5.6 An analysis of unethical conduct by UNAMIR
5.6.1 UNAMIR unethical intrusiveness in Rwanda domestic affairs
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The next section examines the unethical conduct of the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda to determine the degree to which host state sovereignty and peacekeeping principles were violated or undermined.
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stabilize the political and security situation in the affected country.30 He emphasised that Rwanda was no exception as it had to submit most of its government economic, political and military functions to direct and indirect monitoring and supervision by the civilian component of UNAMIR and military peacekeepers on behalf of the Security Council. These views are shared by an official from the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) that was interviewed by the researcher in Durban on 16 July 2015. He argued that African states have themselves to blame for having their sovereignty violated by UN peacekeepers because the UN does not invite itself to come to these countries. He added that failure to resolve internal conflicts through dialogue, coupled with the politics of exclusion and winner takes all mentality result in the deployment of UN peacekeepers. On arrival they interpret the situation through their own lenses and attempt to seek solutions that they believe will bring about long lasting solutions to the country even if it means violation of state sovereignty to achieve this objective. In his view, the peacekeepers intrusive activities in the political activities of the host country such as monitoring and supervision of the political processes constituted unpopular but necessary intrusive behaviour on the part of the peacekeepers that undermines host state sovereignty in order to achieve a better future for the population. However what this official failed to acknowledge was the fact that peacekeepers intrusiveness was meant to promote the self-interests of some big powers at the expense of the local population. Regrettably, in the majority of cases, host governments have little room to manoeuvre in order to limit the extent of the intrusiveness by the peacekeepers because they would have voluntarily consented to the deployment of foreign forces on their soil in the first place. This was the case with the Rwandan government although the incumbent government agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers under duress from the US authorities.
Al Qaq (2009:114) argues that the Habyarimana government had consented to the deployment of UN peacekeepers under duress hence the host-state consent it granted was coerced consent because it acquiesced to the deployment of peacekeepers in Rwanda as an alternative to a military defeat by the RPF and also as a result of increased international political isolation.
This view is buttressed by Prunier (1997:101-102) and Des Forges (2007:50) who confirm that the GoR agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers as the only viable alternative to a
30 The diplomat gave an analogy of a domestic squabble between a husband and wife. He said that once the in- laws or neighbours are invited to assist in resolving their dispute, in the majority of cases these outsiders end up knowing too much about the private life of the affected couple and their advice, to be effective, should be premised on certain domestic sensitive facts that might appear as if they are intruding in the private affairs of the couple seeking assistance.
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military crashing defeat by the RPF on the battlefield. The GoR was rescued from a humiliating military defeat by the RPF through the timely military intervention by French troops during the 1993 rebel military offensive operations (Ibid). Added to this, the UN system was conscious of the fact that the outcome of the Arusha Agreement amounted to a “negotiated surrender of political power” by the incumbent government hence its approach in dealing with the regime was cognisant of the regime’s inherent political, economic and military weaknesses (Al Qaq 2009). In the same vein, the main leverage the UN had over the GoR was the threat of withdrawing the peacekeepers. A withdrawal of UNAMIR would translate into a defeat of the GoR on the battlefield (Al Qaq 2009). With this in mind we can appreciate the negative impact of the threats of peacekeepers’ withdrawal that were exerted on the GoR to speed up the transitional process which it viewed as a negotiated surrender of power and privileges to the opposition.
In a letter to President Habyarimana in January 1994, the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reminded the state president that continued presence of UNAMIR was dependent on the fast track implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreements. He stressed that in its Resolution 893 of January 1994, the Security Council had “strongly urged the parties to comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreements…the Council stressed that continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement (UN Doc. United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996:42)
Mounting additional pressure on the Rwandan government to speed up the implementation of the Arusha protocols, the Council further warned: “…Security Council calls the attention of the parties to the consequences for them of non-compliance with that provision of the Agreement. It notes that UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha peace Agreement fully and rapidly (S/PRST/1994/8, dated 17 February 1994). The Secretary General further ratcheted up the pressure on the Rwandan Government by threatening to withdraw UNAMIR if the transitional process was not speeded up (S/1994/360, dated 30 March 1994). In a deliberately calculated move to further mount the pressure on the Rwandan President, on 05 April 1994, instead of extending UNAMIR mandate by six weeks as recommended by the Secretary General to the Security Council, an extension of only four weeks was granted on condition that the Secretary General reported progress on the implementation of the transitional process, failure which UNAMIR was to be withdrawn (S/RES/909 (1994) dated 5 April 1994). The unethical and irresponsible withdrawal of the bulk of UN peacekeepers that took place at the height of the genocide was in part a fulfilment of
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this threat that was meant to pressurize and squeeze the GoR to speed up implementation of peace agreements that the government considered to be a “negotiated surrender” of political power (Al Qaq 2009 Op. Cit.). The deliberate and concerted pressure on the GoR however ended on 06 April 1994, when the Presidential plane was shot down triggering the genocide and the RPF final and decisive military offensive operation to take over complete and undiluted political power in Kigali and not necessarily to stop the genocide.