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Chapter 3: An adequate Christian ecological theology

3.3 Theology

3.3.1 The God-world relationship

There are four views on the G-W relationship: theism, deism, pantheism and panentheism.

N. Gregerson uses the following formulae to articulate these:

Panentheism: G>W

Acosmic theism and deism: G/W Pantheism: G=W (2004: 19).

The researcher suggests the following:

Panentheism: G_>W Theism: G>W Deism: G/W Pantheism: G=W

Interestingly, Tillich maintains that "feeling" in this phrase should not be understood in a psychological sense, but as an awareness of that which transcends (1968: 47).

Theism, sometimes referred to as monotheism, is the view that God created the world out of nothing, remains in it, but governs it through His sovereignly (Peters 1992: 123). While God is personal, He is distinct from creation. Theism affirms God's immanence and transcendence.

This view functions in a monarchical model of the G-W dynamic.

With deism, God created the world and gave it natural laws so that it can function

independently from Him. The universe and God are ontologically distinct. God leaves the world and does not intervene in its affairs. Deism functions with a mechanistic model of the world (Tilby 1992: 44). Both theism and deism emphasise God's transcendence.

Pantheism is the view that creation emanates from God. God and the universe are the same.

There is no ontological difference between God and the world; he or she is literally identified with the universe and all its parts. This understanding of the G-W relationship may be

partnered with polytheism and monism (Peters 1992: 123).

Several ecological theologians endorse panentheism . Panentheism is a term coined by K.C.F Krause in the early nineteenth-century (Pailin 1989: 76). Krause believed finite entities are included in God, but they do not entirely constitute God. They have a degree of independence from God, but exist in Him or Her as "one universal life" (: 76). God is independent from finite reality, but also contributes to it. Finite beings influence God and God affects the world.

Panentheism is therefore the view that God is in the world and the world is in God.

It may be described as a middle position between theism and pantheism (Macquarrie 1984:

15). In this manner panentheism attempts to maintain God's transcendence and immanence.

Macquarrie prefers the use of the term "dialectical theism", as this makes use of the word dialectic, which is a movement between two opposites (: 14). Moreover, dialectical theism is preferable, because panentheism is often confused with pantheism.

Macquarrie insists that both pantheism and theism are guilty of overemphasis. Theism emphasises attributes that relate to God's transcendence and these include, "externality,

19 (Boff 1995, 1997; Moltmann 1981, 1985, 1989; McDaniel 1989; Edwards 1999, Deane-Drummond 1996, Gebara 1999).

immutability, impassibility, eternity" (: 53). Theism does consider divine immanence and God's involvement in history and creation, but these are underplayed. Pantheism overvalues divine immanence to the point that God is completely identified with creation. Panentheism views God as being fully transcendent and immanent. Macquarrie does not see a logical problem with it, because God's logic differs from the logic of the finite.

For Moltmann God is part of the evolutionary process in terms of immanence, but He (sic) also transcends it (1985: 206). It is possible to reflect on God beyond the world if God can be perceived as immanent. In this manner God does not become a product of the evolutionary process, as God transcends this, but She or He is a part of it through divine immanence.

Bouma-Prediger insists ecological theologies must emphasise the notion that God's immanence depends on God's transcendence (1995: 287). This means immanence and transcendence are not contradictory terms. God may only be intimate with creation, if She or He transcends it. This is reasonable, because God can experience the totality of the world, but is not overcome or exhausted by it.

For Edwards transcendence and immanence are not "polar opposites", but presuppose one another (2004: 200). For God to be present in creation in the manner that God is, She or He needs to be transcendent to it. There is thus an ontological distinction between God and creation. It is this distinction that allows God to be intimate with creation.

Conradie maintains numerous ecological theologies over emphasise God's immanence in creation. (2005a: 295). This prevents deism, but a distinction between God and creation does not imply that creation is alienated from God. A transcendent God is not a God who is uninvolved or unconcerned with creation. God's transcendence is necessary for the integrity and freedom of creation. While the earth and cosmos are derived from God's being they remain distinct from Him or Her. The distinction between God and creation should thus be acknowledged and not denied.

Boff affirms these insights when he writes,

God is not identified with the cosmic process..., but God is identified in the cosmic process..., the universe is not identified with God..., but is identified in God (1997: 147) Italic's Boff s.

An important characteristic of panentheism is the notion that God is the cosmos, but is also greater than it (Peterson 2001: 399). God is the cosmos and yet is not the cosmos. God is connected to the world and is distinct from it. G. Peterson differentiates between "weak" and

"strong" panentheism (: 399). The former relates to God's presence with the world20, while the latter identifies the world in God. Weak panentheism thus focuses on God in the world, while strong panentheism stresses the world in God. The main issue for panentheism is how to articulate the preposition en in panentheism. Panentheists use three metaphors to describe the

21

en .

