC unilaterally. The North Koreans stated that they would do so too. The UNC allowed a North Korean work party to cross the MDL to retrieve the bodies of the soldiers and the North Korean JOT to supervise the work. No receipt was asked for returning the killed North Koreans. A few days later, North Korea held a state funeral in P’yôngyang for the soldiers. The North’s media accused US forces of “murdering” North Korean DMZ
“civil police.” At the 243rd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on April 8, North Korea accused the South of the April 5 attack and the South the North in accordance with established practice.132
15 the term “...the water contiguous to...” is used; it has become one of the major factors of tension in the West Sea.133
According to Lee (2001b), in 1958 the UNC and the Republic of Korea established the Northern Limit Line (NLL) to prevent fishing boats from sailing into fishing grounds north or east of the five islands Paengnyôngdo, Taech’ôngdo, Soch’ôngdo, Yônp’yôngdo and Udo. In fact, beginning in 1957, many South Korean fishing boats had been seized by North Korean patrol vessels in the waters along the coast.
North Korea was not informed since the line was set up for operational purposes and was classified confidential for some time. Yet, in spite of being contested, between 1953 and 1994 the NLL issue was never discussed at MAC meetings. The UNC has not charged North Korea with simple crossings of the NLL.
From 1958 to 1967, naval incidents in the West Sea that involved alleged South Korean fishing boats or naval vessels’ in- trusions into coastal waters north of the NLL generally took place in the vicinity of the five islands under UNC control. On such occasions, the standard UNC response was that the locations of North Korea’s charged violations were within the waters contiguous to the South Korean islands if within three nautical miles of them or that they were in international waters if beyond that distance. In fact, during the armistice negotiations North Korea and China had insisted on in- serting 12 nautical miles if the territorial sea was to be numerically defined.
Throughout the 1960s, North Korea claimed its exclusive rights
133_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 15; Downs, ibid., p. 119; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 87-8.
to fish in territory that extended 12 nautical miles from its shores whereas South Korea claimed three nautical miles. An important fishing ground is situated more than three miles from North Korea’s shore, just to the north of the MDL on land. Fishermen from South Korea were attracted to fish here, but North Korea regarded their fishing as an infringement of its jurisdiction over the fishing grounds.
North Korea sent patrol boats and occasionally fired shore batteries to harass the fishermen, who often were lost at sea or abducted. To protect the fishermen, South Korea sent its naval vessels to escort fishing boats to the northern fishing ground, leading inevitably to confrontations.134
In the early 1960s, North Korea began to accuse South Korean naval vessels of having violated the Armistice Agreement between the three and 12 nautical mile line from the North Korean coast and the five islands controlled by the UNC. At the 202nd MAC secretary meeting held on March 22, 1960, the South denied the North’s claim made at the 201st meeting convened on February 5 that a patrol craft escort on January 19 had intruded into the North’s territorial waters and escaped. At the 123rd plenary meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on July 27, the North accused a UNC naval vessel on July 22 of having utilized the fog to intrude and fire on a North Korean police vessel on patrol before disappearing. The South claimed that it was a service ship delivering food stuffs and supplies which had not intruded into the North’s territorial water. One man was shot to death by the North.
134_Downs, ibid., pp. 119-120; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 92, 96-7: ibid., 2001(b), pp.
87, 88-9: op. cit., 2004, p. 94.
The North criticized South Korea at the 124th meeting re- quested by the KPA/CPV convened on August 3 for an incident on July 30 when the South’s naval vessel K.E. no. 72 had attacked and seized a North Korean patrol vessel in the East Sea. It urged the return of the vessel and its crew and punishment of those responsible. The UNC/
MAC explained that the North’s police vessel had fired first and that the ship had been sunk in self-defence. Four surviving North Koreans would be returned if they so wished. At the 214th secretary meeting convened on August 11, the South claimed that its investigation had concluded that the North’s protests made on July 19 against intrusions of fishing boats were groundless. At the 128th plenary meeting re- quested by the KPA/CPV held on October 6, the North again urged the return of the vessel and the dead bodies from the July 30 incident. The South responded that it had not yet salvaged the vessel, but the fishermen were returned in September-October.135
At the 193rd meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on November 13, 1964, the South denied the North’s accusation con- cerning seven violations of its territorial waters since October 21 made at the 192nd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 28. At the 195th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on December 14, the South declared that its investigations had concluded that all the North’s protests against violations of its territorial waters made at the 193rd and 194th meetings were false (the 194th held on November 24 was called by KPA/CPV). At the 228th meeting proposed by the
135_Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 185; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 75-6, 77, 293, 297; Lee, ibid., 2001(a), p. 132: ibid., 2001(b), p. 89. Lee (ibid., 2001a) records that six North Korean crewmen were rescued and returned whereas Kim notes that there were only four survivors.
