5.6 An analysis of unethical conduct by UNAMIR
5.6.4 UNAMIR’s unholy alliance with the RPF
After the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement (APA), the RPF successfully negotiated on 28 December 1993 for the deployment of its advance battalion in the heart of Kigali allegedly to provide protection to its officials working on implementing the BBTG. The RPF protection battalion was quartered around the parliament building, strategically located in the central district of Kigali, and this eventually became the forward logistics base for perpetrating the RPF military offensive operations. Furthermore, the parliament building served as an advance bridgehead for launching the military campaign that toppled the Rwandan government (Bruguire Report 2006:32).The decision to deploy the RPF battalion at the parliament building, the seat of government, had a devastating psychological impact on government forces and
34 This was the view of an African diplomat interviewed in Harare on 13 November 2015. The Ambassador lamented the AU continued dependency on foreign funds to run its operational and security budgets and added that “some of the so called AU strategic partners are like arsonists who set your house on fire and later come dressed as fire brigade to pretend as if they genuinely want to assist you in putting out the fire yet they would have created access for their intrusion in your own domestic affairs without you realizing it. They will be pursuing their own selfish interests, based in your country, undermining your sovereignty under the cover of assisting you to put your house in order.”
35 In an interview in Harare on 15 November 2015, the academic called for commitment and sacrifices of similar magnitude as demonstrated during the decolonization era if the slogan “African Solutions to African Problems”
can be fully operationalized. He however acknowledged that African countries continue to be divided by former colonial powers to guarantee that there is no unity of purpose among the African states as such unity acts against the self-interests of the big powers that benefit from the fragmented approach of African states.
143
officials alike who felt that this was a confirmation of a surrender of political power in the making. Confirming the strategic importance of the parliament building area, General Dallaire acknowledged that UNAMIR was initially opposed to the selection of this site in central Kigali because it was “a position which permitted considerable control over communication arteries between the city and the airport and also the resupply communication access onto another principal roads” (Dallier’s Testimony to the ICTR on 25 February 1999). Thus the selection of this vital location had both military and political strategic significance that favoured the occupants of this vital piece of ground at the centre of the capital.
Dismas Nsengiyarmene, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, testified that the RPF exerted pressure on the interim Prime Minister Madam Agathe Uwilingiyimana to have its battalion deployed on the parliament building premises from where the rebel troops took advantage of the concession which was meant to smuggle weapons, ammunition as well as additional unsanctioned troops into Kigali (Testimony by Dismas Nsengiyarmene to the ICTR). This account is corroborated by Gerad Ntashamanje who confirmed having witnessed secret infiltrations by the rebels into Kigali of “reinforcements of the RPF’s military capability, particularly the supply of surface-to-air missiles.” Most disturbing is the fact that UNAMIR not only witnessed the clandestine operations by the RPF but also abated and facilitated the smuggling efforts in clear violation of their mandate and the principles of peacekeeping operations especially that of impartiality.
A Belgian peacekeeper, Corporal Johnny Boreaux, who participated in the deployment of RPF battalion from their headquarters in Mulindi to Kigali on 28 December 1993; testified on 15 December 1996, that the RPF was infiltrating unauthorised rebels into Kigali when he stated that the monitoring system that had been put in place, “allowed soldiers (RPF) dressed as civilians to infiltrate Kigali and to commit assassinations” that would be blamed on government forces (Bruguire Report 2006:33). This is corroborated by Human Rights Watch (2006) that observed that the Arusha Peace Accord permitted the RPF a total of six hundred soldiers only in Kigali but the rebel movement clandestinely infiltrated more troops, weapons and ammunition in violation of the peace agreement. To further corroborate this account, Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, who was UNAMIR commander of the Kigali region also added that he had always believed that each time the RPF rebels went out looking for firewood in the northern region of Rwanda, “it was in order to bring back weapons” (Bruguire Report Op.Cit.). This
144
assessment has been further corroborated by several peacekeepers interviewed by this researcher.36
The bottom line remains that UNAMIR condoned the RPF illegal smuggling of unauthorised personnel, weapons and ammunition into Kigali whilst they kept government heavy weapons under their custody without applying the same measures and principles to the rebel movement in clear violation of the principle of impartiality.37 General Dallaire appeared to have been working closely with the RPF leadership with the intention of facilitating the illegal, strategic military build-up in anticipation of the military offensive against the Rwandan government.
Black (2014) highlights that there was massive evidence of RPF build-up of men and war materials from Uganda despite UNAMIR’s presence, a mission supposedly deployed to guarantee a peaceful transition to multi-party democracy yet it ended up serving as a smoke screen for US strategic interests and her allies. Black also adds that Dallaire hid this build up not only from the host President and the Rwandan Army but also to his immediate superiors Booh-Booh and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (Ibid.). In so doing, General Dallaire was undermining the sovereignty of Rwanda at the same time violating peacekeeping principles of host state consent and impartiality. In this regard, UNAMIR violated an unwritten assumption and responsibility that peacekeepers should not aggravate or worsen the already precarious situation in which the host country finds itself during the entire duration of the mission’s deployment.
