War and violence are not new phenomena to humanity, but the dimension such have taken in countries necessitates attention (Allen, 1999: 368). These have been characterised by the targeting of civilians, extreme brutality, states initiating and sponsoring violence, commercialising wars as well as the emergence of warlords (Allen, 1999: 371-372). Ethnic and/or religious violence is one of the most dangerous violence faced by states (Burger, 1993:
79). They are almost inseparable from political conflict and by extension, political violence.
Political violence encompasses a conglomeration of attacks within a political community against the government in power and its policies as well as opposing groups (Gurr, 2016: 3- 4). It may assume the form of actual or threatened use of violence, and it may be used to accomplish socio-political change through violence, and may take the forms of limited violence or guerrilla wars, coup d’état, rebellions, terrorism, and riots (Gurr, 2016: 4).
Ethnic, language and religious diversities are potential conflict instigators (Bove and Elia, 2017: 230). Jinadu (1994: 165) and Mushtaq, Muhammad, and Alqama (2011: 275) opine that in most plural societies, political conflicts are weaved around ethnic mobilisation. In societies where ethnoreligious violence is persistent, national integration is often seen as the light at the end of the tunnel. Ethnic conflict, otherwise known as identity-based conflict, is an offshoot of human conflicts, which could sometimes be inseparable from racial, regional, religious, or communal bonds (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 33). Therefore, in some instances, ethnic and religious violence are inseparable.
Ethnic conflicts are not only restricted to conflicts between ethnic groups but may also be within an ethnic group. Irrespective of the size of an ethnic group, they are scarcely homogenous or united because there is the probability that there will be conflicts among its
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sub-groups: this is intra-ethnic conflict (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1804). This reveals that conflicts cannot be in oblivion in most societies but can only be moderated or managed so that it does not snowball into violence (Azarya, 2003: 3).
Post-colonial African conflicts have not been devoid of ethnicity (Azarya, 2003: 8). The worldwide spread of conflicts was further exacerbated due to a series of events which include the economic reforms of the 1980s; the breakdown of the Soviet Republic; the end of the Cold War; and the globalisation of liberal democracy (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010: 1798). The poor economic status of Africa from the 1980s due to decline in oil prices, unfavourable international trade, rising external debts and capital flight coupled with the proliferation of arms made youth readily available for recruitment by warlords for the perpetration of ethnic violence (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 37-38; Osaghae, 2006: 12). The privatisation of states’
assets as well as not meeting the democratic and economic expectations of the people have eroded legitimacy and good governance (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999: 38). Not feeling the impact of the state in infrastructural provisions and not being represented politically may lead an ethnic group to seek redress through violence (Kifordu, 2011: 432). Politics in Africa in the last decade of the Twentieth Century was stained by violence (Allen, 1999: 367).
Perception of exclusion from access to economic, religious, commercial, linguistic rights, among others, could lead to ethnic conflicts (Ibrahim, 1994: 17). In post-colonial Africa, differences in character, attitudes, way of life, habits and feelings lead to antagonism and bitter hostility to one another mainly in power struggle and resource control (Fadakinte and Amolegbe, 2017: 61).
Resource struggles, identity conflicts and wars nearly chomped countries like Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, among others (Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2014: 327; Onwuzuruigbo, 2010:
1798). The struggle for resources has been corroborated by Azarya (2003: 3) when he emphasised that conflict is common and natural with man, and this persists if resources are scarce. Land was the cause of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Arab Nomads and other ethnic groups in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cote D’Ivoire, Angola and other African Countries (Arowosegbe, 2016: 266). That of Sudan had an ethnic dimension (Arowosegbe, 2016: 266).
Land for grazing and farming has led to a series of clashes between herdsmen and local farmers in Nigeria (Abbass, 2014; Adisa and Adekunle, 2010; Omilusi, 2016). This has also taken ethnic and to some extent, religious dimensions. Merging the dual causes of colonialism
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and resource struggle as causes of ethnic and religious violence, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1999: 35) posits that ethnic conflicts and identity could be traced to the colonial tactics of divide and rule and competition for power and resources by African elites. The author gave Rwanda and Burundi as examples.
Ethnic/religious and or regional conflicts are common in Nigeria but are purposefully stimulated by the state in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan (Allen, 1999: 378).
In addition, the challenges highlighted in the preceding paragraphs have led to the rise of dissident groups. In recent years, there has been an upsurge in the number of ethnic militias in Africa and Asia due to the transition from electoral democracy to the consolidation of democracy (Agbu, 2004: 5). These groups existed but were dormant in dictatorial regimes.
