Acronyms
3.3 Armistice Violations on Land
According to Kim (2003), alleged armistice violations by both sides included, besides insignificant ones such as not wearing arm- bands, in order of frequency: bringing in heavy and automatic wea- pons, shootings in the DMZ and constructing fortifications and military camp sites. The number of armistice violations rose; the UNC recorded 88 provocations from the North against the MDL in 1965 and 80 in 1966 but 784 in 1967 and 985 in 1968. Most of these incidents occurred along the part of the MDL controlled by the US Army. Since in 1968 shootings took place from the strategic military campsites that had been built to support intrusions, the DMZ became, to quote Kim (2003), “a battle-place for both sides.” Kim points to the militarization of the DMZ as the main reason for these frequent shooting incidents.
At the 117th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on April 19, 1960, both sides accused each other of dispatching spies. When the 119th meeting called by the UNC/MAC took place on May 19, the South had accused the North of repairing and constructing bunkers and military camp sites. It also protested against the refusal to dispatch a joint observation team (JOT) to investigate them. The North claimed that, since the Armistice Agreement does not prohibit construction of buildings in the DMZ for civilian police, the request to dispatch a JOT
“Korea United: North & South Set Aside Differences to Demine” (http://www.
maic.jmu.edu/ journal/5.1/Focus/keith_F/keith.html); Hahm, The Living History of the DMZ: 30 Years of Journeys in the Borderlands (Seoul: Eastward Publications, Inc., 2004), pp. 5, 188, 191; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 232; Kim,
“Win-win-ûi DMZ,” in Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2000, pp. 33-4: DMZ p’yônghwa tapsa:
Nambuk p’yônghwa-wa Namnam hwahae-rûl wihae (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Orûm, 2006), pp. 8, 59, 93, 211; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 181-2; Lee, ibid., 2001(b), p. 100;
Lerner, op. cit., pp. 114, 115. In 2004, the author saw a warning sign for mines at the hill Paekhwasan in the small town T’aean.
was foolish; the issue was an internal one. Notably, at the 210th MAC secretary meeting convened on June 24, the South admitted the North’s claim that on June 18 one shell had fallen on the North’s territory in a major armistice violation (no. 21). At the 211th meeting held on July 6, the South protested that on June 24 two armed soldiers from the North had crossed the MDL, one of whom was killed, but the North asserted that the protest was fabricated. When the 220th meeting took place on November 5, the South denied accusations made by the North on September 28 and October 4 of shooting incidents in the DMZ.112
At the 235th meeting held on July 26, 1961, the North claimed that the fifth Joint Observer Team had concluded that spies from the South had intruded into the northern part of the DMZ, but the South argued that these incidents were fabricated by the North. When the 250th meeting took place on September 15, 1962, the South asserted that its investigation of the North’s protest made at the 249th meeting convened on August 14 against a shooting incident in the DMZ had concluded that it was false. At the 252nd meeting held on December 11, the South denied the North’s protest made at the 251st meeting convened on October 27 against a shooting incident in the DMZ. At the 253rd meeting held on January 10, 1963, the South rejected the North’s claim that more than the jointly agreed 35 guards had been brought into the Joint Security Area.
When the 179th plenary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on November 16, 1963, the South accused the North of
112_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 98, 99; Kim, ibid., 2003, pp. 178, 182;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 73, 295-6, 298. Original quotation marks.
having killed a South Korean captain and wounded a UN soldier who had taken part in a patrol controlling border posts. Shootings took place with automatic weapons that are prohibited in the DMZ. The North denied any knowledge of the incident. At the 181st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 26, the North accused the South of having crossed the border with a patrol from the US Army Intelligence Group and firing shots on December 17. The North then killed one soldier in self-defence and captured another. Again, the South denied any knowledge.113 The rising number of incidents shows that North-South tension had risen; “negative peace” characterized the state of affairs more than during the 1950s.
