130
humanitarian intervention intensified culminating in the adoption of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the UN General Assembly in 2005.
The next section examines Belgian participation in UNAMIR and the negative role it played towards undermining the outcome of that mission.
131
extremely difficult to remain impartial in a situation in which they had clearly defined self- interests and preferred political outcomes of the mission. This policy was adopted to dispel any fears of UN peacekeepers serving the interests of the former colonizers yet in practice, the interests of western powers were taken care of by US dominance of the missions at the strategic and operational levels as demonstrated in chapters three and four of this thesis.
The British were denied the opportunity to contribute peacekeepers during the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Belgians were denied a similar opportunity during the Congo crisis of 1960 to 1964 (Al-Qaq 2009). Surprisingly, the Belgian government was not only keen to support UNAMIR but actually provided the strongest military contingent to the Rwandan mission and was assigned the most strategic and sensitive military sector of securing the capital Kigali and the airport (OAU Panel of Experts Report 2000). In actual fact, Belgian troops formed the military backbone of UNAMIR. The justification for deploying Belgian troops, the only NATO country to do so remains unclear although this appears to have been a well calculated strategy to implement the regime change agenda designed to displace French influence from the Great Lakes region and replace it by an English speaking regime that advanced the geo-strategic interests of the Anglo-American alliance (Interview with an African Diplomat in Addis Ababa 2015).
General Dallaire advances the argument that a deal could have been struck between the French and Belgian authorities for Belgian troops to protect French interests in Kigali after the departure of the French battalion as required in the Arusha Peace Agreement (Dallaire 2003).
On the contrary, the Rwandan government that was very close to the French authorities was being undermined by the presence of Belgian peacekeepers implying that French interests in Rwanda were also being undermined by the presence of Belgian troops in Kigali. Prunier (1995:103–6) argues that France feared that the RPF, with Ugandan diplomatic and military support represented a formidable threat from the Anglo-American alliance against a former French-speaking colony. Belgian troops were therefore not necessarily promoting French interests as Belgian peacekeepers deliberately undermined the Rwandan government authority and sovereignty favouring the RPF to the extent that it is strongly suspected that they were instrumental in the assassination of the two presidents on 06 April 1994 that triggered the genocide (Bruguire Report 2006). Moreover, it was the RPF that suggested the deployment of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda to counter the influence of France during the deployment of UNAMIR as stated above. France desperately tried to prevent the coming to power of “English- speaking Africans” in Rwanda but failed (Hintjens 1999:273). In facilitating the coming to
132
power of the RPF, the peacekeepers were playing the role of managing the demise of French influence in Rwanda and the ascendancy and installation of the RPF regime. Once hostilities started, the UN following its traditional practice, sided with the US in facilitating the demise of the Habyarimana regime (Al-Qaq 2009:162). This was in clear violation of the host state sovereignty that attracted hostility from those that were going to lose power as a result of Belgian manipulation of the crisis to secure an outcome favourable to the Belgians and their US and UK allies.
5.5.1 Anti-Belgian sentiments in Kigali
According to the Bruguire Report (2006), the origins of the anti-Belgian troops’ presence in Kigali can be traced to several factors. Firstly, the participation of Belgium in UNAMIR was at the recommendation of the RPF that aimed at neutralizing the strong French influence in Kigali; Secondly, the entry into Kigali by the RPF battalion, under the escort of Belgian peacekeepers on 28 December 1993 as part of the Arusha Agreement, caused some serious resentment and mistrust of the Belgian contingent among government troops and elements loyal to the Rwandan government. This was aggravated by the questionable conduct of Belgian troops during their stay in Kigali, where they were perceived to be favouring the RPF elements deployed in the capital. Of particular importance was the alleged role played by the Belgian peacekeepers in the assassination of the two presidents on 06 April 1994.28
On the fateful day when the presidential jet was shot down, Belgian peacekeepers had earlier escorted RPF rebels into the Akagera national park located in the direction from which the missiles that shot down the presidential plane were fired (Bruguire Report 2006:7). The Belgian Parliamentary Commission that investigated the killing of 10 Belgian peacekeepers failed to identify the RPF rebel officials who were escorted into the national park and the exact nature of the mission thereof (Ibid.). The fact that despite the death of 10 Belgian soldiers in Kigali at the hands of the Presidential Guards troops, the Belgian Parliamentary Commission failed to identify the RPF officials that were escorted to the area considered to be the launching base for the missiles, significantly contributed to the strong theory and suspicion that Belgian peacekeepers were directly or indirectly involved in the conspiracy and possibly the actual facilitation of the terrorist attack of the two presidents (Ibid). Empty missile launchers were
28 The Security Council has failed to commission an independent international inquiry into the deaths of two African presidents. Efforts to establish such an inquiry continue to be blocked by powerful members of the Security Council whose international standing might be jeopardized by the true findings of such an investigation.
133
later found abandoned in the Akagera national park which tends to reinforce the suspicion of the Belgian peacekeepers’ unexplained visit to the park on the day the two presidents were assassinated.
It is now an undisputed fact that the missiles that were used to shoot down the presidential aircraft were from the official inventory of the Ugandan Armed Forces, thus linking the Belgians and RPF to the shooting incident.29 The Rwandan forces had no anti-aircraft missile systems in their military inventory. On the contrary, the RPF had surface to air missiles (SAM 14 and SAM 16) missiles in their inventory (Bruguire Report Op. Cit.). The fact that the Rwandan Forces did not have anti-aircraft missiles in their inventory dispels the theory that Presidential Guards troops shot down the aircraft. We can recall that Belgian troops’ (not peacekeepers) role in the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.
There appears to be too much of a coincidence in that the Belgians were directly involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba, in covert cooperation with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In Rwanda Belgian troops were implicated in the terrorist attack on the presidential plane that killed the Rwandan President and his Burundian counterpart, an act that triggered the genocide. In both cases the CIA was implicated. The failure by the international community to investigate the assassination of the two African presidents reflects the existence of a powerful influence within the Security Council to block any such attempts at establishing the true facts as to who shot down the presidential aircraft killing two African heads of state (Philpot 2005).
It is evident from the discussion above that the deployment of Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda was unethical right from the start. The deployment ultimately resulted in unethical conduct by the peacekeepers arising from the strategic role they were meant to play in the implementation of a geo-strategic plan to promote Belgian and Anglo-American interests designed to dislodge French influence from this region. Worse still, the Belgian authorities influenced the Security Council to withdraw the bulk of UN peacekeepers at the height of the genocide following the withdrawal of the entire Belgian contingent.
29 The origins of the missiles used were from an official weapons consignment delivered to Uganda from the USSR. The serial numbers of the fired cartridges matched the remaining missiles still in the Ugandan military inventory, thus linking the RPF and possibly the Belgian peacekeepers to the act of assassination.
134
The next section examines the unethical conduct of the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda to determine the degree to which host state sovereignty and peacekeeping principles were violated or undermined.