3.2 Background to the 1960-64 Congo crisis
3.2.3 Interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions by the UNSG and Prime Minister of
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3.2.3 Interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions by the UNSG and Prime Minister of
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(Akehurst 1984:189). The ambiguity regarding the peacekeeping mission and its obscure objectives formed a bitter source of conflict between Lumumba and the UN Secretary General.
O’Neill and Rees (2005) have argued that ambiguous mandates were meant to give the Secretary General enough room to manoeuvre where the circumstances were not legally binding and left room for flexibility in deciding what mandate the peacekeepers would have.
Prime Minister Lumumba could be forgiven for having interpreted the deployment of ONUC as “the government’s right arm” since that was what the Congolese government had requested for, as a reinforcement to their efforts to get rid of the invading Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries (O’Neill and Rees 2005:56). The UN role was tacitly but clearly predicated on the assumption that it was willing and capable of helping the new Congolese Government exert total and effective control over all its national territory and effectively neutralize and ultimately defeat the secessionists (Ekpebu 1989:31-38).
Prime Minister Lumumba questioned the impartiality of Secretary General Hammarskjold in his interpretation of the resolution as well as his initiatives to engage in negotiations with Katangese authorities behind the government’s back. Lumumba wrote to the Hammarskjold a scathing letter convinced that the 14 July UN resolution firmly stated that “in its intervention in the Congo the UN is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council was to place all its resources at the disposal of my government” (Abi-Saab 1978:46). Lumumba castigated and challenged Hammarskjold’s initiative to engage in “secretive” negotiations with Tshombe the secessionist leader without prior consultation with the Central Government. He made his views clear that he considered Hammarskjold to be interfering in Congo’s internal affairs between his government and secessionist Katanga using the UN peacekeepers “to influence its outcome which is formally prohibited by the very paragraph which you invoked”
(Ibid.:46-47). This in Lumumba’s view was in violation of the UN Charter as well as Congo’s sovereignty. On his part, Hammarskjold insisted that his actions were part of “quiet diplomacy”
essential for securing an agreement from secessionist leader Moise Tshombe to comply with the demands from ONUC. The sharp contrast in the interpretation of the mandate which continued to sour relations between the Secretary General and the Prime Minister can be discerned from detailed tasks given to General Carl von Horn by the Secretary General’s Special Representative in Congo.
Briefing General Carl von Horn the substantive commander of ONUC on his arrival in Congo, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph Bunche interpreted the Security Council
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resolution loosely as follows: ONUC was to replace the Belgians in key strategic areas and once this was achieved, the Belgians would withdraw followed by ONUC’s replacement of the unreliable Congolese National Army (ANC) troops, curb the unruly behaviour and activities of the local army and gradually transform them into a more reliable and professional force.
Bunche further emphasised that General Von Horn was expected to secure ONUC’s freedom of movement across the length and breadth of Congo and was to ensure that he prevented any unilateral interference by the Soviets following the request for assistance made by Lumumba.
Bunche made it clear to General von Horn that his mission was to effectively “take over the responsibility for law and order maintenance in the country both from the Belgians and the rebellious Congolese troops posing as the Congolese Army” (Sitkowski 2006:66). This interpretation of the mandate literally implied that ONUC was the “de-facto security force” of an independent Congo whose operations were not obliged to respect the sovereignty of the host country. The legitimacy of this interpretation of the Security Council Resolution raises an ethical dilemma considering that the Congolese Army was rebellious and harassing innocent civilians and the other troops in the country were the invading Belgian troops. In such a situation the UN peacekeepers appeared to be the only legitimate force available to bring about law and order in the country.
The tasks outlined by Bunche to General von Horn could not have been successfully accomplished without serious and controversial interference in the internal affairs of the host country. Higgins (1980:40) observed that it was extremely difficult not to interfere in Congo’s domestic affairs, considering that the mission had been tasked with the responsibility to maintain law and order and territorial integrity of the host country in an attempt to prevent an outbreak of civil war. In addition he is of the view that overseeing Belgian troop withdrawal was to prove increasingly challenging considering that the UN had “a clear bias towards the central government and its juridical sovereignty (Ibid.).” Important to note is the fact that there was no serious emphasis given for cooperation with the Congolese Army or authorities in the law and order maintenance instructions given to General von Horn by Bunche. Moreover the interpretation of the Security Council Resolution posed a dilemma in that Bunche’s interpretation also served as an alternative legitimate interpretation. However, lack of emphasis on cooperation with Congolese political leadership served as a clear demonstration of contempt of Congolese authorities in violation of that country’s sovereignty.
Hammarskjold and Bunche’s interpretation of the Security Council resolution angered Lumumba who argued that the UN forces were in the Congo on the invitation of the Congolese
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Government specifically to deal with the invading Belgian troops. Moreover, Lumumba argued that the Katanga secessionist movement was not an authentic secessionist movement but rather
“a mere façade for foreign intervention” without which the whole attempt to secede would have collapsed much earlier (Hoskyns 1961:173). The Secretary General Hammarskjold remained adamant and insisted that the Katanga problem was an internal crisis which the UN would remain neutral and impartial, a strategy meant to buy time for the consolidation of the Katangese authorities that was designed to make the Katanga secession appear less directly dependent on Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries (Ibid).
Tshombe welcomed the Secretary General’s interpretation of the UN resolution and his proposed terms of introducing ONUC troops in Katanga as this served his strategic designs to hypocritically enter into an unexplained relationship with Central Government while buying time to consolidate the foundations of his illegitimate independence (Abi-Saab 1978:45). In the interim, the CIA, the Secretary General and his inner core advisers were working out a plan to immobilize, neutralize and ultimately eliminate Lumumba from Congo’s political scene in blatant violation of Congo’s national sovereignty (Collins 1993).
Lumumba, sensing the conspiracy, made five requests to the Secretary General: “(a) to send exclusively African and Congolese troops immediately to Katanga; (b) to withdraw all non- African troops there from; (c) to provide UN planes for the transport of Congolese civil and military personnel to Katanga; (d) to seize all arms and ammunitions distributed by the Belgians in Katanga and give them to the Central Government; and (e) to entrust the guarding of all airfields exclusively to Congolese army and police instead of UN troops” (UN Doc.
S/4417/Add. 7/II). Secretary General Hammarskjold in a demonstration of contempt for the Prime Minister refused to respond to the substance of Lumumba’s demands but promised to forward them for discussion in the next Security Council meeting where both the Secretary General and Lumumba would have an opportunity to defend their positions and views (Ibid.).
The Secretary General remained adamant that ONUC would remain “impartial” yet covertly it was working towards promoting Western interests in Congo as will be explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs below.
The ambiguity of the mandate and competing interpretations of the mandate created irreconcilable enmity and mistrust between the Secretary General Hammarskjold and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The suspicion battle between these two influential individuals played out prominently after the deployment of ONUC as their inter-personal conflicts further
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complicated an already complex situation that served to undermine the ability of the host government to protect its population in fulfilment of its mandate to safeguard the well-being of the Congolese population.