4.3 UN non-humanitarian motives for intervention in Somalia
4.3.2 An ethical analysis of non-humanitarian motives for military intervention in Somalia 87
making Somalia an example of how the UN would deal with countries and regions of instability in the post-Cold War era. Diehl (1994:186) observed that Somalia was supposed to have been the UN benchmark mission for peace-building in the post-Cold War era. Proactive actions adopted by the Secretariat were partly in response to severe pressure emanating from the US which dictated to the Secretariat to either “reform or die” hence the Secretary General had to revitalize the UN post-Cold War peace and security role in conformity with the US dictates and wishes which served as a precondition for guaranteed access to US financial support for the world organization (Solomon 1996:6). The argument that humanitarian considerations were the main driving force for military intervention in Somalia has been challenged by several political analysts and academics.
De Waal and others have queried whether humanitarian concerns centered on Somalis’
starvation were indeed the major motivating factors for the UN/US intervention in Somalia.
Their argument is mainly centered on the fact that at the time of deploying UN peacekeepers in Somalia, the bigger challenge in that country was death from diseases possibly caused by malnutrition and not famine induced starvation (De Waal 1994:152). Some humanitarian and human rights organizations that were against the military humanitarian intervention in Somalia included Save the Children Fund, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the American Friends Service Committee. Their anti-military humanitarian intervention argument
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was based on the fact that “more limited alternative options had not been exhausted and that the intervention was based on false information about the Somali situation and (that the military option) would not solve the political crisis in Somalia” (De Waal 1996:296). Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that were deployed in the country together with the Secretary General’s Special Representative to Somalia who was directly ceased with the crisis did not believe that time was ripe for a military humanitarian intervention yet the UN under pressure from the US decided on the contrary to proceed with military deployments before all alternative peaceful options had been exhausted. Such observations and sentiments justify the search for unethical non-humanitarian motives that influenced the launch of military peace enforcement operations when the assessment of some of the donors on the ground was that the military intervention was not only unnecessary but also that it was not going to produce positive results, a view that was ultimately vindicated less than a year later.
4.3.3 An ethical analysis of the relationship between Boutros-Ghali and Farah Aideed The New World Order that was anticipated at the end of the Cold War did not immediately materialise as disorder and violent internal conflicts across the globe characterised international affairs to the dismay of the proponents of the envisioned ideal world and doctrine (Utley 2006).
In line with this ideology, Boutros-Ghali was a strong advocate for military humanitarian peace enforcement missions as he formulated a plan in conjunction with US officials at the Pentagon, towards the deployment of a humanitarian peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Not surprisingly, the Somalis, especially General Farah Aideed and his followers were suspicious of Boutros- Ghali’s ulterior motives for intervention in Somalia as they did not believe that he and the UN he represented had good intentions in intervening in the domestic affairs of Somalia. This view is shared by Hirsch and Oakley (1995:19) who noted that General Aideed and his militias maintained old animosities towards Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.
Prior to becoming Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali served as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in Egypt. During that period, Egypt strongly supported the rule of President Siyad Barre, the man who had imprisoned and tortured Aideed for more than five years, which General Aideed now held against the Secretary General (Ibid.). The feeling that Boutros-Ghali had found an opportunity to effectively deal with Aideed cannot be ruled out as the Secretary General rushed to embrace the military offensive option before exhausting other non-coercive measures that were being pursued by Sahnoun, his special representative whose approach was respected by the warlords and traditional leaders in Somalia. As a result, the powerful mutual feelings of animosity between the Secretary General and Farah Aideed played a critical role in
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the promotion of difficulties encountered by the UN/US mission in Somalia (Ibid.). In this regard, it can be considered rational to conclude that one of the contributing factors for Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s enthusiasm for military intervention in Somalia that violated that country’s national sovereignty was the pursuit of the military defeat of his arch enemy General Farah Aideed as reflected in one of the Secretary General’s public address.
