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complicated an already complex situation that served to undermine the ability of the host government to protect its population in fulfilment of its mandate to safeguard the well-being of the Congolese population.
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provide the bulk of the peacekeeping troops (Simmonds 1968:137). These principles were both violated at the onset of the operation. The appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to Congo, Ralph Bunche a seasoned American diplomat who was also the overall commander of ONUC in the field during the early days of its deployment was in violation of the first principle that prohibited staff officers and troops from permanent members of the Security Council from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. It also contributed to the violation of the peacekeeping principle of “impartiality”, which for the sake of this study is defined as follows: “peacekeepers will be expected to serve universalistic interests … and must not serve the parochial interests of specific foreign powers, which seek to project their influence into the conflict in question” (Gibbs 2000:360). The critical importance of impartiality has been emphasised by several scholars such as James (1990: 106); Ramsbotham and Woodhouse and Ramsbottom (1996:125) and Goulding (1993:454). James (1996:211) emphasises that “it is impartiality which gives peacekeepers its distinctiveness … is the lifeblood of peacekeeping.”
The Secretary General’s initiative to deploy a seasoned and “prestigious internationally known” American diplomat in Congo to “provide overall supervision for the operation” raises serious ethical and moral concerns regarding the Secretary General’s impartiality and neutrality in dealing with the two superpowers. The UN peacekeeping mission had “the preponderance of American personnel” in charge of the planning in New York and execution in the Congo (Gibbs 2000:364). Members of the Eastern Bloc countries were excluded from key decision sessions and “care was taken to see that no member of Secretariat, who was a citizen of a communist state, saw the Congo telegrams” (O’Brien 1962:55-66). Bunche’s deployment to Congo gave far reaching advantages to the US and her allies at the expense of the Soviet Union and her allies and the host country since both superpowers were jostling to establish friendship with this mineral rich and strategically located central African state (James 1990:291).
The deployment of senior US officials in peacekeeping operations was a way of facilitating the entrenchment of US influence in post-colonial countries to replace the vacuum left behind by the weakened and withdrawing former colonial masters (Al Qaq 2009). Bunche worked closely with the US Ambassador to Congo to the extent that the US Embassy saw some of his cables dispatched to the UN Headquarters in New York and at some point relied on US Embassy communication facilities to link up with his Secretary General (Urquhart 1993:312).To make matters worse, the first two military commanders of ONUC were from NATO member states,
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further giving the Western countries unrivalled advantage over their Soviet counterparts since the top leadership of ONUC was effectively under Western oriented practitioners.
General Alexander, a Briton, was ONUC’s first military commander followed by Swedish General Carl von Horn. At the start of ONUC operations, the two most senior UN officials in Congo were an American, Ralph Bunche and a Briton, General Alexander thus heavily tilting the geo-strategic and geo-political balance in favour of Western interests. British General Alexander was later succeeded by “a fierce anti-communist” Swedish General Carl von Horn (Dayal 1976) which guaranteed a further entrenchment of Western interests in Congo. The decision of appointing a known “fierce anti-communist” Swedish General to command ONUC could hardly be coincidental given the deliberate efforts to deny the Soviets access to Congo’s strategic minerals and natural resources. At the UN headquarters in New York, the set-up was such that decisions made were to guarantee the promotion and safeguarding of Western interests in the Congo with little regard to the implications on the local population and the host government.
According to (Al-Qaq 2009:155) at the beginning of ONUC operations in Congo, three prominent American citizens namely-Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinz Wieschof were virtually running the show regarding the planning and execution of ONUC operations.
The Secretary General Hammarskjold had an inner secretive cabinet, the so called ‘Congo Club’ that exclusively consisted of himself and Americans and an outer layer of neutrals mainly Afro-Asians (O’Brien 1962:56). This goes to demonstrate that the top command and administrative hierarchy of ONUC was set up in an unprofessional and unethical fashion. The Secretary General Hammarskjold went to the extent of insisting that the overall military command authority for ONUC was vested in himself as he created a command structure that was predominantly civilian resulting in sustained civilian-military friction from the beginning of the operation (O’Neill and Rees 2005:64). This strange command arrangement led Simmonds (1968:161) to lament that “the wisdom of charging the Secretary-General with
"command authority" for ONUC operations is one that cannot readily be accepted.” To buttress the preponderance of American influence over ONUC affairs, Saksena (1974:272) observed that: “…from beginning to the end the shadow of the greatest Power on earth, the US loomed large in the UN operations in Congo…The result was that they could not help becoming an instrument to achieve US policy goals.”
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It is therefore apparent that Secretary General Hammarskjold and his “inner cabinet” made maximum use of this command and administrative arrangement to successfully influence operations in the field to suit Western political and strategic designs. This assertion buttresses the argument that ONUC, through the machinations of the UN Secretary General and his close associates in New York and UN officials in Congo deliberately undermined the authority of the Congolese Government, further weakening the government’s ability to take charge of events in the country by hand picking their preferred leaders loyal their western masters.
