Chapter 4: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God cosmology
5.2 The particularity of the human being
5.2.1 The soul-mind-body interaction
consciousness. They are relatedness. Human beings are formed by their relationships with each other and the cosmos. They realise who they are, because of their connection with the cosmos. Being a part of the cosmos means viewing it as a subject and not as an object (1999:
92). Gebara believes it is crucial for human beings to understand themselves as citizens of the earth and as creatures with an affinity with its soil (: 90).
Earthly citizenship relates to the notion of community. Moltmann's notion of the "imago mundi" is important in this regard (1985: 186). He believes an interpretation of the human being as imago mundi needs to precede the notion of imago Dei. The former stipulates that people are communal by nature. They can only exist when in relationship with other creatures.
Moreover, human beings are able to understand themselves only when in community.
Moltmann insists the importance for human beings to understand themselves not in terms of their superior position in the cosmos, but in relation to their common genesis with and evolution in it. Human beings are to fellowship with the creation community.
H. Sindima, writing from an African perspective, provides a lucid description of community (1990: 146). For him community as an awareness that all of creation is coherent. The multitude of creatures on the earth are part of each other. Human beings are a part of this community and thus share its destiny. The vision of such a community of nature is life in its entirety for human and non-human beings.
The body of God anthropology is thus compatible with point one of the study's ecological anthropology, as it stresses a relational view of personhood. The issue now is whether or not it provides strong enough arguments against a dualistic-reductionistic understanding of
personhood and thus an articulation of human particularity.
McFague argues it is self-consciousness and not rationality, which differentiates human beings from other beings (1993a: 122). She takes issue with the argument that intellect differentiates human beings from animals. Humans have developed the ability to reason logically and have a complex linguistic capacity, but the common creation story places them on a continuum with animals. However, rationality may be identified in higher animals as well (: 120). Rationality in this regard is understood as the ability to prioritise a set of preferences into a structure.
Higher animals have preferences and this indicates that they have the ability to reason. Self- consciousness, on the other hand, involves free will and therefore the ability to change a context. It is the capacity for the self to meditate on the notion that it knows and on what it knows (: 122). Self-consciousness provides human beings with knowledge and thus power.
McFague correctly observes that human beings are responsible agents, because they possess knowledge of nature and thus have power. This power can be used to destroy humanity and other species of life or it is may be used to facilitate the creative processes that nature
possesses (: 108). Human beings are dependent on nature. McFague thence uses the metaphors of "guardians" and "caretakers" to articulate how humanity is to exercise its power and
knowledge (: 109). Human beings are to be responsible agents and care for the well-being of all creation. McFague writes,
we are-basically, intrinsically, and always-interrelational, interdependent beings who live in total dependence on the others who compose the body, while at the same time being responsible for the well-being of one tiny part of the body, planet earth (2002a: 53) (Emphasis the researcher's).
While McFague argues for the particularity of the human being, she does not do so on the basis of a complexity hierarchy. It was concluded previously that the body of God cosmology is in danger of reductionism unless a complexity hierarchy is introduced. The charge of
reductionism may again be levelled against the body of God anthropology.
McFague argues that self-consciousness distinguishes human beings from other beings. It is this mental activity that allows them to reflect consciously and self-consciously on the world around them. However, McFague does not describe how mental activity in human beings includes the functioning of the brain and thus the body. It seems as though the credibility of her argument hinges on how the body and mind interact, but McFague fails to do so. The reason for this is that although McFague does accept the multilevelled nature of reality in
general, she does not stress a complexity hierarchy at the anthropological level. It was noted before that the danger with this is that mental properties become nothing but physiological interactions within the body. McFague asserts,
This picture is a profoundly organic one, but it scarcely supports dualism or conservatism ...it privileges matter rather than mind, inasmuch as matter is the source of everything, including mind (1993 a: 46).
It was indicated before that downward and upward causation are characteristic of a complexity hierarchy. At the human level this means that mind and body interact in terms of these two types of causation. McFague does not indicate how this may be so.
What has been discussed thus far relates to the soul as well. If the notion of emergent
complexity is utilised in understanding the soul-mind-body interaction then a holistic view of personhood may be possible. Conradie maintains it is important to view the soul not as split form the body or immortal, but as a part of it. The soul describes the nature of the psyche and its capacity for, "interpersonal relationships, language, culture, ethos, worldviews and religion"
(2005c: 110)
While these capacities are based on neurological functions, they cannot be reduced to them. A soul requires a functioning brain, but this is insufficient. There is more to the dynamics of the soul then mere neurological impulses. According to this approach the human is understood as a complex, psychosomatic being. A person may thus be understood as a living organism with biological process, as well as an individual who is responsible and can make decisions (: 111).
The soul is therefore not understood as something alien to or incarnated in the body.
McFague does not appear to address the soul-mind-body interaction adequately. She makes reference to the human being as an, "inspirited body among other living bodies", but does not take this any further (1993a: 113). To prevent the spirit/soul from being reduced to
neurological functioning, McFague needs to introduce a complexity hierarchy into her
anthropology. The difficulty with the body of God anthropology is that while it does oppose a dualistic anthropology, it does not describe how soul and body interact. If it did then its case against dualistic anthropologies may be stronger. As it stands McFague's anthropology struggles to achieve a holistic view of the human being.
In addition to these reflections on the soul-mind-body interaction, the issue of human
responsibility is also relevant. The body of God anthropology does intimate that human beings have knowledge and power and are to use this responsibly vis-a-vis their relationship with creation. This is a valid and crucial point. But again this is not argued on the basis of a complexity hierarchy. It was indicated before that human beings have a highly developed mental infrastructure and this gives them power. A complexity hierarchy is thus necessary to show why human beings have such power. If such a hierarchy is not stressed the body of God may be overly egalitarian.
According to Conradie, several ecological theologies do demonstrate the distinctiveness of human beings without including a hierarchy in their system, however he insists that such an approach is overly egalitarian and therefore does not take into account the varieties of hierarchies present in ecosystems (2005c: 104).
McFague takes issue with egalitarianism, because such a view does not acknowledge
differences (1993 a: 121). Even though the body of God anthropology takes unity and diversity seriously it does not indicate how this may be so. Hierarchies are necessary for diversity, because as T. Berry notes, "Fish are the best at swimming, birds at flying, trees at creating oxygen and humans at reflective thinking" (in Conradie 2005c: 104). McFague therefore does not appear to negate an egalitarian worldview and in the process weakens an argument for human particularity. This may be due to her emphasis on relationship at the expense of hierarchy.
A consideration of the above critique shows the body of God anthropology not to be in agreement with point two of the requirements for an ecological anthropology. It is unable to describe the interaction between mind and body and thus does not present a strong argument for a holistic anthropology. In addition to this it may be reductionistic and thus provides a weakened argument for human distinctiveness. However, McFague's argument for human distinctiveness and a holistic anthropology may be strengthened using insights from supervenience theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology.
5.2.2 A modification of the body of God anthropology's approach to the soul-mind-body