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failure to agree on priority tasks for ONUC. The misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and the Secretary General deteriorated to such levels where UN officials began to explore ways of removing Lumumba from the political stage in Congo in preference of a more moderate pro- Western Congolese leader; initiatives that were directly in conflict with the principle of host state sovereignty.
In a demonstration of double standards by ONUC officials who had earlier violently opposed Lumumba’s military request from the Soviet Union, President Kasa Vubu was later allowed to appeal for external forces to deal with Katangese rebels and mercenaries well after the death of Lumumba. This action was condoned by ONUC officials because the Congolese government was firmly under pro-Western leaders (UN Doc. S/4630 of 16 Jan. 1961).
The next section examines the handling of the constitutional crisis in Congo that aggravated an already precarious situation; a direct result of ONUC officials’ meddling in the internal affairs of the host nation.
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of Lumumba’s reinforcements and supporters in the capital city. This action was neither taken in good faith nor was it neutral. It was designed to consolidate the newly promoted Colonel Mobutu’s authority and popularity among the Congolese soldiers who had not been paid their salaries for months. Cordier’s initiative was meant to buy the soldiers’ loyalty for Mobutu and prepare the ground for his coup attempt a few days later (Kalb 1982:96). Thereafter, Cordier made several key decisions that effectively aligned the UN with Kasa Vubu in his dispute with Lumumba.
Following the dismissal of Lumumba from office Cordier made his most important and strategic decisions that completely changed the political landscape and power dynamics in Congo. He ordered UN troops to close the major airports and to seize the national radio station in the capital under the false pretence to ostensibly keep the crisis within bounds and especially to avoid bloody civil outbreaks (Dayal 1976:37). This illegal and unethical act in violation of Congolese sovereignty had far reaching implications as it primarily hurt Lumumba’s political plans and ambitions and tilted the political power balance in favour of Kasa Vubu.
Prior arrangements had been made for Kasa Vubu to have access to radio facilities in neighbouring Congo (Brazzaville) while Lumumba was denied a platform to appeal to his national political followers (Weissman 1974:91-2). Similarly, Kasa Vubu's political allies were allowed to use the ostensibly closed airport to travel into the Congolese interior to mobilize support for the president while Lumumba's supporters were grounded(O'Brien:1962).Both actions served to entrench Kasa Vubu's control of the capital while silencing his charismatic rival Lumumba.
Cordier did not bother to consult or inform the newly appointed UN Special Representative who was already in Leopoldville before issuing such far reaching instructions that violated Congo’s sovereignty. Urquhart observed that Dayal the newly posted Special Representative was “taken aback by Cordier’s decisions,” to the extent that, “for a moment he considered resigning” (Urquhart 1987:446). Cordier’s failure to inform Dayal about his controversial decisions would suggest that he knew that Dayal would not endorse such unethical decisions that openly favoured one party in the Congo crisis against the other.
The political decisions taken by Cordier, a UN senior diplomat in Leopoldville were a strategic master-stroke that eventually led to the downfall and subsequent arrest and assassination of Lumumba. Al-Qaq (2009:31) concludes that this equally demonstrated the futility of considering UN peacekeeping activities as “impartial, neutral and disinterested.” The rationale
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of deploying senior American diplomats as Special Representatives of the Secretary General appear to have paid dividends towards fulfilment of a deliberately well calculated strategic plan to influence events in Congo in the direction preferred by the American government.
Cordier, in his acting capacity succeeded in "immobilizing" the Congolese Army to such an extent that it could not be used by Lumumba who had been placed under virtual house arrest.
His unethical and illegal actions served to deepen the Congolese crisis and enhanced greater chances of Congolese civil war as some tribes felt deliberately short changed by the UN peacekeeping mission through biased interference in the country’s internal affairs. This view is supported by Dayal (1976) who stated that at worst Cordier inadvertently abetted an anti- Lumumba plot conceived and directed by Western embassies. O'Brien (1968:93-94) who was the UN representative in Katanga in 1961, believes that Cordier deliberately helped Washington plot Lumumba's ouster, and may have done so with Secretary General Hammarskjold's plausibly deniable approval. This researcher shares O’Brien’s version considering that Secretary General Hammarskjold and Cordier strongly believed that Congolese internal squabbles and bickering were of less significance in international politics compared to the potential of East-West conflict arising from the Congo crisis.
The facilitation of Mobutu’s coup d’état and immediate closure of Soviet and Eastern countries’ embassies in Congo culminating in the assassination of Lumumba, were meant to ensure that the communist bloc, was effectively denied a possibility of having meaningful influence in post-independence Congo (Collins 1993). In trying to ensure the success of the UN mission as they conceived it in the Congo, Cordier and other top UN leaders took steps which constituted de facto intervention in internal Congolese affairs. In effect, they played kingmaker, albeit within certain constraints of deniability (Ibid.). ONUC officials made a deliberate choice of their preferred Congolese leaders and gave them full support in complete disregard of the wishes of the majority of Congolese people and parliament. In so doing Cordier’s actions compromised the UN professed principles of neutrality, impartiality and non- interference in internal affairs of member countries. It is therefore not surprising that many Africans, Non-Aligned Members as well as the Eastern bloc countries expressed their indignation at the manner in which ONUC handled the crisis and equally questioned the UN allegedly neutral role in the Congo (Al Qaq 2009).
