6.2 The Evolution of the Federal System in Nigeria .1 Pre-Independence Era
6.2.4 The Fourth Republic
The 1999 Constitution is the framework for the practice of federalism from 1999 until date.
The Constitution is a derivative of some of the provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions.
The Exclusive List consists of 68 items while the concurrent list is made up of 30 items. Just like in 1979, the federal government still controls mining and mineral resources. This means revenue and power were still more concentrated in the centre. Notable revenue and resource control issues that dominated the early years in the Republic are the Onshore-Offshore dichotomy between the oil producing states and the federal government.
Ironically, state control of mineral resources recently ‘started’ in Nigeria but with contentions and threats to stability. The abundance of gold in Zamfara State and the control of the commodity by the state has further generated some heat on the issue of resource control. The Nigerian government has vested control of gold found in Zamfara state under the control of the state. The state is even proposing to sell gold worth N5billion to the Central Bank of Nigeria (Godwin, 2020). This negates item 39 of the exclusive list of the 1999 Constitution which provides for control of mineral resources by the federal government. This has
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generated concerns from the Deputy President of the Senate and a Niger Delta group, Coalition of Riverine Deltans (Amaize, 2020; Godwin, 2020). According to the same authors, they noted that the proceeds of oil from the Niger Delta region goes to the Federation Account, which is shared by all tiers of government. The authors posit that it is improper for the proceeds from gold to go to Zamfara State alone. The control of gold by the state, if reciprocated in all states with respect to the mineral resources they possess would have been a very good idea. This would have reflected true federalism. However, granting the exclusive preserve to a Northern state is a threat to the stability of the country. The distrust between the North and the South may increase through this. This substantiates the need for restructuring where the groups in the country would come together and discuss how true federalism can be realised in which each geo-political zone will not be short-changed.
The democratic nature of this period means that the subnational units still enjoy some level of autonomy. However, the government at the centre have meddled with the affairs of the state inappropriately at different times. There are notable cases, for example, in May 2004, statutory allocations meant for local governments in Niger, Nasarawa, Ebonyi, and Lagos were withheld by former President Obasanjo on the grounds that they created new local governments and conducted elections there (Elaigwu, 2006: 230); however, that of Lagos State was withheld longer. Impeachment of state governors under controversial circumstances and declaration of state of emergency in two states were also indications that the states were mere appendages of the centre. Local governments have also accused states of illegal deductions from their allocations and shortening their three-year tenure (Elaigwu, 2006: 231).
Federalism during this period has also been threatened by ethnoreligious crises. These include riots that emanated after the introduction of Sharia in some Northern states, Jos riots, Shagamu violence between Hausas and Yorubas, Boko Haram insurgency, perennial herdsmen/farmers crises, among others. Another flaw in the Nigerian federal system since post First Republic is the absence of state police. Section 215 of the 1999 Constitution provides for a Nigeria Police Force, which is federal police. This no doubt has largely hampered the state’s reaction to ethnoreligious crises because federal police may not have a good knowledge of cultural and geographical features of areas where it posts its personnel.
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For instance, a police officer from Bauchi posted to Anambra state may face such a challenge, and this may limit his discharge of responsibilities.
In a similar vein, the ‘abduction’ of former Governor of Anambra State, Chris Ngige by a group led by an Assistant Inspector General of Police was an indication of the overwhelming power of the central government over police deployment (Fagbadebo 2020: 154-155). One of the participants emphasised the unitary nature of Nigeria’s federal system, with respect to one of the most recent security challenges in the country. He emphasised that, ‘You have instances where state governments for instance in Zamfara with all the killings carried out by bandits on innocent citizens, the governor is incapacitated to take the necessary measures because he does not command the security apparatus’ (PICL 1, January 2019). This expression resonates with the submission of Suberu (2019: 18) that one of the virtues of true federalism is the removal of police from the federal list. That means in Nigeria, though the governor is the chief security officer of his state, the commissioner of police does not receive instructions from him but the Inspector General of Police.
However, if states can have their police, governors may use the agency as a tool of intimidation. This narrative is justified because even some state governors still use federal police to promote their selfish political interests. For instance, in 2000, the former Osun State Governor, Chief Adebisi Akande used policemen to disrupt the proceedings of the House of Assembly to scuttle his impeachment process. The Aide de camp to the governor and the Chief Security Officer in the government house led policemen who manhandled the legislators (Fagbadebo, 2020: 437). Thus, state police could further strengthen the incumbent to intimidate opposition political groups and individuals.
In conclusion, federalism does not mean the absence of diversity, but it should be structured to promote unity in diversity. However, the Nigerian federal system operates with perpetual linings of ethnicity and religion in almost all matters. A participant substantiated this, asserting that ‘ethnicity and religion have emerged as the major fault lines in the Nigerian federal politics today. Even issues that had no ethnic or religious bearing, once they get politicised, they become interpreted as ethnic and religious and that divides the country immediately’ (PISSOL, December 2018). Usman (2014a: 376) elaborates that the challenges of the Nigerian federal system are fiscal federalism, resource control, activities of ethnic militias, ethnic and religious conflicts, census politics, state creation demands, allegations of
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inequality, among others. The author also notes that the Nigerian federal system has been threatened with coup d’états, secession threats, civil war, several ethnic and religious conflicts, and the emergence of ethnic militias (Usman, 2014a). Moreover, the sharing of revenue between the centre and the component units is a major problem of the Nigerian federal system (Usman, 2014a).