KPA/CPV convened on August 5, 1966, the North claimed that on July 29 the South’s naval destroyer no. 202 and patrol vessel no. 56 had intruded into its waters in the East Sea and fired at fishing boats. The North urged punishment of those responsible, an admission and an excuse. Also, measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence. The South asserted that nine naval vessels camouflaged as fishing boats had attacked a South Korean patrol vessel and tried to seize it, but the attack had been repulsed and the ships had escaped.
At the 248th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on June 1, 1967, the North claimed that on May 27 more than ten naval vessels from the South had for 20 minutes fired more than 700 shells along the North’s coast of the South Hwanghae province. The South claimed that the shelling was in self-defence since the North had fired first on the open sea at three patrol vessels during a routine patrol tour. When the South had responded, firing ceased. At the 277th meeting convened on September 5, 1968, the UNC/MAC claimed that a North Korean intelligence vessel on August 20 had become disabled during an espionage mission near Cheju Island. The UNC/MAC displayed photographs of the vessel, the dead and captured North Koreans, their equipment and weapons, including an 82mm recoilless rifle, a 40mm rocket launcher and several anti-aircraft machine guns. The “agent boat” carried the flags of both Koreas, Japan and China to cover its true identity. The North deflected charges of espionage by showing no interest in the return of its own vessel or crew.136 Thus, in the case of armistice violations at sea as well, the zero-sum game was repeated.
136_Downs, op. cit., pp. 138, 305: fn. 45; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 160, 189-190, 210; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 185; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 108, 137, 150. Original quotation marks.
Throughout the 1960s, the capture of fishing boats and the kidnapping of fishermen were also frequently raised at MAC meetings.
Previously, in May 1955 and in December 1958, North Korea had declared through its broadcasts that “to ease the hardships of South Korean fishermen it permits free fishery within the North’s waters.”
However, at this time, the capture of fishing boats was no major issue;
owing to the poor state of the North Korean navy there were hardly any between 1953 and 1957, but in November 1957, 56 South Korean fishing boats were captured for the first time since 1953. These boats were inspected by North Korean naval authorities. For propaganda purposes, if there were fishermen on them, they were well treated and, if necessary, boats were repaired and returned. On the other hand, if there were refugees from North Korea among the crew, they were not returned. In 1958, nine fishing boats and 54 fishermen were captured, but the first kidnapping of ten South Korean fishermen had taken place on May 28, 1955.
In 2007, altogether 3,696 fishermen had been abducted since 1953, but 3,267 had been returned while 428 remained in North Korea (one of the four who had defected is not included). The total number of abductees was 3,795, 480 of whom had not been returned.
In accordance with previous practice, North Korea did not confirm the existence of abductees. The number of abductees rose from 35 in the 1950s to 227 in the 1960s. However, since some fishermen did not report or record their names, they are not included among abductees, making the statistics incomplete. According to North Korean defectors and returnees, there are many abducted South Koreans in the North whose names, as well as the circumstances of their abduction, are not known to South Korean authorities. The reasons for not returning
abductees were that North Korean authorities found their knowledge and manpower useful to them. For instance, some abducted South Koreans were reportedly engaged in spy and espionage training or broadcasts to South Korea. In 1993, about 20 unidentified South Korean abductees worked as spy instructors at the “Centre for Re- volutionizing South Korea” in P’yôngyang.137
At the 132nd MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 4, 1961, the North accused the South of kidnapping on December 19 “[two] fishing boats and after the passage of two weeks returning 28 persons but detaining the other ten” and demanded the immediate return of all detained personnel, cargo and belongings. The UNC/MAC explained that “the Communist vessels were armed and the detained personnel are remaining in accordance with their free wishes” and argued that it had rescued the boats since there was a risk of them sinking. The non-returnees remained of their own free will, whereas cargo as well as belongings had been returned.
A similar situation developed at the 229th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 11, 1966. The North asserted that “a North Korean fishing boat which had returned to Ullûng Island had been kidnapped by force by a naval vessel.” The UNC/MAC response was
137_Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 187, 188, 190; Kim et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2007 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007), pp.
261-3, 264-5, 267-8, 269; Lee, op. cit., 2000, p. 87: op. cit., 2001(a), p. 92; Lim et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2006 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), p. 251. Original quotation marks. A list of the 434 fishermen abducted and detained in North Korea between 1955 and 1987 appears in Lim et al., ibid., pp. 298-311. Fishermen comprised 3,692 of the 3,790 abductees which include the dead but not unconfirmed reports of people kidnapped from third countries. For data on the other 51 abductees, divided into crew of Korean Airlines (12), naval personnel (22) and [non-specified] others (17) see ibid., pp. 297, 312-313.
that “the fishermen who had come to the South had chosen freedom in accordance with their hopes.” In 1961, the parties repeated their positions at the 133rd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on January 13. Later, the boat was returned. At the 134th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 24, the South declared that two fishermen had asked to remain in South Korea but the North argued that the South had prevented them from returning by threats.138
At the 139th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 11, the South protested that on April 7 “the North had captured six torpedo boats and 43 fishermen and demanded the return of the boats and the fishermen.” The North asserted that “the UNC naval destroyer no. 706 had intruded to capture fishing boats and then fired 300 shells.” The kidnapping was denied; the issue led to charges of offense and defence from the two sides. At the 140th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on April 22, the South protested the North’s capture of torpedo boats and demanded “cooperation from both sides for peaceful fishing.”