The locative metaphor emphasises that God and the world have different areas of space (: 399- 400). The world is seen as in God and vice versa, although those who endorse this metaphor focus on the world in God. According to this approach the world is a like a small circle surrounded by a larger one which is God. God is considered to be the whole and the world the part. The whole part relationship is also understood in terms of a hierarchy of complexity.

Divine agency is therefore understood in terms of top-down causation. This metaphor is a form of strong panentheism.

The mind-body analogy suggests, "God is to world as mind is to body" (: 400-2). The analogy uses a holistic anthropology to understand divine agency. It was shown in the previous section on anthropology that the soul-mind-body interaction is described in terms of bottom-up and top-down causation. This analogy is a type of weak panentheism.

Peterson argues with the substance metaphor that the locative metaphor and mind-body analogy view God and the world as separate and thus describe "a kind of substantival relationship" between the two (: 403). Peterson appears to be arguing that both approaches have ontological implications, except that they don't use the language of Greek metaphysics22.

R. Page uses the term "pansyntheism" to describe the notion of the copresence of God and the world (2004: 222).

21 it should be noted that panentheism functions well with metaphorical language. A metaphor that describes God, invariably speaks of God's transcendence (the is not of God) and His or Her immanence (the is of God).

Clayton argues that while Classical Philosophical Theism and panentheism have ontologies, the former is based on substantive metaphysics and the latter on relational ontology (2004b).

Is panentheism viable for an ecological theology? Panentheism attempts to make the

relationship between God and the world a closer, more intimate one. Theism and deism over emphasise God's transcendence. The consequence of this a worldview characterised by

"acosmism" (Macquarrie 1984: 40).

Hessel believes such thinking separates God from nature with the result that God's "living presence in creation" is underplayed (2001: 187). This means that creation is devalued and loses its sacred nature. For Granberg-Michaelson it is important for an ecological theology to stress the holiness of creation (1994: 103). The immanence of the Spirit may prove fruitful in this regard, as this elevates the sacredness of creation23. Panentheism may prove to be useful in this manner.

An advantage in using panentheism in an ecological theology is it implies that if the world is in God then it must share the same value that God has (Peterson 2001: 397; Brierley 2004: 11). In regard to evil, many panentheists would affirm Augustine's privative understanding of evil.

This means that evil is the absence of good and is something that is infectious to the world.

God operates through the good in the cosmos to bring it to its full glory.

For Moltmann panentheism encourages an ecological approach to "God, man and the world in their relationships and indwellings" (1981: 19). He insists the reason for the exploitation of nature is due to an overemphasis on divine transcendence where there is a clear distinction between God and the world. To overcome this distinction, Moltmann believes the notion of the presence of God in the world and the world's presence in God needs to be appropriated (1985:

13). Like Macquarrie, Moltmann maintains there should be a dialectical relationship between God's transcendence and immanence and that after having created the world God remains in it and it in Him (sic) (: 182,98).

Macquarrie provides two guidelines for any doctrine of God and as we will see later in the study these two insights have important implications for the doctrine of creation and divine agency (: 55). The first is that God must be spiritual. Physical reality orientates itself to that which is beyond it. The second is that God is creator of the universe and also its goal. This

This implies that the Spirit is involved in the sanctification of the universe and not just human beings. Sanctification literally means, "making holy" (Gaybba 2004: 222).

means that God is not an emergent process. God meets the process in this regard. In other words God is the Spirit who through divine immanence is a part of the evolutionary process, but through divine transcendence confronts and meets it. The issue now is divine agency.

Having created the cosmos, how does God continue to relate to it (i.e. providence) from a panentheistic perspective24?

P. Davis believes panentheism best assists us to understand God's relationship with the physical universe and rejects divine intervention or non-intervention (2004: 96-9). The notion of creation being open-ended provides place for divine agency. According to Davies, God selected a range of laws that allow matter to be complex and self-governing. God continues creating the universe without violating these laws and thus allows creation a measure of creative freedom.

According to Peacocke, God assists creation (animate and otherwise) to actualise its

possibilities for becoming something more complex. God has thus "gifted" creation with laws that allow it to evolve and grow, however God has imposed "boundary conditions that limit how complex something can become (2004: 143-4). In order to do this God needs to be in creation.

According to Polkinghorne, systems in the cosmos are influenced by "energy transactions"

(i.e. physical processes) and by "active information" (in Clayton 1997: 204). God influences the world in the latter manner. This preserves the spiritual nature of God. In other words it is in the Spirit that God provides creation with the data it needs for becoming. God thus acts on the evolutionary process as Spirit.