Chapter 4: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God cosmology
4.3 McFague's counter to a mechanistic understanding of the universe
McFague believes there are two predominant cosmological models: machine and organism (1993a: 15). The mechanistic model utilises atomism and reductionism to articulate the
universe. With this model the parts of something are considered to be primary. It is shown how these parts influence the whole. In other words mechanism takes bottom-up causation
seriously. Things are understood at the most fundamental level with the consequence that they become nothing more then their most basic parts.
McFague provides a polemic of the machine model (: 33-4). She believes it enforces the notion that nature is simply composed of non-living things. Such a view justifies the manipulation of nature. This metaphor has thus led to a distorted anthropology. It encourages the view of a self objectified from nature and thus permitted to dominate it. The consequence of this is a loss of any sense of connectedness to nature.
Moreover, McFague maintains the machine model is highly individualistic (1987: 7). The objects, things or entities that are located in the universe are viewed in a substantive manner.
This means that they are seen as separated from each other and relate only in an external manner. Mechanism stresses the immutability of the natural world. Entities do not have an inherent capacity for novelty and change. McFague therefore indicates that central to the machine model is the idea of predictability. She takes issue with this model, as it does not accept what is central to postmodern science: the notion that the universe is dynamic and relational. Moreover, a mechanistic view of reality does not iterate that notion that things or entities are constituted by internally based relations. It is apparent that McFague stands in opposition to much of the Western views in classical or modern science and philosophy. She opposes static, atomistic and reductionistic views on reality.
Is McFague's critique of mechanism justified? She makes the important point that the machine model is reductionistic. At the ontological level this means all things can be reduced to the most basic parts of nature. This model therefore assumes a kind of essentialism or
universalism. It was shown previously that an ecological theology takes both unity and diversity seriously. Metaphors of nature that demonstrate commonality and individuality are thus applicable for ecological theologies. The machine model emphasises simplicity at the expense of complexity. In this manner the rich diversity that is observable in the natural world is negated.
The machine model is reductionistic at the epistemological level as well. Reductionists are continually seeking a theory that will be able to explain everything in the universe, whether it is a "Grand Unified Theory" or "Theory Of Everything" (1993 a: 91). This epistemological approach is therefore thoroughly unpostmodern, because it does not appear to take various cultural and religious interpretations of reality seriously. It believes the scientific approach is the only hermeneutic.
In addition to this, mechanism only describes upward causation. In this manner higher levels are simply the output from lower levels. While this may be constructive in regard to describing how higher levels come about, it is inadequate when considering how higher levels interact with lower levels. No consideration is made as to how the whole interacts with and may influence its parts. The machine model can therefore not be used as a root metaphor for an ecological cosmology, as it does not take downward causation seriously enough. The machine model is incompatible with point one of the cosmology criteria.
The machine model also views reality in a very static manner. The universe is understood as entirely predictable, because the natural laws that govern it can be understood and explained. It was noted before that natural laws do exist within the natural order and these can be explained.
However, it was also indicated that there is a strong degree of openness and chance in nature.
This indeterminism 6 occurs in conjunction with these natural laws. Natural laws are of such a nature that they allow for a dynamic universe. Mechanism does not facilitate the notion of a dynamic universe.
And, the machine model only takes external relations into consideration, while ignoring the idea that the entities in the universe are internally related. Such an approach does not appropriate the idea of things being constituted by their relationships. Entities are separated from each other and are unable to generate change within themselves. McFague believes this dualistic, hierarchical manner of viewing reality is inadequate (1987: 11). Dualism promotes individualism and not relationship. The machine model is highly individualistic and thus nullifies the notion of a cosmic community. It was noted before that a relational view of the universe sees things as part of a community. This cosmic community metaphor is thus in consonance with an ecological cosmology. The machine model views the universe in a static manner and does not underscore the notion of a cosmic community. It is therefore opposed to point two of an ecological cosmology.
Another problem with the machine model is that it views nature as entirely self-sufficient with natural laws controlling and regulating it. This makes the need for divine agency minimal and even unnecessary. According to such a view the only adequate understanding for the G-W relationship is deism and if no God-concept is assumed then an atheistic outlook is
appropriated. When mechanism is taken to its logical conclusion, a naturalistic view of reality transpires. God then becomes the product of the evolutionary process or does not exist at all.
The machine model therefore does not appear to be theocentric. It may tend towards an anthropocentrism that enforces a form of naturalistic humanism. If nature is predictable, then a utilitarian understanding of the natural order assumes supremacy. The machine model may also become cosmocentric where things are nothing but atoms and molecules. In this manner everything is understood only according to physical and biological processes.
Determinism is the view that an event could only have happened in the manner that it did, in other words it is "determined (Reese 1999: 170). This position compromises free will. Indeterminism is the opposite of determinism.
The researcher is therefore in agreement with Sallie McFague in regard to the mechanistic model. Mechanism does not conform to the study's cosmological requirement and can thus be deemed insufficient as a root metaphor for a Christian ecological cosmology.