6.3 Fault Lines of Nigerian Federal System
6.3.5 Threats of Secession, Civil War and Unresolved Grievances
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(Akinola, 2010: 212). Hence, militancy dominated the political landscape of the region since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo emerged in 2004, with an all-out war against oil companies in the region and the Nigerian state (Luqman, 2014: 171). The leader was arrested in 2005, and charged for treason, but this did not stop the operations of militant groups in the region (Luqman, 2014: 171).
The response of the government was the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in early 2000 and more of military intervention, but this did not stop the violent agitations from the region. The steps taken by President Yar’Adua to end the conflict in the Niger Delta include reorganising NDDC, having a Niger Delta Master Plan, creating the Niger Delta Ministry and finally granting amnesty (Odoemelan, Okeibunor, Alikor, and Agu, 2014: 722). The last one was the magic that drastically reduced conflict in the region (Odoemelan, et al., 2014: 715).
Hitherto, negotiations were difficult. The large number of armed groups that exist in the Niger Delta region has always made negotiation with the government and oil companies difficult.
Consequently, the Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) has risen, to harmonise these grievances and engage in talks with the government (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). This helped to bring a great measure of peace to the region since the end of 2016 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). The activities of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which emerged in January 2016, truncated the peace that had been experienced in the Niger Delta between 2009 and 2015 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4).
Following negotiations between PANDEF and the government, NDA reduced its attacks on oil installations, and this led to the emergence of Reformed Niger Delta Avengers, which is committed to ensuring that government fulfils its developmental promises to the region (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4).
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Legislative Council in Lagos (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The Western Region also threatened to secede in 1953 if the Colony of Lagos was not merged with it (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The Eastern region threatened to secede in 1964 following the way the 1964 election was conducted (Tamuno, 1970: 574). Because of the maladministration of their territory from the colonial period to independence, the Tiv people threatened to secede in 1965 (Tamuno, 1970:
575). When General Aguiyi Ironsi changed the country to a unitary system in 1966, the North threatened to secede (Elaigwu, 2006: 220). The secession attempt that threatened the integration of the country most was that of Biafra in 1967.
Earlier on, the Unification Decree of General Ironsi sent a signal of Igbo domination of the civil service and other sectors of the country. The unification decree was designed to jettison regionalism as well as tribal loyalty and consciousness (Teniola, 2017). This negates the federal principle of unity in diversity because no matter how a country needs to be united, people are still aware that they belong to an ethnic group. He went further to centralise the public service, and the major component of this was to downplay the quota system but embrace merit (Teniola, 2017). According to Teniola (2017), these decisions never favoured the North because in terms of human resources, the South, especially the Eastern region, had more qualified personnel. The author further averred that while the Eastern Region governor, Odumegwu Ojukwu applauded the decree, the governors of the Mid-West and North were against it. The Western region governor was neutral. The Head of State was also an Igbo man.
This led to the pogrom of tens of thousands of Igbos resident in the North between May and September 1966 (Hill, 2012: 52).
After the July 1966 coup (executed by some Northern officers), the pre-coup events and the death of Ironsi aggravated the fears of the Igbos in the North. Gowon became the Head of State and Ojukwu being the Governor of the Eastern Region rejected him on the ground that he was not the most senior military officer in the country and should not have been made the Head of State (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 174). In September 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu asked Igbos living in other parts of the country to return home. In January 1967, there was a meeting between the Supreme Military Council and Ojukwu to prevent the impending crises, but the outcome was not a success. Ojukwu declared that the Eastern region was going to take over federal government departments and agencies domiciled in the Eastern Region, but the federal government declared such intention as illegal (Hill, 2012: 52). By
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May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the independent state of Biafra, and by July 6, 1967, war broke out between the Nigerian and Biafran forces (Falola and Heaton, 2008: xvi-xvii; Hill, 2012: 52-53).
The war ended on January 12, 1970. It is believed that the major reason the federal government fought against the secession is the abundance of crude oil in the then Biafra (Hill, 2012: 52). Biafra was reincorporated back into the country after the war (Falola and Heaton, 2008: xvi-xvii). The 30-month civil war led to the death of 1 to 3 million people (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 158). The circumstances surrounding the civil war and the continued secession bid of Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra and IPOB has decimated the trust other parts of the country bestow on the Igbos as actors on national integration. This has affected the trust other Nigerians have in an Igbo man becoming the president. There are claims that the ethnic group is being marginalised in terms of producing the president of Nigeria and holding other key positions. This is shared by PISEP holistically.
Yes, mine has been marginalized, and there is a historical argument to it. I am of the Igbo stock. Prior to the Biafran crisis or the Nigerian civil war, there has always been this suspicion of the Igbos trying to dominate the other parts of the county, then of course when the civil war now occurred, the Igbos were like defeated. Certain amnesties were reached, certain structural arrangements were equally put in place, then you now talk about re-integration of the people that supposedly broke away from the federation, and now you started noticing certain levels of limitation of people.
The public service, military institutions and stuff of that nature which is what you hear reverberating up till this moment. People will tell you that they do not have any senior military officer in any command position or even within the security apparatus of the country. These are all issues that you look at within the political angle and now say okay here could be marginalisation (PISEP, January 2019).
This reiterates the belief that elites can use these as instruments to propagate manipulation even though they will be the ones to occupy these key positions with little development. This elitist attitude and approach to development are not peculiar to South East Nigeria, but it is a national issue. However, PISWP 1 disagreed with PISEP’s opinion by focussing on the positions people from the region have occupied in this Fourth Republic. He stated that:
For the Igbos, to them, their marginalisation is that they have never been able to head the federal government and they hope that by 2023 they will be able to achieve their ambition, but the South East will not look at appointment structure even from 1999.
They dominated the Obasanjo administration if you check. The key offices, the key positions. They did the same thing with Jonathan but as far as they are concerned, even when you look at the National Assembly, how may Igbos have been president of the Senate, not less than five of them (PISWP 1, December 2018).
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This resonates with the fact that deprivation may not be absolute but relative. However, PISWOL posited that the region’s demands are unimportant. He submitted below.
Now let us take a case of the Igbos. The Igbos are saying that since the civil war, they have not been president of this country…. this and that. That is correct, that is a fact.
Now before the civil war, you said you do not want Nigeria. Do you really have legitimacy in asking to be president of a country you said you do not want? They are yet to provide answers to that question; we want to build; we do not want to destroy.
We should ask that question then. The second question is there are still clamour for Biafra, IPOB, and all that is all over the place and none of the leaders is speaking against it, and at the same time, you say you want to be president of Nigeria. You cannot be here and there, let us know where you are. Then you now say we are being marginalised; you marginalised yourself because you have shown insincerity, you have shown lack of patriotism, lack of support for this nation. You cannot lead a nation that you are fighting (PISWOL, December 2018).
The fact that there is still demand for secession by the South East indicates that national integration is still fractured in Nigeria. All these fault lines have repercussions on achieving peace agenda in Nigeria.