Acronyms
2.7 The UNC Cancels Paragraph 13(d) in 1957
summer 1956 NNSC members were for a few months put under
“house arrest” by the UNC in Panmunjom. They were not allowed to leave the area except to visit American hospitals or make official trips, but in the latter case the permission of the South Korean authorities was required. The UNC lifted the restrictions in the summer of 1958 and completely abolished them in 1970.82
to establish that the plane was armed.
At the extraordinary NNSC meeting held on November 12, Poland and Czechoslovakia were for the dispatch but Sweden and Switzerland were against; no decision was made. No agreement was reached either when the Commission convened its 283rd plenary meeting on November 15. At an extra-ordinary meeting held the following day, it was decided that the NNSC would inform the armistice parties that no agreement had been reached to dispatch a mobile inspection team. At the 157th MAC secretary meeting convened on November 20, the dead pilot and the destroyed aircraft were returned after a receipt had been handed over.83
According to the South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003), the suspension of the NNSC’s work in 1956 had been made in advance to prepare for stationing “more modern and efficient weapons”
referring to such dual-capacity weapons as guided missiles with the capability to load nuclear warheads in South Korea. However, already on January 31, 1955, the UNC Commander had suggested a disso- lution of the NNSC and a cancellation of Paragraph 13(c) and (d) to the US Ministry of Defense (cf. p. 66). He asserted that, even if all the other 15 countries who had taken part in the Korean War to assist South Korea did not agree, the US should even act unilaterally to accomplish these targets. On February 5, the US Army expressed its full support for the proposal, but the Ministry of Defense argued that from a political and legal point of view such a unilateral act was not at all desirable. The meeting held on February 24 by the 16 countries that
83_Benckert, ibid., pp. 2-3; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 53, 280; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 121.
had dispatched troops to South Korea expressed support for rearma- ments.
At the South Korean government’s National Security Council meeting held April 21, the UNC Commander argued that since the Soviet Union openly brought new weapons into North Korea outside the ports of entry, the longer Paragraph 13(d) were maintained, the more disadvantageous it would become for the US. But in the end, the US administration failed to reach any agreement; it was easy to agree that Czechoslovakia and Poland were “hostile countries” but to prove the North’s armistice violations to rationalize the dissolution of Paragraph 13(d) was no easy task.84
On May 14, 1957, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced at a press conference that the Americans would bring atomic warheads to South Korea to meet the Syngman Rhee govern- ment’s request. The final step towards dismantling the Armistice Agreement was taken at the 75th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on June 21. The South then unilaterally declared that it would suspend Paragraph 13(d) “... until military balance was restored and the northern side proved by actions its intention to observe the provisions of the AA”; a stumbling block for introducing new weapons was removed. It claimed that the North had violated Paragraph 13(d) by bringing in combat materials not mentioned there and by introducing equipment that in terms of capacity and style were entirely different from those they had when the armistice was signed, without reporting and outside the ports of entry.
84_Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 179; Pak, op. cit., 2003, pp. 46-8. Original quotation marks.
Recall that the 16 allied nations are enumerated on p. 49: fn. 41.
The UNC informed the NNSC about its decision the same day.
Reporting to the NNSC ceased. For replacements of combat material, discontinuation was definitive but for the rotation of military personnel temporary. At the MAC meeting, the KPA/CPV regarded the de- claration as “non-valid” and asserted that the UNC, by the introduction of large amounts of new weapons, was rearming South Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement, which it urged the UNC to observe. No party could unilaterally amend the agreement. According to Colonel Tore Wigforss (1957), the North accused the US of being a warmonger and through the assistance of the Syngman Rhee “clique”
of trying to make South Korea an American colony and a base for nuclear weapons. The South regarded these accusations as groundless.
Downs (1999) writes [without saying when] that the North Koreans vociferously accused the UNC of “wrecking the armistice agreement and incapacitating the NNSC and its inspection regime.”