Addressing an American Conference on Global Development at the Carter Centre, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali revealed his ambitious goal in Somalia when he stated that after the food distribution in Somalia, the militia gangs would completely disappear following United Nations aggressive peace negotiations with the Somali warring clans. What this implied was that the warlords like General Aideed were to “disappear” and be replaced by preferred leaders after the elimination and disappearance of the militia gangs. This was confirmed by comments made by one senior UN official who stated that, ‘‘…the factions will be weakened by this military intervention, so the creation of a new force—with United Nations assistance—might work’’ (Peterson 1992). All these ambitious targets aimed at reconstructing and politically re- engineering Somalia were being planned for execution without any input or participation of the Somalis in clear violation of that country’s sovereignty and self-determination. In that regard, General Farah Aideed and his militias were justified in harbouring suspicions regarding the true motives of the UN/US military intervention in Somalia.
Suspicious of the true intentions of the UN military involvement in their country, Somali spokesmen representing various warlords opposed to peacekeepers’ deployment warned Boutros-Ghali that the UN force would be resisted if deployed as they were considered to be an invading foreign force (Wheeler and Roberts 2012:13-14). Secretary Bolton, who was serving in the Bush Administration warned that it was not advisable to deploy any foreign troops in Somalia arguing that it was ‘‘premature until there is an effective ceasefire.’’ His advice was not taken heed of by both the UN Secretary General and the Bush administration.
Bolton’s advice was based on a warning made to him by an aide to General Aideed who warned that ‘‘…if the UN sent in 50 military observers, they might as well send in 50 coffins too’’
(Moffett III:1992) a warning that was not taken seriously considering the operational handling of General Aideed’s faction during the course of the operation. Such warnings clearly demonstrated that the UN troops were not welcome at all in Somalia hence the fabricated consent in New York was considered invalid. True to their word, the Somalis were determined not to succumb to a foreign imposed military solution to their internal political and security crisis as they intensified their resistance to UN sponsored foreign military invasion.
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Mohamed Sahnoun, the former UN Special Representative to Somalia, once remarked that UNOSOM’s military heavy handedness and its “heavy military presence' led the Somalis to perceive the peacekeepers’ presence as an occupation force trying to impose an alien political solution without the full participation of the Somali people (Thakur 1994:399). The UN sponsored “humanitarian” intervention in Somalia was not an ordinary military intervention to help the suffering population in that impoverished country. Richard Haass (1994:26-27) observed the difference between standard humanitarian interventions aimed at "providing protection and other basic needs," and much more complex endeavours, such as nation- building, which envision "recasting the institutions of the society” and he concluded that the Somalia humanitarian mission was widened to include nation building because "policymakers got ambitious." The ambitious and aggressive conduct of UN operations in Somalia tended to suggest that the Secretary General had other ulterior motives in the outcome of the Somali operation.
According to (Kapteijns 2013:437), during the course of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, the military dimension overwhelmed and cancelled out the humanitarian one leading to serious violation of Somali people’s human rights and the country’s national sovereignty.
Kapteijns adds that the “humanitarian label” placed on the military campaign in Somalia, helped to camouflage the true UN and US highly subjective political preferences in Somalia (Ibid.). Such subjective preferences could only be attained through the violation of Somalia’s national sovereignty by the invading UN sponsored forces. The dilemma faced by the peacekeepers in Somalia was therefore whether to appease those with power, the warlords on the ground or oppose them with force and face the consequences (Mayall 1996:109), a dilemma that found a solution in the excessive use of force against the most powerful warlord General Farah Aideed in which thousands of innocent civilians were killed in cold blood.
Considering the fact that the initiative to launch a military “humanitarian” mission in Somalia was largely that of Boutros-Ghali backed by the Bush Administration, it is prudent that the chapter now focuses on examining the non-humanitarian motivations that influenced the US to deploy a massive military force in Somalia; the United Task Force (UNITAF) at a time when the effects of the famine were already in decline.