In an act of defiance and lack of respect for the Rwandan authorities, General Dallaire closed one of the two runways and left open runway 28 that overlooked the heavily wooded Masaka Hills from where the missiles that killed the President Habyarimana were fired. The closure of the runway was done at the request and insistence of the RPF (Black 2014). The closure of one
36 Retired Colonel Bambazonke (not real name) admitted that “UNAMIR peacekeepers were sympathetic to the plight of Tutsi exiled rebels and refugees whose human rights to return home were being blocked and violated by the Habyarimana regime that was practicing apartheid like policies against a minority segment of the Rwandan population.” He added that “this sympathy made the peacekeepers turn a blind eye and in some cases assisted the RPF in the smuggling of illegal weapons and ammunition because we strongly felt that the Tutsi deserved better treatment and this could only materialize if enough military pressure was exerted on the government of Rwanda by the rebels who were fighting to liberate themselves just as we liberated ourselves from our colonial masters.
The only difference was that the Tutsi were being subjugated by fellow Africans in a land of their common ancestors.”
37 The Arusha Peace Agreements had directed the peacekeepers to establish a weapons free zone around Kigali by withdrawing heavy weapons from the belligerents and keeping them in safe custody. UNAMIR kept Government heavy weapons under custody while at the same time allowing the RPF to smuggle its heavy weapons, (including missiles use in the shooting of the presidential aircraft) into the country from Uganda and the northern demilitarized zone into Kigali.
145
of the two runways in January 1994 channelled approaching aircraft for landing to a single approach route thus raising the probability of precision aiming and hitting oncoming aircraft.
The closure of the runway was done without prior consultation with the Rwandan government authorities in violation of host state sovereignty. This act alone signifies the extent to which peacekeepers can go towards undermining host-state sovereignty in furtherance of the interests of big powers that are the main sponsors of UN peacekeeping missions.
The preparations for the RPF military offensive to effectively take over power in Kigali was manifested by several activities that started long before the shooting down of the presidential aircraft and the military offensive operation that ensued thereafter. The Bruguire Report (2006:40) highlights some of the prominent signs for the preparation of a major military offensive by the RPF which include the following: stepping up of campaigns to recruit young exiled Tutsis and those within the country to join the RPA; the logistical preparations for a major military campaign through stockpiling of weapons and ammunition caches by the rebel movement in the de-militarized zone that was under UNAMIR control; the unchallenged infiltration of rebel combatants; weapons and ammunition into Kigali including the SAM 16 anti-aircraft missiles under the guise of fetching firewood from RPF Headquarters in Mulindi under the escort of UNAMIR troops and replenishment of weapons from Uganda with the connivance of the peacekeepers.
These observations and views are corroborated by UNAMIR Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal who testified that the RPF strategy was to mislead the international community together with the peacekeepers on their real intensions when he stated that: “I state this with all the more conviction as I myself (sic) was fooled by their persistent propaganda when faced with the ARUSHA negotiations. Once in KIGALI, I realized that there was a gap between words and deeds. A milling machine, that’s what this totalitarian movement was.” (Bruguire Report 2006:40). Colonel Luc Marchal had earlier noted in his diary on 04 April 1994 that: “in fact the theory defended is that the sole motivation of the RPF in taking up arms against the current government is not the victory of democracy but the conquest of power by violence … this theory fits my observations and deductions” (Quoted in Bruguire Report 2006:43).
According to the International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000), the military offensive operations by the RPF against government forces began several hours after the shooting down of the presidential. The capacity to launch a countrywide military offensive by the RPF within several hours of downing the presidential plane suggests a deliberately pre-planned military
146
operation; as it is impossible to initiate battle procedures and launch an offensive campaign for a large military force within a few hours unless they were already on standby to spring into action. Thus the genocide that was triggered by the terrorist assassination of president Habyarimana was meant to trigger the civil war that was destined to benefit those who masterminded the conspiracy against the legitimate GoR.38 The level of commercial looting of strategic minerals from eastern DRC tends to confirm this observation as western powers together with their regional proxies continue to prolong the UN mission in this region for them to loot natural resources without paying taxes to the DRC government in violation of that government’s sovereignty.
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the granting of consent to the deployment of peacekeepers does not in itself guarantee success of the mission. The Rwandan genocide happened when the two belligerents had signed the Arusha peace agreement and conceded to the deployment of international peacekeepers, yet the mission was a total failure. The undermining of the host state’s sovereignty aggravated the tension between government loyalists and the rebels as UNAMIR was accused of being not only sympathetic to the rebel cause but actually facilitating the infiltration of weapons and rebel fighters into Kigali in anticipation of the civil war that would eventually topple the legitimate host government.
The Rwanda civil war and genocide effectively belied the Arusha peace agreement and this was a direct result of a weak mission coupled with weak implementation which further undermined a peace agreement that had already weakened the government’s cohesion and authority. Steadman (1997:25) is of the view that a strong UNAMIR with credible capability to effectively deal with extremists and spoilers could have prevented the genocide. However the real problem was that such a force could not be created and deployed in Rwanda as this could have scuttled Anglo-American strategic plans to re-shape the Great Lakes region in their favour. The overall ethical assessment of UNAMIR is that the mission facilitated the downfall of the Rwandan government, as well as the military ascendency to power of the RPF. In doing so, the mission did very little to protect the victims of the genocide that was aggravated by the RPF military offensive operations that violated the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement as
38 Views expressed in an interview with a senior military analyst who decided to remain anonymous. The interview was carried out in Harare on 14 August 2015.
147
well as Rwanda’s national sovereignty in their bid to take over complete and undiluted power in Kigali.