6.3 Fault Lines of Nigerian Federal System
6.3.4 Resources
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Among these, that of 1990 was conspicuously ethnically inclined and threatened federal stability in the country. The April 22, 1990 Coup was an ethnically lined coup because it was carried out by officers from the Middle Belt and the Southern part of the country against Northern officers. Major Gideon Orkar, a Tiv man from the North Central, led the coup. The announcement that the core Hausa, Fulani and Islamic states of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto were to be excised from the rest of the country exposed the ethnic undertone of the plotters (Wara, 2014: 30). Major Orkar’s statement further established the ethnic marginalisation paintings of the coup thus:
We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country (in Mordi, 2015).
It has been posited that the Gideon Orkar-led coup against the Babangida administration was another confirmation of minorities’ frustration (Genyi, 2014: 486). Their actions were mostly in support of the people of the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta. This was history in action like the agitations of the Middle Belt and Niger Delta in the First Republic. It was a sign that some parts of the country were still not satisfied with the Nigerian project.
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The Niger Delta Development Board was created in 1958, following the recommendation of the Willink Commission, because of the neglect and ecological challenges witnessed by the region (Osaghae, 2001:13). Nevertheless, this project was tainted with politics through the establishment of similar basin authorities across the county (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132). The continued exploration of oil in the region led to the continuous deepening of economic impoverishment as well as social, environmental degradation and these made Isaac Adaka Boro set the pace for Niger Delta agitation (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132). According to Fawehinmi, (2004), the focal points of Boro’s agitation were socio-economic and political exclusion, neglect, and deprivation of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian State (Fagbadebo, 2010: 87). These led to the establishment of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) (Fagbadebo, 2010: 87).
Isaac Adaka Boro declared the Niger Delta People’s Republic on 23 February 1966, and this culminated in a twelve-day revolution against the Nigerian state (Ama-Ogbari, 2010: 132;
Fagbadebo, 2010: 87; Omede, 2010:120). The Nigerian government later quenched this uprising, but it has since created political awareness on the plight of Niger Delta citizens, and this has threatened the integration of the Nigerian state. The Niger Delta issue generated less political tension (except for petitions) from the civil war period up to the Babangida administration (Nyityo, 2010: 17-18). Although, the government in the Second Republic set up a Presidential Task Force Known as the 15% committee in 1980. This did not deplete the challenges of the region.
After this period, Niger Delta groups started their agitations with a soft approach and not violence. These include petitions to the government, sponsoring motions in parliament, media publicity, the formation of a mass movement group, which drew up the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) (Nyityo, 2010: 17-18). Ken Saro Wiwa-led activities for the Niger Delta from the 1980s to the mid-1990s marked the end of somewhat peaceful agitations (Larab, 2010:189).
In the 1990s, the Ogonis of Niger Delta clamoured for improved resource allocation to the region and environmental protection because of the activities of the multinational oil companies (Usman, 2014b: 292). Hence, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992 (Falola and Genova, 2009: xxv).
The government in response formed the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission in 1992, but the challenges with the region persisted. The demands in the Niger
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Delta have been documented by the agitators through the OBR (1990), Ijaw Youth Congress Kaima Declaration (1998), Ogbia Declaration (1999) and the Ikwere Rescue Charter (1999) (Osaghae, 2001: 11). These demands are enveloped in three main points: more political autonomy and resource control like that which the regions experienced in the First Republic as well as inclusiveness and equality in the composition of the government at the centre (Osaghae, 2001: 12); the second one is the provision of large financial compensation by the multinational corporations for environmental damages as well as developing the host communities and employing their youth (Osaghae, 2001: 12); the last one is to restructure revenue allocation so that oil-producing states can have more from derivation (Osaghae, 2001: 12).
Up until 1998, the people in the Niger Delta region were making demands without much violence. The military government jettisoned the derivation principle (Nyityo, 2010: 14). For instance, before this time, in 1970, derivation was 45%, it was later reduced to 20% and by 1979, it was eliminated in favour of the federal government (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 186).
The killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, eight others, and the continued negative response of the state to protests by the oil producing communities made militancy become the only option to make their grievances known (Walter and Uhunmwuangho, 2010: 377). The Nigerian government in 1998 deployed personnel of the Nigerian Army and Navy as well as two warships to volatile states (Delta and Bayelsa) (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 6). In response, more than 2000 youths protested in the state capitals and soldiers opened fire on them (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 6).