At the 76th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on June 26, the North again accused the US of making South Korea a base for nuclear weapons. It criticized the conclusion of the mutual US-South Korea defence agreement in 1953 and claimed that the US was plann- ing a permanent division of Korea. The North asserted that the unilateral cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) was a severe armistice violation and requested a withdrawal. The South responded that the MAC was not a proper forum to discuss political issues. At the 77th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on July 28, the North again criticized the rearma- ment of South Korea and urged, to the author’s knowledge, for the first time a withdrawal of the American troops. The South pointed out that the North from the beginning had not reported the introduction of combat materials to the NNSC. Until the North observed Paragraph
13(d), the South could depart from the obligations to follow it.85 At the 78th meeting held on October 11, the South accused the North of being responsible for the current state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula. The North argued that peace had not been secured because the US had not withdrawn from South Korea. Considering these counter-accusations and previous accounts of the MAC meetings, it is not surprising that Wigforss (1957) writes that the atmosphere during the meetings, 113 of which were held between 1953 and 1959, should be regarded “as close to hostile.” His compatriot Brigadier-General Sven Tilly in his report for November 1957-May 1958 to the Foreign Ministry even described the atmosphere as “extremely hostile.” In the report for March-December 1959 to the Foreign Ministry, the Swedish Major General Karl Ångström wrote: “The meetings are characterized, especially by the northern side, by great savageness with personal and insulting attacks. There is no objective discussion of facts.”
According to Lee (2001a), the North’s pure anti-American political propaganda comprised 65-70 percent of their Senior Member’s speeches in the late 1950s. In 2004, he wrote: “During the period between 1958 and 1964 North Korea utilized more than 70% of the meeting time to dispense slanderous political propaganda and threats to the U.S. and the ROK.” In contrast, “During the first four years of the Armistice, North Korea utilized about 34% of meeting time for this purpose.”
To the author’s knowledge, at the 56th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 22, 1955, the South for the first time had
85_Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 600; Downs, op. cit., p. 109; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op.
cit., 1999, pp. 53-4; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 179-180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op.
cit., 1993, pp. 54-5; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 39-40; Wigforss, op.
cit., pp. 0, 1. Original quotation marks.
pointed out that the North abused the Commission for propaganda purposes. At the 58th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on May 25 the same year, the South again pointed out that the North called meetings for propaganda purposes but also to criticize the South.86 Whether true or not, the evaluations show that the trust and credibility necessary for successful negotiations were absent in the MAC.
Regarding the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d), the Czech and Polish members argued that the NNSC had to prevent a new war by condemning the UNC/MAC action as a violation of the Armistice Agreement and a threat to peace. On the other hand, the Swedish and Swiss representatives argued that the Commission as a neutral body with a mandate from both parties could not work without being united in this case and asserted that the issue lay outside its mandate.
In the end, no agreement was reached; the NNSC failed to become “...a kind of war parties’ court of arbitration...”. Notably, at the 324th Plenary Meeting held on July 25, 1957, the Polish member expressed the opinion “...that the activity of the NNSC constitutes a very im- portant factor in the cause of preserving peace in Korea” (cf. pp. 29-30, 68, 87).
After the UNC had ceased to report on combat material, the Swedish-Swiss opinion was that only reports on personnel would be evaluated and forwarded to the MAC, a proposal which Czecho-
86_Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 172: table 2; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 44, 45, 55; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 150: op. cit., 2004, p. 158; Tilly, Viktigare tilldragelser inom den neutrala övervakningskommissionen november 1957-maj 1958 (Panmunjom, May 27, 1958), pp. 0, 7; Wigforss, ibid., pp. 0, 2; Ångström, Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea mars 1959-december 1959 (Panmunjom, December 31, 1959), pp. 0, 2.
slovakia and Poland opposed. In the autumn, the NNSC delivered two separate reports for June on combat material and personnel respectively to the MAC. But from July onwards reports only covered evaluations of personnel. In November, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the reports also for August-October.87
The cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) further reduced the NNSC’s tasks. In the words of Mueller-Lhotska (1997): “Its essential role now consisted of a mere symbolical presence aimed at manifesting the vital importance to both parties of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.” The official weekly meetings every Tuesday at 10 a.m. at the NNSC Head- quarters continued to be held, but sessions only lasted for two to four minutes. Documents that were formally correct but had practically no contents as to their real aim were approved according to established standards. At the meetings, an agenda was adopted, the records of the preceding session were approved, the number of records on replace- ments of combat materials or the rotation of personnel were taken into account and the date of the next session was decided. Once a month it was also said that the reports “had not proved any violation of the Armistice Agreement,” meaning that both sides’ data had been correct from an arithmetical viewpoint. MAC members from both sides attended the official meetings as observers. The approved minutes and adopted declarations were handed over to the MAC and delivered to the NNSC archive at its Headquarter.
