The first fundamental ethical principle of peacekeeping operations that contributes towards their constitutional and legal basis for deployment and continued presence of a peacekeeping force within a state is host state consent. This is a vital requirement for the deployment of consensual peacekeeping missions for the simple reason that state sovereignty plays a critical role in the context of establishing a UN mandate for non-violent peacekeeping intervention.
Tsagourias (2006:3) buttresses this point by acknowledging the criticality and centrality of host state consent when he states that “…consent is critical for the creation of a conducive operating environment for a peacekeeping force inside a target country and this consent provides the mission with the relevant legal and legitimate basis, failure which the deployment would be viewed as a violation of host state sovereignty.” Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter prevents the
184
world body from intervening in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of member states (United Nations Charter 1945). It follows therefore that the deployment and continuous presence of a peacekeeping mission requires the host state’s consent, failure which, the deployment will be in violation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter.
Since there are no provisions for peacekeeping missions in the UN Charter, peacekeeping operations derive their legitimacy from the Security Council resolutions and host state consent (Jett 2001:39). Host state consent legitimizes the deployment of foreign troops in a given country. Consent is derived from the parties’ “perceptions of the peacekeepers’ impartiality and moral authority” (Durch 1993:12). Essentially, consent serves to reduce the risk to the peacekeepers and more importantly, upholding this principle preserves the sovereignty of the host state (Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Any erosion of consent can significantly diminish the peacekeepers’ ability to fulfil their mission and mandate in addition to endangering their lives hence peacekeepers have an incentive not only to maintain consent but also to cultivate and nurture it for the benefit of all concerned. In theory, host state consent and Security Council mandate together make a very strong case that prevents the world body from intervening and meddling in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states without their approval.
The presence of host state consent also ensures that peacekeepers are in the majority of cases, deployed into stable and “permissive” operational environments where the use of force in self- defence is anticipated to be at a minimal. In that regard, irrespective of how the operating environment is, it is critical that the mission maintains and upholds its legitimacy since legitimacy of peacekeeping troops influences the behaviour of local actors, general support from the population and provides the basis for continued acceptability (Latif and Khan 2010:236). In the post-Cold War era, host consent has been granted grudgingly in some cases as it was not offered freely and wholeheartedly by receiving states. Some powerful states have sought to apply various strategies to manipulate weak states into accepting peacekeepers’
deployment in their territories for meagre political and economic incentives thereby undermining their state sovereignty and national integrity. It is therefore pertinent to investigate why the big powers go to the extent of coercing receiving states to accept the presence of UN peacekeepers against their will.
Welsh (2008:562) noted that in cases such as in Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, host state consent was coerced by the big powers through diplomatic, political and economic pressures especially in situations involving humanitarian emergencies. In the African context, the
185
Sudanese President was coerced to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur against his government’s wishes (De Haas 2008). In the DRC, UN peacekeepers remain deployed in that country when the host government demanded their departure or their drastic scaling down all to no avail.
These cases are testimony to the current practice of undermining host country’s sovereignty, a development that heralded a significant and regrettable departure from the original founding principles of UN peacekeeping operations as a non-coercive tool of third-party involvement designed to ameliorate and contain violence without undermining the authority of the host government.
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are a tool that is being frequently used to undermine host state sovereignty through manipulation and violation of host state consent. At the international level of states’ interaction, the concept of sovereignty implies the ability to deny any unwelcome foreign intervention in domestic affairs that are strictly considered to be within the jurisdiction of the state. In practicing its sovereignty, the state is not subject to any foreign authority of any nature whatsoever, including ethical values, without its consent and out of response to its national interests (Abu al-Haj 2013:118).
Some scholars argue that the principle of non-intervention is not absolute citing situations where a government fails to protect its citizens from genocide, it would have reneged on its responsibility to protect its own population. The most recent example in Africa is when the Libyan government threatened to massacre its own citizens that were revolting against Gaddafi’s continued rule, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone as the international community assumed the responsibility of protecting the Libyan population against its own government.
The principle of non-intervention is considered to be one of the fundamental principles of International Law that is designed to guarantee international order and the independence and sovereignty of states, hence the commitment and undertaking by member states to respect rights of each state and not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states (Shukri 1986:141). Regrettably, the principle of territorial integrity, though substantially retained in theory, has in practice, been negatively affected and substantially watered down as a result of the effects of globalization and accelerated interdependency among member states (Enabulele 2010:409-410). Host state consent in the context of UN peacekeeping operations has equally been watered down and violated as a result of these global forces.
186
7.2.1 The problem of state sovereignty and human security
The need for host state consent prior to the deployment of peacekeeping missions at times causes problems in some complex mission environments. The importance accorded to human security over the past two and half decades has taken centre stage to the extent that if a UN mission does not guarantee or be seen to be prioritizing human security in the first place, then it is considered a futile undertaking (Latif and Khan 2010:236). This implies that human security, under these circumstances is being accorded higher priority over that of state sovereignty.
Newman and Richmond (2001:4) observed that the focus of post-Cold War peacekeeping has dramatically shifted towards human security in the context of international society. This view is supported by the Brahimi Report (2000) which called for a stronger rethinking regarding human security (Peou 2002:65). These developments have resulted in the complication of issues regarding host state consent in the context of “new humanitarian interventions” and state sovereignty. This complication has resulted in a dilemma between the defence of humanity and defence of sovereignty and it is unclear which principle should prevail when they are in conflict (Latif and Khan 2010:237). Following the humanitarian disasters that happened in places like Somalia, Rwanda, DRC, Bosnia and Haiti, the UN Secretariat came to acknowledge the existence of the dilemma of nation state sovereignty and human security. In the year 2000, the then Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that in the practice of classical peacekeeping operations, “consent” by host states was vital however, he was also quick to highlight and emphasize the problem that exists in contemporary missions when he stated that:
I also accept that the principle of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak states. But to the critics, I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights, violations that offend every precept of our common humanity? (Annan 2000:47-48).
He further acknowledged that humanitarian interventions can be used as a cover up to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and that it can be used by secessionist movements from affected countries to deliberately provoke governments to commit gross human rights violations and trigger foreign intervention in support of their cause (Ibid.). A problem arises where it is not clear what action the international community should take in order to assist the suffering population without undermining the sovereignty of the host state that is suspicious of actual intensions of the intervening forces.