The problems of the region have become more complex in the Fourth Republic, and this led to the springing up of several groups of which most of them took to militancy. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic, some actions of the government have made the region feel alienated the more. The Odi massacre, the onshore-offshore dichotomy case that favoured the federal government, the loss of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon and the failure of the government to properly settle the indigenes of Bakassi (Nyityo, 2010: 15) all have negative effects. The Odi Massacre had its root cause in the Killing of some policemen by Ijaw people on November 21, 1999 and the retaliatory killing of over 60 civilians in Odi by the Nigerian military (Santas, 2014: 241).
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Ojakorotu (2006: 230-233) identifies causes of conflict in the Niger Delta to include the structure of the Nigerian federal system, perceived/real marginalisation of the region, activities of oil and gas firms, and ethnicity/nationalism. Others are the failure to repeal or amend perceived obnoxious legislations, alliance of the government with the oil companies at the detriment of the oil communities as well as military response and proliferation of arms.
The militants used these among other historical reasons to justify their operations. One of the participants explained the reasons for militancy in the Niger Delta thus:
Marginalisation is in terms of degrees as an ordinary citizen of Nigeria from whatever part of the country you come from. You have certain entitlements as a citizen, and you do not get that, you may well feel marginalised. If it becomes part of a group, then the group is marginalised. That is at the first level, but the greater part of marginalisation is the type being cloned by the people of Niger Delta. Is not just that you have certain entitlements for being citizens of Nigeria, the resources are derived from your territory, yet you do not have access to……the bulk of it is being taken elsewhere, controlled by other people, used in developing other parts of the country whereas your own part of the country stagnates in misery, despoliation, and poverty.
So, that is like a double tragedy, and then when the resource we are talking about happens to be oil and gas, the tragedy becomes triple because in collecting these resources, further damage is done to the environment. You cannot even maintain your pre-style level of existence, peasant farming, fishing, artisanal vocation and so on, so you are not benefiting from the resource derived from your area, you are not compensated as a citizen of Nigeria, and your environment/source of living is despoiled, and that is the worst form of marginalisation. Yes, for me, where I come from, the Niger Delta, I experienced it first-hand (PISSOL, December 2018).
The views support Nyityo’s (2010: 10) position that the Niger Delta produces the main revenues for the country and the groups in the region believe that they are being deprived of the full benefits of the wealth that flows from their areas. Similarly, the Niger Delta region grapples with environmental degradation, unemployment, poverty, abuse of rights by security agents due to unfair share and management of oil revenue (Akai, 2010: 48). The challenges with the Niger Delta portray what relative deprivation represents. The poverty experienced in the region and other regions makes the masses susceptible to becoming foot soldiers for executing elites’ orchestrated marginalisation propaganda.
The groups that sprang up include the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta, the Ijaw National Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Itsekiri General Assembly, the Urhobo Union, the Chikoko Movement and MOSOP (Luqman, 2014: 171). The hostility in the Niger Delta later metamorphosed into hostage taking, kidnapping, killings, as well as clashes between security agents and militants
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(Akinola, 2010: 212). Hence, militancy dominated the political landscape of the region since the commencement of the Fourth Republic. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo emerged in 2004, with an all-out war against oil companies in the region and the Nigerian state (Luqman, 2014: 171). The leader was arrested in 2005, and charged for treason, but this did not stop the operations of militant groups in the region (Luqman, 2014: 171).
The response of the government was the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in early 2000 and more of military intervention, but this did not stop the violent agitations from the region. The steps taken by President Yar’Adua to end the conflict in the Niger Delta include reorganising NDDC, having a Niger Delta Master Plan, creating the Niger Delta Ministry and finally granting amnesty (Odoemelan, Okeibunor, Alikor, and Agu, 2014: 722). The last one was the magic that drastically reduced conflict in the region (Odoemelan, et al., 2014: 715).
Hitherto, negotiations were difficult. The large number of armed groups that exist in the Niger Delta region has always made negotiation with the government and oil companies difficult.
Consequently, the Pan Niger Delta Elders Forum (PANDEF) has risen, to harmonise these grievances and engage in talks with the government (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). This helped to bring a great measure of peace to the region since the end of 2016 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4). The activities of the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which emerged in January 2016, truncated the peace that had been experienced in the Niger Delta between 2009 and 2015 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4).
Following negotiations between PANDEF and the government, NDA reduced its attacks on oil installations, and this led to the emergence of Reformed Niger Delta Avengers, which is committed to ensuring that government fulfils its developmental promises to the region (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018: 4).