CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
3.3 The Historical Origins of Realism
3.3.2 Brief Critique of Realism
The longevity and dominance of realism in international relations are perhaps its biggest strengths. They give an impression that realism has yet to find an equal contender in IR theory.
Furthermore, realists pride themselves in having the prudence to accept the world as it is, rather than as it ought to be. For this reason, they avoid the lofty imaginations of “idealists” or utopians as E. H. Carr calls them (Palan 2000:575). Hans Morgenthau (1946) repudiates the liberal position that says a more peaceful world is likely to emerge because of advancement in education, democracy, technology and culture. Realists argue that technological wonders that have made communication easier among traditional borders are not tantamount to the possibility of the world becoming a community.
The fact that realism has permeated the foreign policy of powerful actors like the United States (Ahrensdorf 1997) also adds to its fortunes as frontrunner in international relations theory. Since 1945, argues Robert Keohane (1986:9), discussions on foreign policy have often been through the parlance of political realism, the language that privileges “power and interests rather than ideals or norms.” The vicissitudes of the international system from WWI to WWII also gave realism the conviction that it has a cogent predictive quality. E.H. Carr’s book, to which most realists revert as a seminal piece in realism, was written just before the start of WWII. This arguably shows that Carr correctly inveighed against the League of Nations and the understandable but misplaced optimism that followed the treaty of Versailles. In short, he validly repudiated idealism. Another strength of realism is that its arguments are consonant with the politics of statecraft in general (Viotti and Kauppi 2012). It cannot be naysaid that, generally speaking, many nations would want to secure their interests and relate only with nations that can make that possible. Amid all these credits, however, realism and neo-realism have had to endure their share of criticism.
One of the biggest criticisms of realism is its claim that politics are objective, and hence almost impregnable to the dynamics of the wider international system. In other words, realists perceive
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the world as though it has its own life, independent of the states that actually compose it. This eschews the fact that the international system is actually a consequence of the inclinations, aspirations and actions of its constituent parts. Following the logic of realism would persuade one to believe that statesmen have their hands tied and hence have no leeway to maneuver, and that their actions do not spring from self-will; rather, they are mechanistic. Thus, human beings are victims of a world that is uncontrollable. Even if statesmen would yearn for a more peaceful world, they are unable to engender it because the system is unchangeable and no state would want to be a lone utopian in an international system replete with self-interested and selfish states.
“In sum, critics claim there is a fatalistic, deterministic, and pessimistic undercurrent to much of the realist work” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:75). Tabensky (2007:98) excoriates realism, especially of the Machiavellian inspiration, for making the erroneous leap “from raw observation to normative recommendation.” To confine people’s interest to those of Machiavelli, Tabensky argues, “is incoherent and this incoherence is at the heart of IR realism” (Tabensky 2007:98).
Neorealism has often been criticized for being deterministic; it apparently disregards human agency and free will in international relations.11 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the major superpower, arguably by default rather than intent, challenged neo-realist arguments that states deliberately seek to dominate others. Friedrich Kratochwil (1993:63) asserts that neo-realism was embarrassed by the “chain of events” that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was easy to divine who was ally and foe in a world dichotomized into the liberal world and the communist world.
This status quo provided neo-realism with an unassailable credibility. However, the seemingly peaceful end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union were beyond the expectations of most neo-realist theories (Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Viotti and Kauppi 2012; see Mastanduno 1997).12
Furthermore, neo-realism has been considered more rigid on its stance regarding the influence of material forces in international relations. Viotti and Kauppi (2012) argue that classic realism
11 The end of the Cold War “was particularly depressing for neo-realist theorists of international structure who…exhibited a depressing inability to predict the events of 1989-91” (Vogler 1996:28).
12 Expectedly, Kenneth Waltz (2000), who has been a de facto godfather of neorealism, has defended the relevance of neo-realism even in the post-Cold War international system. One of his arguments is that the changes that took place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did so within the system, they were not changes of the systems.
Thus, the international system, according to him, still remains a self-help realm characterized by anarchy.
This, then, should repudiate claims that neorealism is an obsolete theory in international relations studies.
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seems more amenable to the notion that international relations could be influenced by factors such as ideas, and how domestic dynamics can influence a state’s international relations. Even within the realist school itself, some scholars have sought to disentangle realism from its longtime dissonance with ethics, for example. Zuolo (2016:68) argues that the realist contention that human relations are “primarily shaped by power commits realism to a form of power reductionism, holding that power is the only element that should be taken into consideration in the political sphere.”
John D. Carlson (2008:619) proposes ethical realism because it “charts a middle path that ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism.”
This possibility was first broached by Reinhold Niebuhr (1953; 1964). Ethical realism is premised on the argument that certain conflicts, even war, among nations, erupt not because of the intent to show how powerful one state is; a moral standpoint can actually justify conflict among nations. Put in other words, “the human hopes and moral passions that realism opposes as unreasonable are indelible features of political life” (Ahrensdorf 1997:231). Carlson (2008) attempts to bridge the gap between realism and idealism, the theories that have historically been taken as diametrically opposed.
Gordon L. Anderson (2009:3-4) assails realism and neo-realism because they treat social ideals as if they were of the same level “as wishful thinking.” E. H. Carr dismissed idealism by arguing that the world should be read as it really is, a system fraught with conflict and irredeemable selfishness. However, Anderson (2009:4) argues that while it is sensible to surmise that certain players in the international system might want to augment their status by limiting that of others, this should not be promoted as a “goal” (original emphasis) for states in the international system.
The possibility that states can exercise restraint and forge mutual development of capabilities cannot be totally dismissed, however strongly realists might argue the case of self-help. Elman et al. (1995:188) argue that the opposite of self-help is other-help which is a “sense of community or collective identity which fosters the belief that one's own security and well-being are tied to the security and well-being of others.” This, to realists is viewing the international system as we would want it to be rather than as it really is. In short, accommodating the possibility of a world where states can actually seek community in the international system is idealistic and hence at variance with reality.
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Another possible criticism of realism is that it is “a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012:75), because realists play a part in continuing the international system’s status quo that they analyse. Realists characterize the world as violent, deceptive and prone to war; they then proffer advice on how leaders should act under these circumstances, by employing the means of survival in such a world. Thus, realists preclude themselves from understanding the world in any other way and thus lack resourcefulness in acknowledging alternative conceptions of the world and how they can be achieved.
Furthermore, the realist argument that states are the most significant actors in the international system has been put under increasing scrutiny. Realist arguments have to contend with the fact that non-state actors have increasingly become influential in world affairs that states could actually yield to this influence. The influence of multinational and transnational organisations13 is palpable; so is the influence of terrorist groups and international institutions like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Realists, to their defence, argue that they focus on state behaviour but do not make any claim that non-state actors are immaterial. A theory of international relations that has always acknowledged the potential of non-state actors to determine state behaviour is idealism, or as some would call it, liberal idealism, to which the chapter now turns.