Chapter 3: An adequate Christian ecological theology
3.2 Anthropology
3.2.4 Ecojustice
This demonstrates the need for an anthropology where human beings are open to and orientated towards the triune God. The researcher believes one of the values in Barth's
dialectical theology is that it emphasises the depravity of human beings and their need for God.
Synthesising this with the concept of humanity's dependence on creation means that human beings are to exercise humility before God and creation. This does not mean that they are to worship creation, only to care for it.
For Barth, it is only when human beings are open to God (through Christ) that they realise they are sinners and that sin is destructive to both themselves and the world. Knowing God thus leads to knowledge of humanity, sin and grace (1961: 359ff). This highlights the necessity for human beings to be aware of sin and their need for grace. But how are we to understand sin from an ecological perspective?
Conradie notes that one of the central tasks for an ecological theology is to clarify the nature of sin (2005b: 4-22). Ecological theology responds to the result of human sin (i.e. the ecological crisis) and challenges, "alienation, anthropocentrism and human domination", but, ecological theology needs to move beyond this and rearticulate what the nature of sin is (: 5, 16). The estrangement of humanity from creation has been viewed as one possible interpretation:
humanity is alienated due to its belief that it is superior to creation. There is a multiplicity of interpretations for sin in ecological theologies. However, the issue here is whether or not an ecological theology takes sin and its impact on creation seriously.
This demonstrates that ecojustice is concerned with the welfare of both human and nonhuman beings. There is thus a concern for what D. Hessel calls "ecological health" and "economic justice" (1992: 9). When ecojustice happens, human being's basic needs are met so that
community is built. In this way people can live in harmony with God, one another and all of creation. In addition to this, ecojustice maintains that people are to appreciate creation and view it in a non-utilitarian manner.
J. Cobb, like Hessel, affirms the idea of an economics that is directed towards community. He refers to this an "economics of community" (: 37). He writes,
the economy should be ordered for the well-being of human communities understood to be immersed in larger natural communities whose well-being is also important (: 37).
Hessel and Cobb indicate that there needs to be harmony between God, humanity and the entire creation. However, harmony and peace break down when there is violence.
Moltmann notes that humanity has a violent relationship with creation and that peace will only occur when human beings realise that "other living things" have values and rights (1990: 255).
This means not viewing nature from a utilitarian perspective, but from a justice perspective.
Justice brings about peace: human beings are to strive for the rights of nonhuman creation.
Moreover, Moltmann believes that the term imago Dei points to the idea that human beings have a responsibility for nonhuman beings (1984: 28-9). He insists that every human being has the right to be responsible and self-determining. Human beings are working towards a future that includes fellowship with God, human beings and the entire creation. Being responsible and self-determining means that, "people live personally, collectively, economically, and ecologically in time and history" (: 29).
In other words, if human beings are to struggle for justice in the world, they are to include not only human rights, but the rights of the entire creation as well. This means that an ecological theology should be a form of liberation theology that links social domination with the abuse of nature (Bouma-Prediger 1995: 270).
Ruether notes that there is continuity between the ecological crisis and issues of social
domination. Where there is social domination, nature is dominated as well (1981: 59). Ruether critiques any social system that facilitates high profits for a select few by giving low wages to many people, encouraging high prices and allowing poor working conditions. These
individuals also do nothing about pollutants from industrial processes. As was the case with scholars mentioned before, Ruether insists social justice is required for ecological integrity (: 60).
If the right of all life is to be affirmed how does the issue of value relate to a complexity hierarchy? Humanity's uniqueness does not afford it more dignity than the rest of creation (Conradie 2005c: 120f). If the dignity of human beings is to be affirmed so is that of
nonhuman beings. The entire creation has dignity, because of God's love for it. It appears to be a complex issue on whether or not human and nonhuman beings have the same dignity, worth and value. While all life forms have intrinsic value, they do not necessarily have equal value.
According to D. Griffin, "intrinsic value" is the value anything "has in and for itself;
"extrinsic value" is the value things have for "anything else" (1994: 192). "Instrumental value"
is a form of external value and at the anthropological level is a form of utilitarianism, because it understands non-human beings in terms of their usefulness for human beings. At an extreme level this turns creation into an object.
Intrinsic value on the other hand makes something a subject (Birch 1990: 59). A subject is able to experience its environment. Everything in the created order experiences the need to live, survive and endure. This is a fundamental way of understanding life. Everything thus has intrinsic value.
However instrumental value also means the value something has for another in terms of survival. At the human level this means that human beings need to use the natural environment for their basic needs. J. McDaniel therefore maintains that both intrinsic and instrumental value is needed for creation's integrity (1990: 230-1). Humankind should use the latter responsibly.
Griffin also speaks of "ecological value" (1994: 192). This is a form of extrinsic value where something has value in terms of its capacity to support the processes of life. Examples would
be food, water and air. It will also include the role that various non-human and human beings have in sustaining an ecosystem.
It is with this in mind that Conradie writes, "The health of the ecosystem has priority over the health of individual specimens" (2005c: 127). These insights imply that although not all beings in creation have equal value, they do never the less have intrinsic value. For example, it would be poor advice to imply that viruses and bacteria have more value than human beings. A human being should have the freedom to kill a fly or malaria mosquito.