American financial assistance to ONUC amounted to approximately 42 per cent of all total expenses incurred during entire operation (Lefever and Joshua 1966:154-155). Had the US withdrawn this massive financial support, the operation could have been brought to a grinding halt considering that France and the Soviet Union had declined to pay their dues arguing that the mission was serving American and not UN interests. Considering the operating environment prevailing within the UN Headquarters, O’Brien (1962:56) is of the view that, “it is almost certainly true to say that any Secretary General who lost the confidence of Washington would have to resign.” The predominance of Western influence was extended to field troops in Congo, a situation that was unsuccessfully challenged by the Eastern Bloc.
The Soviet Union queried Canada’s involvement in the peacekeeping operation arguing that Canada was an ally of Belgium in NATO hence its participation was incompatible with the obligations of a UN international military service constituted by non-interested member countries (Simmonds 1968:139). Canada was even given a sensitive responsibility of providing communication resources to all peacekeepers deployed in Congo, an opportunity that was later taken advantage of when a Canadian officer tracked Lumumba’s movements in an unethical conspiracy to facilitate his arrest and subsequent assassination by Katangese authorities(Spooner 2009:109). Swedish troops were first introduced into Katanga Province several months before African peacekeepers could be allowed in the Province. This was said to be a confidence building initiative by the Secretary General to calm the white foreigners in this secessionist province, a development that infuriated Lumumba and further compounded their mutual suspicion and mistrust (Al Qaq 2009). Not surprisingly therefore, many complaints were later raised at various stages of the operation sharply critical of the employment of non-African troops in the Congo operation.
This section has demonstrated the degree to which ONUC decision making hierarchy was Western biased and predominantly American. It has been articulated that major decisions
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regarding the composition of ONUC leadership were meant not to advance UN and Congolese interests but rather American geo-strategic self-interests in its Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and its endeavour to fill the vacuum left by departing former colonial powers.
Whereas the US was ahead of the Soviet Union in scheming its strategic moves in Congo, Prime Minister Lumumba was equally busy with counter moves designed to secure Soviet involvement in the Congo crisis; an initiative that ultimately aggravated western hatred against the Prime Minister as he was seen as trying to introduce communist influence in this region considered a preserve of Western influence.
3.3.1 Implications of Soviet military assistance to Lumumba
This section attempts to illustrate how the predominantly American decision making ONUC hierarchy misinterpreted Lumumba’s motivation in requesting for Soviet military assistance. It also evaluates the implications for Lumumba’s deployment of government troops to fight secessionists in Kasai Province that had followed the lead taken by Katanga Province.
Having failed to convince Secretary General Hammarskjold to militarily engage invading Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries, Lumumba requested and received military assistance from the Soviet Union. This was in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter that authorises foreign military assistance for the sake of self-defence in the case of military aggression. Congo thus became the first independent African country to receive military aid from the Soviet Union and this infuriated the Hammarskjold who vowed to “under-cut Lumumba” (Arnold 1999:94).
In connivance with his American close advisers, the Secretary General sought to ensure that decolonised Congo remained within the Western powers’ sphere of influence and not to depart too far from the colonial path of paternalism that existed during the Belgian colonial era. The Secretary General and his advisors believed that Lumumba had raised the pitch of the crisis to Cold War super power confrontation level. They interpreted Lumumba’s use of Soviet military equipment as an initiative to establish a communist foothold in the Southern African region primarily designed to scuttle Western strategic interests in that part of Africa. This misunderstanding was a clear manifestation of a conflict characterised by mistrust between the UN senior officials and the Prime Minister of Congo and his followers. Instead of creating a harmonious and constructive working relationship between the UN mission and the host government, serious friction and pursuit of conflicting agendas ensued as a result of irreconcilable interpretation of the mandate issued by the UN Security Council Resolutions and
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failure to agree on priority tasks for ONUC. The misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and the Secretary General deteriorated to such levels where UN officials began to explore ways of removing Lumumba from the political stage in Congo in preference of a more moderate pro- Western Congolese leader; initiatives that were directly in conflict with the principle of host state sovereignty.
In a demonstration of double standards by ONUC officials who had earlier violently opposed Lumumba’s military request from the Soviet Union, President Kasa Vubu was later allowed to appeal for external forces to deal with Katangese rebels and mercenaries well after the death of Lumumba. This action was condoned by ONUC officials because the Congolese government was firmly under pro-Western leaders (UN Doc. S/4630 of 16 Jan. 1961).
The next section examines the handling of the constitutional crisis in Congo that aggravated an already precarious situation; a direct result of ONUC officials’ meddling in the internal affairs of the host nation.