At the 307th secretary meeting held on January 12, 1966, the South asserted that the North’s protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ and shooting and arson incidents in the zone were groundless. When the 312th meeting took place on March 11, the South claimed that the North’s accusations of deliberate shoot- ings in the northern part of the DMZ and the introduction of machine guns into the zone were groundless. At the 315th meeting held on April 29, both parties accused each other of arson incidents and the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ. When the 226th plenary meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on May 26, the North claimed that on May 17 more than 300 rounds had been fired into its part of the DMZ. On May 18, four armed personnel from the South had crossed the MDL, intruded into the North’s territory and fired automatic rifles.
113_Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 102, 103, 302, 306, 307, 308; Uggla, op. cit., p. 2.
When the 227th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on July 22, the South denied both incidents and blamed that they were deliberately fabricated. The South claimed that, in a planned incident on May 27, armed personnel from the North had intruded into the UNC’s part of the DMZ, violating the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 6 prohibiting hostile acts within the DMZ and Paragraph 7 prohibiting unauthorized crossings of the MDL. The two South Korean soldiers who repelled the attack were wounded. One North Korean soldier was killed. The North asserted that the incident was fabricated. At the 318th secretary meeting held on August 12, the South refuted the North’s protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ.
On October 21, armed North Korean agents crossed the MDL in broad daylight and at the western front of the DMZ ambushed a South Korean Army food transport vehicle and then returned. In the attack, six South Korean soldiers were killed, three were severely wounded and one was kidnapped. Notably, the UNC regarded this incident as the most serious armistice violation so far. It immediately protested against the incident by telephone and started an investigation. However, before it was over, the KPA/CPV had called the 231st MAC plenary meeting convened on October 25. Before the UNC had protested against the act, the North claimed that the UNC had driven four tanks into the DMZ and fired hundreds of shells into the North’s part of the DMZ. The North entirely denied the October 21 incident.114
114_Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 6, 7; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 189, 192; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 126, 127, 129, 325, 326-7, 328; Lee, op. cit., JSA - Panmunjôm (1953～1994), 2001(a), pp. 147, 148.
At the 241st meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on February 10, 1967, the South protested that on February 3 armed personnel had crossed the MDL on the eastern front. One of the intruders had been killed at an observation post. The North claimed that on February 2 their civilian police had been attacked, denied the protest and showed a US-made carbine as evidence of the South Korean infiltration. Then it turned out that the gun had been stolen in the October 21 attack. When the UNC/MAC Senior Member sharply protested, the North Koreans were much confused. Not only was the attack confirmed but the claim against the South had turned out to be false and the handling of weapons to be a mess. At the 245th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 18, the North criticized the South for having laid mines in the DMZ, but the UNC/MAC refuted this accusation at the 246th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on April 22.
At the latter meeting, the North asserted that on April 20 trench mortars had been fired into its part of the DMZ, but the South claimed that there were no traces of any such action. At the 247th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on May 26, the South protested that on May 22 armed personnel from the North had intentionally crossed the MDL and thrown hand grenades into two front-line units of the US Second Army Division, killing two soldiers and wounding 19 before they escaped. This was the first such attack since July 1953.
Many pieces of evidence had been found besides, but the North denied all knowledge. Previously, on April 28, four intruders had crossed the MDL and on April 29 attacked a checkpoint in the South with hand-grenades. In a counterattack, one intruder was killed and two were wounded but one escaped. The North claimed that these
incidents had been fabricated by the South to conceal the fact that it had introduced heavy weapons into the DMZ and carried out [non- exemplified] hostile acts against the North; these protests were false.
At the 249th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on June 13, another carbine was shown to support the allegation that South Korea had dispatched soldiers into North Korea but it also turned out to have been stolen from the same vehicle on October 21, 1966; the North Koreans lost credibility. When the 256th MAC meeting re- quested by the UNC/MAC took place on December 12, the South claimed that there had been 181 cases of armed intrusions across the MDL into the South since January 1967, but the North did not admit any cases. In response to the North’s armed infiltrations, a special unit of the South Korean Army had reportedly around September 3 crossed the MDL and caused severe damage to North Korean military in- stallations. One South Korean soldier had died in the attack. In November, 12 South Korean soldiers from a special corps had blown up a Korean People’s Army divisional headquarters without sustaining any casualties.115
On March 22, 1967, the only case known to the author of an alleged North Korean double agent began when Lee Su-gun falsely defected as a journalist in Panmunjom while the 242nd MAC meeting was taking place. Lee was vice-president of the only North Korean news agency, Korean Central News Agency. The North protested at
115_Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1999, pp. 209-210, 211; Kim, op. cit., 2003, pp.