For example, militia groups became more active in Nigeria after the commencement of the Fourth Republic. Group competition (which may be facilitated by militia groups) is a major component of a diverse society, but this may be made oblivion by an authoritarian government or accommodated in a democratic dispensation (Adamolekun and Kincaid, 1991:
179). In a democracy, the right to choose is allowed, and this is a pedestal for ethnic groups to slug it out on who gets what, how and when (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Put differently; in ethnically plural societies that are democratic, there may exist intense competitions, rivalries and struggles for power and resources (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Competition is good for democracy, but when it is associated with ethnicity and ethnic factors, it may pose some threat to democracy (Anugwom, 2000: 67). Ethnic agitation becomes extreme when it metamorphoses into the emergence of ethnic militia movements, which bear the identity of such groups, and the platforms through which the desires of the groups are pursued (Badmus, 2006: 193).
Post-colonial African states are presently undergoing social, political, and economic challenges (Agbu, 2004: 13). The state in Africa is weak in autonomy, people would rather prefer to give their allegiance to sectional groups (militia), and this breeds ethnic conflicts (Osaghae, 1999: 262-263). For instance, where the number of people educated has increased but the economic wherewithal to absorb them is not strong; there may be a political disorder or decay (Agbu, 2004: 14). In Nigeria, these ethnic militias represent and protect the interest of their ethnic groups because of the inability of the government to discharge, effectively, its basic responsibilities and the turning of deaf ears to the peaceful presentations by various
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ethnic groups (Agbu, 2004: 5). Porous borders have made these militia groups thrive as this encourages free movement of arms.
The proliferation of small arms and prior military experience of members aid the activities of ethnic militia groups (Agbu, 2004: 12). The proliferation of arms was a boost to violence in Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (Agbu, 2004: 12). Consequently, groups that are threatened resort to arms and in the long run, turn warlords (Allen, 1999: 378). The rise of militia groups and proliferation of arms have produced foot soldiers and tools respectively to carry out ethnic and religious violence. Violent conflicts have led to the loss of lives and property, increased costs for the countries, concerned hardships on the innocent as well as problems for neighbouring countries due to problems of refugees (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1999:
38). From a holistic view, Osaghae (2006: 9-10) submits that these conflicts were a result of economic problems due to structural adjustments, underdevelopment of power sharing and weak accountability, justice, equity, and conflict management mechanisms.
2.4.1 Ethnic and Religious Violence
Some countries have not been spared from ethnic and religious conflicts since the Twentieth Century. Ethnic conflicts and tribal resentments were two major factors responsible for civil wars in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, and the massacre in Burundi (Samatar, 1997: 687). Huge political violence was created in Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia due to dwindling viable and effective states (Clapham, 2001: 14). ‘Extensive violence and warfare became seemingly commonplace in Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s, marking Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Algeria, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zaire’ (Allen, 1999: 368).
Aside from these countries, Ghana has also been affected by ethnic violence. Northern Ghana has been bewildered by inter-ethnic conflicts over the years due to land rights, chieftaincy disputes and competition for power and this has led to the loss of lives, property, displacement of people and negative effects on social and economic activities (Mboruwa, 2014: 108).
Northern Ghana is culturally, ethnically, historically, and religiously diverse with about 16 different ethnic groups (Mboruwa, 2014: 108).
Beyond the shores of Africa, ethnic and religious diversity have also twisted into violence.
Iraq is also diverse along ethnic and religious lines. The Arabs are about 75% while the Kurds
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are about 20% (Brancati, 2004: 8; McGarry, 2017: 523). The Arabs are predominantly Muslims of which over 50% are Shi’a while 30% to 40% are Sunnis (Brancati, 2004: 8;
McGarry and O’Leary, 2007: 674; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 2). Although some Kurds are also, Muslims, while others practise Christianity and Judaism, Saddam Hussein was against the Kurds, and he insisted on forcing them to become Arabs by making it compulsory for them to speak Arabic as the official language and answer Arabic Names (Brancati, 2004:
8-9). He also killed several Kurds with over 100,000 deaths alone during a 1988 chemical weapon attack (Brancati, 2004: 9). This is an example of a state orchestrated ethnoreligious violence. There is also discrimination against the Shia’s in favour of Sunnis by Saddam to the extent of attempting to force all Muslims to be Sunnis (Brancati, 2004: 10).
Ethnic division was the pedestal for political confrontation and conflict in Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, and Spain in the Nineteenth Century (Glass, 1977: 31). In these countries, the perceived second fiddle status by members of important ethnic groups evolved into political dissatisfaction and deprivation, and consequently, many of these ethnic groups expressed their frustrations through different forceful political avenues including violence (Glass, 1977: 31).