Chapter 6: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God theology
6.3 Is the body of God model panentheistic?
6.3.2 God: the embodied spirit of the world
6.3.2.2 Transcendence
McFague claims that the body of God model is a form of panentheism. She provides a sustained argument for the presence of God's spirit within creation and thus makes a strong case for divine immanence. The body of God model disavows the mind-body analogy as an argument for panentheism.
Despite the fact that that McFague takes issue with the mind-body analogy, she initially uses it as an argument against pantheism. She insists that just as human beings do not identify themselves completely with their bodies, so God cannot be completely identified with the world (1990: 213). Human bodies are expressions of humanhood, but human beings have the unique ability to reflect about their bodies and therefore to objectify them. Human beings verbalize about the human body. This indicates that the human self is able to consciously disconnect from his or her body. McFague argues that this is analogous with the world as God's body. God has the capacity to reflect on His or Her body, the world. In other words McFague has used the mind-body dynamic to prevent the body of God model from being a form of pantheism, but in later theological reflection has abandoned the use of this analogy altogether so as to prevent anthropocentrism. The consequence of this is a central argument for divine transcendence in the body of God model is neglected in McFague's later theological reflection.
Moreover, by focusing on spirit and body at the expense of mind, the body of God model utilises a narrow anthropology for theological reflection on the G-W relationship. Jesus is recorded as saying that human beings are to love God, "with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind" (Mk. 12:30). Human beings are therefore not just spirit and body, but mind as well. It was highlighted previously that mentality is not unique to human beings. The process concept of panpsychism was used to illustrate this. If the human being is an appropriate representation of what God is like then it is important to have a broad
anthropology. It was for this reason that the researcher suggested a modification of McFague's anthropology to include the notion of mind or in the least, mentality. The idea that the mind is
irreducible to the body has implications at the theological level, for it implies that if God has a mind it cannot be reduced to the world. In addition to this it was argued before that embodied beings have the capacity for self-transcendence. Human beings in particular are more than their bodies. If the G-W relationship were understood in this manner than a stronger case for
panentheism vis-a-vis divine embodiment may be possible. In this manner the world may be understood as God's body, moreover, with God transcending it. In the body of God model's case, little consideration is given to the mind-body interaction. It is for this reason that McFague's doctrine of God may have reductionistic tendencies.
A problem with the body of God model is that it, as is the case with some forms of panentheism, views transcendence as the opposite of immanence. G. Jantzen believes that transcendence needs to be understood as the opposite of reductionism and not immanence (1984: 127). She maintains such an approach stresses the irreducibility of God to the universe and that the universe is God's body. McFague insists the body of God model does not reduce God to the world; neither does it locate God in another reality. God is present as the breath of life and in His or Her transcendence is the empowerer of the universe, but McFague makes this claim without viewing transcendence as the opposite of reductionism. She focuses instead on God's presence in the world as the embodied spirit.
The researcher believes the mind-body metaphor is better able to demonstrate the nature of God's transcendence and His or Her immanent agency within creation. In addition to this it appears to present a stronger argument for divine embodiment than the body of God model, because it is able to reflect on how it is possible for the non-physical to influence the physical.
This has implications for how divine agency and transcendence is to be understood. Jantzen and Clayton both make use of the mind-body analogy to argue for panentheism.
Jantzen argues that if God is to be considered a person then it seems appropriate to affirm divine embodiment. She insists there are three abilities needed for something to be considered a person: perception, action and presence (1984: 74-100). The body of God model seems to meet Jantzen's second and third requirements for personhood, but what of perception (i.e. the concept of mind)? Perception requires sensory organs and this necessitates embodiment (: 74- 8). It has been argued by theologians that God does not require perception to know what human beings know: God can know what human beings know without sensory organs. In response to this Jantzen differentiates between two types of perception (: 79). The first is
perception of objects and events external to the person through sensory organs. The second is perception of objects and events internally, that is, within the body and these include
experiences such as hunger, pain or contentment. Jantzen denotes the latter as "direct
awareness", because it is unmediated (: 79). She argues theologians typically understand God's knowledge of the world as direct. God does not need light waves to see or sound waves to hear human being's thoughts and intentions. If we are to understand God's knowledge of the world as unmediated then it is tenable to refer to the world as God's body. Jantzen does identify disanologies: God is omniscient and thus has complete knowledge of the processes of His or Her body, whereas human beings have partial knowledge of their bodies. What is significant at this point is Jantzen has provided an argument for the notion of a divine mind functioning within the world. Perception requires a mind. God therefore appears to have a mind that interacts with the world.
The body of God does not reflect adequately on the concept of mind. The result of this is it does not seem to provide an argument for omniscience and divine embodiment, because both of these require a divine mind. McFague does not seem to affirm how exactly God's
omniscience is to be understood. In this manner God's transcendence is compromised.
Clayton makes extensive use of the mind-body analogy to articulate God's irreducibility (i.e.
God's transcendence) and divine agency. He believes human agency is an adequate analogy of divine action in the world . An advantage to this approach is it its ability to explain the relationship between divine agency and natural laws (1997: 242). Clayton then describes supervenience theory in order to articulate the thesis that non-physical properties are able to influence physical states. He uses this as an analogy for divine agency and terms it the
"Panentheistic Analogy" (2004a: 210). Clayton argues there is a bi-directional information flow between mental properties and the brain. This becomes an analogy for the G-W
relationship where God is viewed as the mind of the world. God has contact with all events in the universe, albeit on a non-physical level and monitors this input of data. God then responds to this input by acting on the universe. While the universe influences God, He or She is not reduced to it. The concept of spirit is at a higher level than the mind, with the former being irreducible to the latter. The spirit is mediated through the mind and thence acts on the
Clayton believes however that divine agency cannot be limited to one body as is the case with human beings. It includes the entire universe (2004c).
universe (: 211). The researcher is in agreement with Clayton. The benefits with the panentheistic analogy are: God is not reduced to the world and divine transcendence is maintained61, God is understood to be influenced by the world (i.e. theodicy) and God affects the world through downward causation.
These insights from Jantzen and Clayton stress the need for a mind-body analogy to argue for divine transcendence and embodiment. The researcher suggests the body of God model needs to incorporate the concept of mind into its argument for God's transcendence and agency. If this is not done then the body of God model may tend towards pantheism. Moreover, McFague is not clear about divine agency. Her insistence on a spiritual theology that disavows any reflection on the mind-body dynamic presents a genuine problem with any attempt to integrate the notion of mind into the body of God model.