183, 184; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 133-4, 136, 137, 138, 141;
Lee, ibid., 2001(a), pp. 40, 147-8: Panmunjom, Korea, 2004, pp. 164-5; Rolf, Månadsrapport för maj 1967 (Panmunjom, June 1, 1967), p. 1; Vance Mission to Korea, February 9-15, 1968: Final Report, p. 6. Original quotation marks.
the 333rd MAC secretary meeting held on March 23 that he had been kidnapped, but the South emphasized that he fled voluntarily.
Although warmly welcomed in 1967, he was sentenced to death in a court on May 10, 1969, for, among other things, having gathered data on South Korea and forwarded a coded message to the North Korean embassy in Moscow via Hong Kong. He did not appeal against the sentence and was eventually hanged on July 3 the same year.
In South Korea, Lee was supervised by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). During his trial, he confessed that he had been dispatched to South Korea to spy, implying that the “defection”
had been arranged, but at the time of his defection South Korea claimed that he was a real defector; he was praised and utilized for anti-North Korean propaganda. The only personal accounts the author has found of a meeting with Lee Su-gun after his defection, recorded by James Lee, contradict the view that he was a real defector; James Lee’s opinion during their meeting was that he had not changed at all. At this meeting, Lee Su-gun said: “The US has come to South Korea to attack North Korea again and launch war.” When asked why he had defected, Lee Su-gun replied that it was inevitable due to his personal troubles.
In January 1969, Lee had tried to return to North Korea via Hong Kong and Saigon, but he was arrested at Saigon Airport by the South Korean Embassy Counsellor, Lee Dae-Ung, on his way to Cam- bodia; the CIA had informed the KCIA, which ordered the arrest. On February 1, he was brought back to Seoul. About two weeks later, he was condemned in a public statement by the KCIA as a North Korean double agent who had escaped from South Korea to return to North Korea via Cambodia. Counsellor Lee testified in 1999, based on KCIA
data, that he was not a returning double agent. James Lee (2004) records his personal view that, if he had been a double agent, he would at least have superficially cooperated with the KCIA on some of its anti-North Korea propaganda programs rather than completely rejecting their request for support. If he had planned to return to North Korea, as accused by the court during the trial, it would have been far easier to travel via Japan than via Cambodia, a neutral state where he may have wanted to live.116 To the author’s knowledge, at present Lee Su-gun is not considered to have been a double agent.
In 1967, the UNC’s approach, as it had suggested on October 28, 1964, was that unless one side presented the other with a pro- posed agenda, the MAC would meet no more than once a month and no less than once every six months. North Korea rejected the proposal and called the 253rd MAC meeting to be held on August 16, 1967, to unleash anti-American propaganda in line with a campaign by the Korean Workers Party at the time. The North requested another meeting immediately afterward for the same purpose, but since no serious armistice violation was alleged, the UNC delayed the meeting for a week and demanded an agenda. The North Korean’s response to this apparent delaying tactic was to show force. On August 28, armed infiltrators were sent across the DMZ in broad daylight to attack the US 76th Army Engineer Battalion at the UNC/MAC advance camp. One American soldier and two South Korean soldiers were killed and 12
116_Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 332-3; Lee, “Yi Su-gun, chôngmal ijung kanch’ôp iônna” (http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/nd9802/
98020170.html), pp. 10, 13: ibid., 2004, pp. 174-6; Sergel, Månadsrapport för juni 1969 (Panmunjom, July 8, 1969), pp. 7-8; Yi, “Nambuk pundan-gwa P’anmun- jôm-ûi silch’e,” Pukhan (July 1994), pp. 55-6. Original quotation marks.
Americans and nine South Koreans were wounded. Since the advance camp served the MAC and the NNSC, the attack was regarded as the most serious armistice violation so far (cf. p. 138). Its purpose was to force the UNC to come to the table.
