Chapter 6: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God theology
6.1 McFague's critique of various models for the God-world relationship
Chapter 6: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God
Thou type. McFague rightly critiques this model, because of its anthropocentrism and
individualism. The dialogical model does not take natural and social reality into consideration.
The third model that McFague considers is the monarchical (: 39). This model bears
resemblance to theism. God is understood as a king who controls loyal and obedient subjects.
The monarchical model informs several theologies' views on creation and providence. God's transcendence is emphasised in order to affirm His power and glory. God is understood in personal and political terms and thus opposes the negative tendencies of deism and the dialogical model. However, McFague takes issue with this model and identifies three major flaws with it: God is remote from the world, is only concerned with human reality and controls the world by dominating it (1987: 65).
First, the monarchical model stresses God's otherness and does not consider His being as a part of creation. God is understood as a king located in an otherworldly kingdom. The consequence of this is, "God is worldless and the world is Godless" (: 65). God' s involvement with the world is sporadic and external. This means that God cannot be internally related to creation.
A second issue with the monarchical model is its anthropocentrism (: 66f). God as a powerful king is only concerned with His human subjects and not the cosmos. God provides orders to human subjects who obey, but non-human beings are unable to do this. The monarchical model introduces and promotes dualistic hierarchies, because human subjects are inferior to their king. It was noted before what the consequences of a dualistic hierarchy may be.
McFague also takes issue with the monarchical model's approach to God's exercise of power (: 68f). God acts on the world, but not in it. According to McFague such an understanding of divine agency negates "human growth and responsibility" (: 68). The reason for this is that God does not distribute power, but monopolises it. The researcher is in agreement with McFague on this point. Such a view of divine sovereignty implies that human beings do not possess any capacity for self-transcendence and it does not acknowledge the power that human beings do have.
McFague addresses the agential model as well (2002b: 40). This model presupposes God as a person. This means that God may be viewed as a personal, historical agent: His intent and purpose is demonstrated in history. This model has been a resource for the doctrines of
creation, providence, salvation and eschatology: God creates ex nihilo for His glory and not out of necessity, guides and cares for the creation, provides an atoning sacrifice for humankind when it sins and then brings creation to fulfillment (: 41). McFague identifies difficulties with the agential model (: 41f). In the first instance, the sciences do not always facilitate divine agency. Attempts to correlate divine agency with cosmic processes simply endeavours to validate God's existence and scientific truth; they don't "pay attention to the world for its own flourishing" (: 41). Despite these issues McFague believes the agential model is promising, because it uses insights on human personhood.
McFague believes the agential model needs to be synthesised with the organic model (1993a:
141). The former maintains divine transcendence and the latter, divine immanence. The agential model cannot be used alone, because God gains a monopoly on power and freedom, while the organic model on its own negates individuality and freedom. McFague therefore attempts to construct a panentheistic model for the G-W relationship.
Macquarrie also takes issue with the monarchical model, arguing that Christian theology should focus attention on the organic model (1975: 151). The organic model affirms the mysteriousness and dignity of creation and therefore opposes anthropocentrism. Macquarrie insists, however, that the organic model should qualify the monarchical model and uses E.
Brunner's equations for the G-W relationship to explain this. Brunner argued for the sovereignty of God with the following equations:
God minus the world = God The world minus God = Zero (: 148)
Macquarrie observes that the organic model accepts the second of these equations, because the world requires the Spirit for its existence. The organic model cannot affirm the first equation, because it implies that God is not affected by the world. Macquarrie argues that while a loving God is influenced by the world, God did not create out of necessity, but due to the fact that God by God's nature is creative. Macquarrie maintains that the monarchical model needs qualification by the organic model and this will, in turn, "promote better attitudes to the
physical environment" (: 151). Macquarrie, like McFague, is critical of the monarchical model, however he does not abandon it choosing instead to synthesise it with the organic model.
McFague and Macquarrie thus both make an attempt to balance God's transcendence and immanence.
Barbour critiques the monarchical, deistic, dialogical and agential models. He believes the monarchical model with its stress on divine omnipotence does not facilitate human freedom sufficiently52 and makes God accountable for suffering and evil (1974: 157). Moreover, God's omnipotence is in opposition to natural laws, because God is understood to be able to negate these laws. Barbour believes the deistic model separates God and the universe. Providence is understood as God giving nature laws that allow it to be self-regulatory. According to this body, the universe is not dependent on God (: 157). Barbour believes the dialogical model separates humankind and nature to such a degree that cannot be validated by insights from ecology and evolutionary biologies. The overly subjective tendency of this model does not allow God to be related to nature (: 158). Barbour is more positive about the agential model, which indicates the notion that God relates to nature, but not in a coercive manner. According to this model God is able to act through natural and historical structures. If God's intentions are expressed in the cosmic process then the universe may be seen as part of God's purpose.
According to this model God's intentions gain priority over divine causation (: 160).
Barbour believes the dialogical and agential models are complimentary (: 166). Whereas the former stresses God's relationship with humankind, the latter addresses God's relationship with nature. Barbour's approach seems reasonable. A synthesis of these two models appears to overcome anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism. Such a synthesis may be theocentric, because God is the common factor for both. However, Barbour prefers a process model, because it provides a coherent account of the G-W relationship. He thus views the other models as secondary. What Barbour and McFague have in common is their appeal for an organic view of life, because process philosophy endorses the idea of the world as an organism. McFague, on the other hand stresses the agential model, while Barbour views it as secondary to the process model.
Barbour raises the issue of predestination here. The researcher is in agreement with him on this point, because predestination is deterministic and invariably results in fatalism.