Following the meetings, the Chairmen of each delegation could invite the Heads of the delegations and their Alternates to take part in
87_Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 29; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 40; Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Partly Verbatim Record of the 324th Plenary Meeting, Panmunjom (July 25, 1957), pp. 1, 2; Wigforss, ibid., pp. 3-5.
an informal meeting in the part of the NNSC building that North Korea maintained. Despite occasional ideological differences, these talks were held in a friendly atmosphere that enabled a reasonable solution to pending issues. Through the daily meetings of secretaries in the NNSC building, important contacts between the UNC/MAC and the KPA/CPV were sustained; good mutual relations could be established across the MDL. Until 1957, the implementation of the Analytic Branch was an important task of the secretary. The rotating secretaries had to verify the reports that the war parties delivered once a month and present the results to the Heads of Delegations for approval. When supervision activities ended, the Secretaries’ activities were more or less reduced to purely administrative work such as preparing sessions and editing documents. The work has since been routine.88
In December 1957, the UNC informed the MAC that the South would face the threat of military action by North Korea, which had superior conventional weapons, by stationing nuclear weapons in South Korea. In January 1958, UN and South Korean troops carried out the joint military exercise “Snow Flake” close to the DMZ. Now 280- mm nuclear guns were employed for the first time. On January 29, it was reported in the press that the UNC had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. The weapons were Honest John missiles and “atomic artillery.” On February 3, artillery pieces and Honest John missiles were shown without any hesitation to the public at a big troop parade at the First Army Headquarter close to Seoul. On May 1, exhibition
88_Bettex, op. cit., p. 25; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, ibid., pp. 40, 70-71. Original quotation marks after the first quotation. The author’s readings of numerous NNSC reports confirm that work has been routine.
firing of the missiles and atomic artillery took place at the central front lines.
Following the press report, the KPA/CPV called the 80th MAC meeting held on February 1. The North vehemently criticized the South for having violated the Armistice Agreement, including making South Korea a base for nuclear war as one aspect of its preparations for nuclear war that was the reason for cancelling Paragraph 13(d). The South responded that it firmly observed the Armistice Agreement and that the only way to maintain military balance was to replace old-style weapons with brand-new ones. As at the 77th meeting, the UNC/
MAC claimed that it had the right to depart from the obligations to follow Paragraph 13(d) since the North did not observe it (but the South would observe all other paragraphs). The North again protested that the unilateral cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) was in violation of the Armistice Agreement, which it still regarded as non-valid. At the 84th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC convened on July 2, 1958, the North criticized the US for rearming South Korea by introducing large quantities of nuclear weapons and combat materials.89
On February 3, the KPA/CPV had submitted a letter condemning the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Korea to the NNSC. It was demanded that the NNSC should “carefully observe the UNC’s criminal activities.” The Czech and the Polish delegate suggested that the NNSC should “express its concerns regarding the current situation and expect a rapid improvement.” The Swedish-
89_Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 29; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 58; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 55-6, 57-8;
Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, ibid., p. 40; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 41; Tilly, op. cit., p. 3. Original quotation marks.
Swiss view was again that the issue lay outside the mandate. At an extra meeting held on February 4, the Czech member emphasized the flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement. In his opinion, it was the Commission’s task to analyze each justified claim regarding violations of the agreement from both sides. The Polish member shared his view. The Czech member also wanted the NNSC to inform the MAC of its views. The joint Swedish-Swiss position was that the NNSC should formally acknowledge having received the letter and then put it in the files. Since the Swiss side regarded the issue to be outside the Commission’s area of competence, no decision was made and the meeting was adjourned for one week.
