6.3 Fault Lines of Nigerian Federal System
6.3.2 Religion
Religious crises have been a bane to integration in Nigeria. Factors that have bolstered religious sensitivity and religious disturbance in Nigeria include joining the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, the status of Sharia in the constitution, the role of government on religious pilgrimage, the religious affiliation of political office holders, construction of religious centres with government fund, allocation of public land to religious institutions, among others (Suberu, 1993: 42-43). The fear of losing Northern Muslim support made Babangida attempt to join the Organisation of Islamic Conference, and this was not in tangent with Nigeria’s Christians’ understanding of the country’s secularity; he had to shelve the plan to join the OIC due to pressure from Christians (Falola and Heaton, 2008: xl and 222).
The Maitatsine religious uprisings of the early to mid-1980s were not really an inter-religious matter. The sect mainly targeted Muslims on ideological issues. Most of the riots that occurred during the Babangida regime centred on religion in the form of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims which led to death from both sides and destruction of property (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 222-223). There was a bloody uprising by non-Muslims in some Northern states regarding the economic and cultural dominance of the Hausas and
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Fulanis in the late 1980s (Suberu, 1993: 43). These include those of Ilorin in 1986, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Katsina, Funtua, Kano, and Zaria in 1987; Bauchi in 1991; and Zaria in 1992 (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 222). Zango-Kataf is a town inhabited by the People of Kataf and Hausas, and both have lived in tension over land ownership and location of market. In February and May 1992, there were clashes between the Hausas (predominantly Muslims) and Kataf (predominantly Christians) which led to the killing of many Hausas and later snowballed to a broader Muslim-Christian clash (Falola and Genova, 2009: 378). This created a sharp ideological and religious divide, especially between the majority Muslims and minority Christians in Northern Nigeria, and this has created distrust among them.
The unity of the country was threatened in the early months of the Fourth Republic due to the introduction of Shariah by some Northern states. The Nigerian legal system stands on the tripod of English Common, Sharia and Customary laws (Elaigwu, 2006: 209). The issue of Sharia is not new in Nigeria. As far as 1978, Northern Muslims had lobbied that a Sharia Court of Appeal should be included in the Constitution so that Muslims could be tried at the federal level using Islamic law (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 205; Oloso, 2010: 277). Christians opposed this and the compromise reached was that Muslim judges could seat to hear appeals in higher courts on cases emanating from local Sharia courts (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 205).
The Nigerian system provides that Sharia law should handle only civil cases like divorce, guardianship, inheritance, among others, and it applies to only Muslims (Elaigwu, 2002: 91).
Zamfara state introduced Sharia legal system in 1999 (but took effect in 2000), and it was the first state to utilise it for criminal matters. Although it was meant for Muslims, non-Muslims feared it was a step towards Islamising the country (Falola and Genova, 2009: xli). Eleven other states soon followed Zamfara with varying degrees of implementation. Southerners saw the move by the Northern States as an attempt to frustrate the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southern Christian. The Muslims in the Northern States were more disposed to the practice of the Sharia Legal System, while Southern Muslims had mixed feelings (Oloso, 2010: 278). The reasons for the response are not far-fetched from having an almost equal population of Christians and Muslims in the South West and North Central as well as Christian majority in the South South and South East. The introduction of Sharia in Kaduna led to the killings of Southerners in the state and the reprisal killing of Hausa/Fulani in Abia and Imo states (Elaigwu, 2002: 91).
113 6.3.3 Ethnicity and Military Coups
The way the British designed their handover was such that the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups were saddled with the political control of the country (Wara, 2014: 29). This created suspicion by other ethnic groups and fear of being dominated by the Hausa and Fulani groups, and it became a conducive atmosphere to support the activities of the coup plotters especially in the South (Wara, 2014: 29). Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Region also alleged that the Igbos like to dominate wherever they are. These passive factors snowballed into the first military coup of 15 January 1966. Some officers in the Nigerian Army of which all except one were from the East carried it out. However, the obvious reasons for the coup include the Tiv riots of the 1960s and the military response of the Northern region government to quench it, the 1962/63 election crisis, the Western Region crisis of 1962, the 1964 General Election issues, the 1965 Western region election brouhaha, among others (Nwala, 1997: 11; Tamuno, 1970: 575).
The ethnic dimension with the coup became conspicuous because most of the victims were Northern and Western politicians and military officers. The North was not happy with the way the Sardauna (the premier) was killed. Although, the coup was not successful but Ironsi, the most senior military officer who was also Igbo became the Head of State. What added salt to the wound apart from the Unification Decree earlier mentioned was that most of Ironsi’s advisors were Igbos and this sent a continued Igbo domination signal to the North (Heerten and Moses, 2014: 173). In addition, the plotters of the January 1966 coup did not face trial but were just detained and were still receiving their salaries (Akinsanya, 2002b: 16- 17). All these events caused dissent between the North and the East and were some of the major causes of the civil war.
A counter-coup was carried out in July 1966, and mostly Northern military officers executed it. This cost the lives of Aguiyi Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of the Western Region. This was seen as revenge against the Igbos over the first coup. This no doubt widened the divisions between the North and the Igbos and was one of the immediate events that led to the civil war.
Apart from the two coups explained above, there were coups in 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1997. Some were successful, some were not, and some were alleged.
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Among these, that of 1990 was conspicuously ethnically inclined and threatened federal stability in the country. The April 22, 1990 Coup was an ethnically lined coup because it was carried out by officers from the Middle Belt and the Southern part of the country against Northern officers. Major Gideon Orkar, a Tiv man from the North Central, led the coup. The announcement that the core Hausa, Fulani and Islamic states of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto were to be excised from the rest of the country exposed the ethnic undertone of the plotters (Wara, 2014: 30). Major Orkar’s statement further established the ethnic marginalisation paintings of the coup thus:
We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup, but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country (in Mordi, 2015).
It has been posited that the Gideon Orkar-led coup against the Babangida administration was another confirmation of minorities’ frustration (Genyi, 2014: 486). Their actions were mostly in support of the people of the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta. This was history in action like the agitations of the Middle Belt and Niger Delta in the First Republic. It was a sign that some parts of the country were still not satisfied with the Nigerian project.