The North responded that the incident was not kidnapping but
“the fishermen had crossed the border to the North of their own free will.” The North raised kidnappings by the South of fishermen at the 153rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 10, 1962. On June 26, an anti-submarine ship had seized a fishing boat from the North and kidnapped eleven fishermen. The North urged the return of the boat, the fishermen and their belongings. The South declared that the incident was under investigation and that the North would be
138_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 112; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 187-8;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 79, 128.
informed of the result when available. At the 154th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on July 20, the South announced that in accordance with the fishermen’s wishes they would be returned along with their equipment. In contrast to most incidents, a solution was reached.
At the 155th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 29, the North claimed that the South on August 7 had kid- napped fishing boats, but the South rejected the claim. At the 167th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 3, 1963, the North claimed:
“An armed South Korean group had intruded in West Sea waters close to the north of Kakhoedo [Island] and attacked fishermen, killing two and kidnapping one.” The South responded that its investigation of the incident that took place on April 25 showed that the North’s claim was false. When the 168th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on May 17, 1963, a verbal battle occurred due to an exchange of fire after a North Korean spy ship had crossed the NLL to the west of Yônp’yông Island. When the UNC/MAC argued “since the spy ship had violated the NLL, we fired,” North Korea asserted “Our naval vessel never crossed the Northern Limit Line”, which it regarded as the MDL at sea. At the 217th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on November 4, 1965, the South criticized the North for having kid- napped more than 100 fishermen in the West Sea on October 29.
When the 220th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 5, 1966, it was announced that all but two of the 104 fisher- men had been released.139
139_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 127, 128; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 188, 189: fn. 67; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 82, 90, 91, 97, 122, 123;
Yi, “Pug-ûi yoksim, Nam-ûi chosim...NLL-ûn puranhada,” Sindonga (May 2006),
After 1967, offense and defence was followed by arguments as to whether the fishing boats were armed or not and the issue of the intrusion of armed spy ships. On January 19, 1967, a South Korean naval patrol escort boat, PCE-56, which had a crew of 40, was fired on without any warning by the North’s shore batteries while it was escorting fishing boats. It sank at a location 3.5 to 5.1 miles off the coast and 39 seamen died. At the 239th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 21, the South charged the North Koreans with having fired at and sunk a naval vessel on “peaceful, non-hostile duty.” The UNC/MAC claimed that it was one of the North’s most serious armistice violations and requested an investigation by the NNSC in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 28, on the dispatch of the Commission to investigate armistice violations outside the DMZ [but Downs makes no further reference to the NNSC]. The North claimed that the boat had illegally intruded into its territorial water and bombarded the shore numerous times, and that it had acted in self-defence.
According to Downs (1999), the KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, claimed that the patrol boat had “illegally in- truded into our coastal waters...and overtly committed a vicious hostile act by suddenly opening fire and showering scores of shells on our coastal area.” He claimed that the North’s shore batteries took “due self-defence neasures” and warned against similar naval or air in- trusions into its coastal waters or airspace. To maintain peace, the South Korean government transferred the escort mission from its navy to its maritime police. In the late 1960s, the capture of fishing boats
pp. 165-6. Original quotation marks.
and kidnappings of fishermen had become especially serious; whereas only one-two boats had been captured during the years 1961-66, the number rose to 67 in 1967, when 352 fishermen were kidnapped. In 1968, 100 fishing boats and 805 fishermen were kidnapped. South Korea regarded the kidnappings as a way to train spies. Only 60 fishing boats and 482 fishermen were returned. However, after 1970 the number of kidnapped fishing boats fell dramatically to six-seven per year after tension decreased thanks to the holding of the North- South dialogue.140
Armistice violations also took place in the air. At the 200th MAC secretary meeting held on January 15, 1960, the South asserted that its investigation had concluded that the claim made by the North at the 113th plenary meeting convened on December 4, 1959 that a fighter plane had violated its airspace was groundless. The claim was also rejected at the 201st meeting convened on February 5, as well as the protest made on January 15 against crossings of the MDL by military airplanes. When the 207th meeting took place on May 26, the South admitted its violation of the North’s airspace on May 2 (no. 23). At the 214th meeting convened on August 11, the South claimed that its investigation had concluded that the North’s protest made on June 21 against intrusions of its airspace was groundless. When the 216th meeting took place on September 6, the South admitted the North’s protest made on August 13 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace (no. 24). At the 217th meeting held on September 16, the
140_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 28; Downs, op. cit., p. 120; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 199-200; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 189-190;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 133, 426; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 105.
Original quotation marks.