The issue was raised at the 254th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on September 8. The UNC/MAC protested and de- manded an investigation by a joint observer team (JOT). The North Koreans refused to agree to a JOT investigation since it had no authority outside the DMZ itself and argued that the UNC had intruded into the northern part of the DMZ. They showed carbines and explosives as evidence. However, the UNC/MAC claimed that they had been stolen during the October 21, 1966 attack, but no conclusion was reached.
The UNC/MAC’s call for an NNSC investigation was also rejected since the Czech and Polish delegates refused to permit an investigation of a violation that the Commission had specific responsibility for.117 The parallel with the obstruction tactics pursued during the years 1953-56 is obvious.
The American military intelligence analyst Richard A. Mobley records (2003) that in 1967 the US intelligence community identified a) North Korea’s commitment to re-unification under communist rule, b) diminished hopes of an internal revolution in the South, c) a stag- nating economy versus a booming one in the South, d) embarrassment over the inability to deter and match the South Korean commitment to support the Vietnam War and e) wishes to undermine the American presence in the South as an explanation of the rising number of attacks
117_Downs, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy, pp. 101-102; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 45; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 139, 140; Yi, ibid., July 1994, pp. 56-7.
on American and South Korean forces along the DMZ. On the other hand, according to Kim (2003), it is unclear whether the hard-line policy towards the US aimed to raise tension and start war or, as North Korea asserts, to meet the US hard-line policies towards the North and its war provocations. In the author’s view, both explanations could be valid, but it is extremely unlikely that either party aimed to launch a new war, although in the MAC the North had accused the South of war preparations altogether 24 times throughout the 1960s.
Kim also notes that throughout 1968, incidents involving the intrusion of armed spies and clashes along the MDL were more fre- quent than in any other year. On 186 days, serious incidents took place mainly within the DMZ. The death toll was 145 South Korean soldiers, 18 American soldiers and 35 civilians. The numbers of wounded were 240, 54 and 16 respectively. In addition, 312 armed North Korean intruders were killed.118 Negative peace reached a peak.
Lee (2001b) records that between 1966 and 1968, North Korea launched armed attacks on UNC/South Korean guard posts in the DMZ on 244 occasions, causing the deaths of 260 South Korean soldiers, 34 US military personnel, 58 South Korean civilians and 549 North Korean infiltrators. The number of the wounded was 409 South Korean soldiers, 105 US military personnel and 69 South Korean civilians. Lee (2001a) points out that when major incidents were raised in the MAC between 1966 and 1969, more than 70 percent of the North Korean speeches consisted of political propaganda (cf. p. 96).
According to Downs (1999), between January 1966 and De-
118_Kim, op. cit., 2003, pp. 184, 191; Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003), cover, pp.
11-12.
cember 1969, 75 US and 299 South Korean military personnel, 80 South Korean civilians and 647 North Korean infiltrators were killed in North Korean actions directed against the South. In addition, 111 US and 550 South Korean military personnel as well as 91 South Korean civilians were wounded at a time when North Korea had waged armed attacks against American and South Korean forces in and near the DMZ on more than 280 occasions. In fact, Mobley writes that the years 1967-69 are sometimes called the “Second Korean War.”
Downs explains the escalation of violent acts against the UNC and South Korea by North Korea by its realization in the mid-1960s that its efforts to foment revolution in South Korea and force a withdrawal of American forces had failed miserably. The timing of the violence con- curred with rising US involvement in the Vietnam War. Notably, Lee (2004) argues that the main reason for North Korea’s failure to achieve national re-unification by taking over South Korea, either militarily or politically, was the presence of the American forces.119
The far higher level of negative peace in the 1960s is indisputable.
Along with the expression “Second Korean War,” such a situation gives credibility to the opinion that an invisible war took place in the Korean peninsula, as quoted in the Introduction. However, it is virtually impossible to determine whether Lee’s opinion is correct or not, but the American forces were a very important factor.
On April 13, 1968, North Korea proposed to hold the 266th MAC meeting on April 17 but without providing any agenda. On April
119_Downs, op. cit., pp. 117-119; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 153: op. cit., 2001(b), p.
101: op. cit., 2004, p. 60; Mobley, ibid., p. 8. Original quotation marks. For casualties from North Korean armistice violations, 1953-1991, see Appendix IX, pp. 682-3.