At the second meeting held on the same issue, the NNSC members repeated their strict positions, but the Swedish-Swiss side wanted to further investigate the Czech proposal to send a letter. This meeting, too, was adjourned for one week. At the third meeting, the Swedish member declared that he could not support the submission of a letter for the same reason as before. The Swiss member thought that the NNSC could inform the MAC of having received the letter on the condition that no comments were made. After the Czech member had worked out such a letter proposal, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Switzer- land decided to send the letter but Sweden abstained. However, it turned out that the Swiss member had made an almost similar pro- posal as the Czech member to find a solution acceptable to all parties.
Eventually, the letter was forwarded to the MAC without any com- ments - it just said that the NNSC had “considered” the received letter.90
90_Edebäck, Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea oktober 1958-mars 1959 (Panmunjom, March 19, 1959), p. 8; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, ibid., pp. 29-30; Tilly, ibid., pp. 3-4. Original quotation marks.
In 1958, another crisis arose on February 16. A South Korean civilian airplane with 34 passengers was hijacked by five North Korean agents during a flight from Pusan to Seoul. At the 81st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on February 24, the North argued that it was not a problem to be raised in the MAC but to be solved between the two states’ authorities. It maintained this position at the 82nd, 83rd and 84th meetings held on March 10, March 20 and July 2 respectively, the first requested by the KPA/CPV and the two latter by the UNC/MAC. The South requested a prompt return of the plane and the passengers. A return of the plane was also urged at the 82nd, 83rd and 84th meetings. After the plane reportedly had landed safely in P’yôngyang on February 17, 26 passengers were returned on March 6 through Panmunjom after the UNC had admitted a violation of the Armistice Agreement and provided a receipt (no. 20). Eight anti- communists were killed on suspicion of being spies. When the South raised the return of the plane on the anniversary of the hijacking, the North referred to its previous responses and considered the issue terminated.
At the 85th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on July 14, the North accused the South of having violated the Armistice Agreement by establishing a “guided missile base” close to the DMZ and introducing brand-new weapons such as Honest John missiles and atomic artillery, obstructing peaceful re-unification. An immediate withdrawal of nuclear weapons was requested. The South responded that new weapons introduced after the cancellation of Paragraph 13 (d) would not be withdrawn since the North, by rearming, had violated the agreement. As at the 80th meeting, modernization of equipment was defended by arguing that it was necessary to maintain military
balance. In a missive letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member to the NNSC, the base was regarded as “a hostile and provocative act from the UNC.” Hopefully, “the NNSC would pay attention to this armistice violation.” Subsequently, the Czechs and Poles wanted the NNSC to assert the agreement in some un-specified way. The Swedish and Swiss members argued that the NNSC should not discuss politics but that the MAC was the correct forum for raising such violations.91
The UNC/MAC repeated its non-withdrawal of new weapons at the 91st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 19.
The North accused the South of establishing a “guided missile base” by having introduced Matador missiles in mid-December to make South Korea an outpost for a regional nuclear war. The South protested that the North had obstructed the inspection teams’ work and after the armistice was signed had illegally introduced then non-existing fighter planes as well as weapons on a large scale. As long as Paragraph 13(d) was not observed, the South would not follow it either. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Kang Sang Ho, had pointed out in a letter to the NNSC that the introduction of missiles was particularly serious since it took place at a time when the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) had just been withdrawn. On October 28, the withdrawal of around 200,000 CPVs was completed, but in accordance with the Armistice Agreement the Chinese MAC members remained in Kaesông.
91_Edebäck, ibid., pp. 6, 8-9; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 59-60, 61-2; Kim, “Hyujôn ihu ssangbang chôngjôn hyôpchông wiban,” in Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2006, p. 226; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 56-7, 58, 60-61; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 121; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op.
cit., p. 41; Pak, “Pukhan-ûi hyujôn hyôpchông wiban sarye-mit t’onggye,” Pukhan (July 1995), p. 118; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 42; Reuterswärd, Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea maj-oktober 1958 (Panmunjom, October 13, 1958), pp. 3, 5, 6. Original quotation marks.