5.6 An analysis of unethical conduct by UNAMIR
5.6.2 An analysis of UNAMIR’s failure to use force to stop the genocide
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this threat that was meant to pressurize and squeeze the GoR to speed up implementation of peace agreements that the government considered to be a “negotiated surrender” of political power (Al Qaq 2009 Op. Cit.). The deliberate and concerted pressure on the GoR however ended on 06 April 1994, when the Presidential plane was shot down triggering the genocide and the RPF final and decisive military offensive operation to take over complete and undiluted political power in Kigali and not necessarily to stop the genocide.
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UN inaction. The US was the strongest opponent to any attempt at using military force in Rwanda as it argued that any hasty military intervention in Rwandan civil war would result in failure as was the case in Somalia (Barnett 1997:572). Thus the mandate for UNAMIR was very restrictive in what the mission could do without prior approval from New York.
Hiding behind a restrictive interpretation of its mandate, UNAMIR remained idle and watched hopelessly as Rwandans were slaughtering each other during one of largest and fastest genocides of the 20th century (Sitkowski 2006:111). Although the Security Council mandate did not categorically authorize UNAMIR to use force to protect civilians in danger of being killed, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) drafted and distributed by the force commander General Dallaire authorized peacekeepers to use force for the sake of protecting endangered civilians. Sitkowski (2006:16) observed that UNAMIR ROE authorized peacekeepers to use force in order to “prevent crimes against humanity, but these were deliberately not applied”
demonstrating continued existence of ambiguity in the exact role of military peacekeepers in peace operations with a humanitarian dimension (Ibid). Paragraph 17 of the ROE specifically authorised UNAMIR peacekeepers to use all means available for protecting Rwandan civilians.
It stated in detail that:
Crimes against Humanity: Ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts may also be committed during this mandate and will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to put an end to them. Examples: Executions, attacks or displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attack on demobilized soldiers, etc. On such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROE outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity (ROE-Operational Directive No.2 dated 19 November 1993).
Directives such as this were very uncommon during traditional peacekeeping operations as this violated the principle of minimum use of force except in self-defence (UN Doc. S/1999/1257).
The deteriorating security situation in Rwanda where low level acts of genocide were taking place and preparations for genocide were evident through the distribution of war materials and the spreading of hate language against the Tutsi influenced General Dallaire to draft this rare set of ROE. The Force Commander described the inclusion of paragraph 17 in the ROE as breaking new ground in a bid to compensate for the absence of a Chapter VII mandate that authorizes the use of force for the protection of civilians (Dallaire Op. Cit.:71-72). Although the ROE was in force among UNAMIR contingents, it was neither endorsed nor denounced by UN headquarters when the draft copy was submitted for approval. This was condoned possibly because it was morally appropriate to use force other than in self-defence for the sake of
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protecting endangered innocent civilians in a situation of an ongoing genocide. It would have been legally and ethically justifiable to use force in order to curb crimes against humanity in line with the provisions of the Genocide Convention. What is morally apprehensible is that the provisions of paragraph 17 were not applied to curb or stop the genocide. The mission lacked both the authority and capacity to use force in defence against gross human rights violations as stated in paragraph 17 of the ROE. As a result the parties to the conflict took advantage of the weak UNAMIR as a golden opportunity to reorganize and regroup their forces for the resumption of the unfinished civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:282).
Reasons given for non-use of force to stop the Rwanda genocide was that the ROE were self- limiting and restrictive in that they prescribed that authority to use force of arms in situations other than legal self-defence had to be secured from the Sector Commander of Kigali or from the Force Commander who in turn had to seek authority from his superiors in New York (Sitkowski 2006). This is evidenced by denial of permission for the Force Commander to use force to protect the Rwandan Prime Minister Madam Agathe Uwilingiyimana who was killed in a UN compound in the presence of peacekeepers (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). This also partly explains why the ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed in cold blood without firing a single bullet in self-defence (Ibid). The other reason for non-use of force was fear of triggering a violent military backlash from government forces once peacekeepers used fire arms aggressively against government security elements threatening the lives of government officials and committing genocide.
The Carlsson Report (1999) noted that General Dallaire did not launch a military operation to rescue the captured Belgian peacekeepers that were being tortured by Presidential Guards soldiers because he felt the risk of intervening peacekeepers’ casualties would be unacceptably too high to justify an attempt at rescuing the ten peacekeepers. He equally felt that UNAMIR had too limited resources in manpower and military fighting capacity to mount a violent rescue operation. Considering that UNAMIR contingents had no adequate food, medical supplies, ammunition and combat supplies, it would have been a futile if not suicidal attempt at rescuing fellow peacekeepers through the use of force as the peacekeepers were completely outnumbered and out gunned by government forces. In addition, such an act of war would almost have guaranteed the withdrawal of government consent to the continued deployment of
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the peacekeepers.31 This scenario posed a serious military ethical challenge on whether or not to risk the lives of many more peacekeepers in an attempt at rescuing ten Belgian peacekeepers implicated in the shooting of the presidential plane. The future of the mission itself would have taken a totally different and dangerous course had an attempt to forcefully rescue the Belgian troops been mounted. Considering that UNAMIR was a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission General Dallaire decided that it was prudent to let the Belgian troops pay the ultimate price without any assistance from their fellow UNAMIR peacekeepers (UN Doc. S/1999/1257).