The next section examines the role played by some accomplice peacekeepers in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. This is important as it buttresses the point that ONUC was
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not primarily deployed to serve the interests of the Congolese population but rather, those of Western powers.
3.4.1 The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba
This section exposes the unethical practices by ONUC officials that contributed to the assassination of the elected Prime Minister of Congo Patrice Lumumba who was killed in January 1961.
Lumumba was arrested following the constitutional crisis. He escaped from detention and was tracked, captured, tortured and eventually assassinated through the coordinated efforts of Mobutu, Kasa Vubu, Tshombe and the CIA agents (Weissman 1974:88-90. A Canadian Lieutenant Colonel Berthiaume, who continuously monitored Lumumba’s movements over the UN communication system supplied and manned by the Canadian contingent, passed up-to- date information to Mobutu of Lumumba’s whereabouts who then arranged the capture of Lumumba (Spooner 2009:109). Berthiaume was known to be “sympathetic to the aims, if not always the methods of the Kasa Vubu-Mobutu elements in the Congo” and was therefore an accomplice in the capture and subsequent assassination of Lumumba (Ibid.).
On the night of 27-28 November 1960, Lumumba escaped arrest from Leopoldville where he was under the protection of the UN troops (Sitkowski 2006:69). As the legally elected Prime Minister, Lumumba later requested for a protection unit from ONUC when he was moving from Port Francqui to Mweka but this was declined by ONUC officials after having consulted Secretary General Hammarskjold, thus deliberately exposing him to danger (Ibid.). He was later captured by pro-Mobutu soldiers and subjected to harsh treatment. A Ghanaian platoon commander who witnessed Lumumba being kicked and slapped, tried to intervene to stop the beating without realizing that this could be misconstrued as interference in internal Congolese political affairs (Ibid :69-70).
The Ghanaian attempts to secure UN authority to take Lumumba into safe custody were again declined by ONUC officials after consultation with UN headquarters. Challenged in York to explain why ONUC had not protected Lumumba once he was seen being beaten by Congolese troops, Secretary General Hammarskjold replied that it would have necessitated the use of force by ONUC, “an initiative which lay beyond their mandate and was in violation of the principle of the non-use of force” (Abi-Saab 1978:90). The UN assessed that getting Lumumba into their custody and protecting him from his enemies would amount to interference in internal affairs of the Congo as Lumumba was pursuing his political aims in the Province of Kasai where he
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was apprehended by Mobutu loyalists. Ultimately Lumumba was handed over to Katanga authorities, where he was later assassinated. His death was announced over the Katanga radio by Godefroid Munongo, Katanga’s Interior Minister on 13 February 1961 to the astonishment of the progressive world (Abi Saab 1978).
This political and moral disaster drew sharp criticisms from across the globe with the Soviets accusing the Secretary General Hammarskjold and his ONUC command in Congo of complicity in surrendering Lumumba to Katanga authorities. Indonesia and UAR immediately withdrew their military contingents from ONUC in protest (Sitkowski Op.cit.:70). African members of the “radical Casablanca group” namely Egypt, Morocco and Guinea also withdrew their troops resulting in the UN suffering tremendous reputational damage as a result of the unethical mishandling of this mission by senior ONUC officials (Adebajo and Landsberg 2007:165).
The circumstances surrounding the downfall and elimination of Lumumba reflected serious unethical practices by the UN officials as they connived with Western backed authorities to oust a legitimately elected national leader of the host country, in violation of Congo’s national sovereignty. ONUC officials also denied him protection when he needed it most. The denial of Ghanaian officers to protect Lumumba was a demonstration of utmost contempt of the legitimate host government of Congo by ONUC officials. The fact that the new Congolese authorities handed Lumumba to Katangese officials suggests that there was some prior communication going on between the secessionist leaders and the newly installed Congolese government a situation that explains why Lumumba was not satisfied with Hammarskjöld’s handling of the crisis through his ‘secret diplomacy’ meetings with Tshombe.
Once the US had achieved its strategic goal of eliminating Lumumba from the Congo political scene and the elevation of General Joseph Mobutu to the helm of power, “Washington eventually devised the military plan to end the secession in Katanga” as this marked the first UN peace enforcement mission that not only entrenched US hegemony in Congo but also seriously violated Congo’s national sovereignty (James 1994:44-58).
The use of force by ONUC to incorporate Katanga back into the unified Congo is not part of this study as it was properly constituted through legitimate authorization by the Security Council. However, of major concern is the fact that UN peacekeeping offensive operations in Congo were primarily meant to consolidate the power base of the imposed, unelected and
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unconstitutional government in Leopoldville a development that did not serve the self- determination national interests of the Congolese population.