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Chapter 4: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God cosmology

4.4 The relational cosmology of the body of God model: the universe as organism

4.4.2 The body of God model's embodiment metaphysic

however a reductionistic approach cannot take the holistic notion of a complex universe seriously. McFague appears to be implying that a holistic cosmology such as the organic model can in fact demonstrate upward and downward causation, whereas an atomistic cosmology cannot. She thus rejects atomism, however the very same charge may be brought against McFague's cosmology.

The credibility of McFague's cosmology seems to hinge on the issue of a complexity

hierarchy. The error in this particular cosmology is that it does not demonstrate how a holistic cosmology such as the organic model may be hierarchical by nature. McFague's cosmology may thus be accused of reductionism. It appears to the researcher that unless a cosmology is based on a complexity hierarchy, it will invariably reduce the systems in it to a select few parts. McFague does not appear to demonstrate clearly enough how top-down and bottom-up causation functions in her cosmology. Reductionism becomes more of an issue when

addressing McFague's embodiment metaphysic.

derogatory understanding of creation. McFague writes of the Christian version of the organic model,

What it neglects is the rich, diverse, physical plenitude of creation- in other words, it neglects just about everything (1993a: 36).

It is for this reason that McFague decides to pursue a body model (: 13-25). This is therefore another metaphor that accompanies the world as God's body. The idea of embodiment is at the heart of McFague's understanding of reality. It seems reasonable to denote this as an

embodiment metaphysic. McFague's project is praiseworthy. The body and nature have been closely associated in the Christian tradition, because they both relate to physical reality. In order to change how human beings view creation a more positive understanding of the term body is thus required. McFague argues that an ecological theology requires human beings to acknowledge embodiment and then change the way embodiment is understood. She suggests that the body functions as a lens through which reality is viewed and as such is used to construct society (: 24).

McFague believes it is important to affirm that human beings do not have bodies, but are bodies. She maintains that there is continuity between body, soul and mind (: 16). This is an anthropological issue and will be dealt with more fully later. The point that McFague wants to stress is that not only human beings are embodied, but the entire creation as well. The problem as McFague understands it is that embodiment has only been made applicable to human beings and animals. She maintains that the notion of embodiment needs to be extended to the entire universe. The body model therefore affirms the notion of universal embodiment.

For McFague anything that is matter and occupies space can be considered a body (: 17). It is thus possible to refer to the body of a bird, the body of a sand dune and the universe's body.

Atoms and rocks are also bodies. McFague acknowledges that the model of the body uses the bodies of animate things as a reference point. Human beings are able to understand other bodies, because of their own embodiment. However, this does not mean that the term body is only relevant to animate beings. McFague's logic here is that the organic model as qualified by the common creation story shows reality to be interconnected. This means that things share something in common. If human beings have bodies, then other things will also. The value of the body model is that it unites bodies (: 18). This makes the body model ecological, because it

emphasises relationships between bodies. Moreover, McFague argues that this model finds alliance with liberation theology, because bodies are prioritised (: 23). She insists,

salvation for our planet means, first of all, the health and well-being of the body of the world and the many bodies that constitute that larger organism (1993a: 23).

McFague's embodiment metaphysic appears to be a valuable resource, as it values physical reality. This promotes a sense of value for creation and thus care and justice for it. However, the issue of reductionism again becomes an issue. A central concern with McFague's embodiment metaphysic is how it relates to her evolutionary, ecological cosmology.

According to the body of God cosmology reality is characterised by relationship, change, unity and diversity.

The body model emphasises relationship and unity. Bodies are located in physical reality and thus function as interfaces between entities in the universe. This implies that entities are able to be in relationship. Embodiment therefore connects subjects together and allows intimacy. This connectedness presents "all life-forms in networks of shared suffering and joy" (: 18)

(Emphasis the researcher's). It was highlighted previously that the body model unifies bodies.

How does this relate to change and diversity? Are bodies able to change and how do they express individuality? McFague does not appear to be clear on these issues. This lack of clarity may be due to her under emphasis on a complexity hierarchy in the body of God cosmology. If the body of God cosmology did incorporate a hierarchy that demonstrates increasing

complexity and organisation then the body model may be able to indicate how bodies change and what makes them particular.

McFague attempts to overcome this problem with the fourth feature of the common creation story. She asserts that substance is an inadequate manner of describing reality and thence proposes that, "life is a type of organisation" (: 106). Moreover, she affirms the notion of subjectivity in all things. McFague acknowledges the postmodern scientific insight of the continuity between matter and energy, which negates a dualism between spirit and flesh and thence mind and body (: 16). These insights are not pursued any further. If McFague were to argue for the notion of universal subjectivity then she may be able to show how bodies differ from each other and how they are have an increasing capacity for change. Human beings for

example are bodies with a complex mental infrastructure that allows for an extremely high degree of subjectivity. They are therefore able to make decisions and form opinions about reality. Human beings have a high capacity for novelty, because they can make decisions that allow them to change. They are in continuity with creation by virtue of their embodiment, but different from it due to their high level of subjectivity. McFague believes matter is the source of mind and thus privileges the former over the latter (: 46). The problem with McFague's embodiment metaphysic is that it fails to show how bodies change and how they differ from each other. The result of this is that everything in the universe is reduced to body. McFague herself suggests that an over emphasis on body may result in reductionism when she asserts,

in the organic model (or 'mutualistic' model-a term that avoids the suggestion of reducing life to bodies which is implied in 'organic') all entities are subjects as well as objects (1987: 11) (Emphasis the researcher's)

McFague may argue that the body model is a metaphor and thus not a description of reality. A metaphor uses what is familiar to human beings so that they may understand what they cannot experience. But what is familiar to human beings is that they consist of body and mind in continuum. It thus appears reasonable to assert that if human beings are body-mind and are interconnected with nature, then everything in the universe is body-mind.