CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
5.4 The Second Republic: One-Party State (1972-1991)
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However, internal and external forces, both political and economic (like the slump in copper prices in the 1970s; see Zambia Review 2016) tried Kaunda’s idealism. The resurgence of tribal and ethnic rivals at home was equally a threat to his ideals and grip on power. The resignation of Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe as vice president, and the subsequent formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP headed by the same Kapwepwe) posed a palpable threat to the Kaunda government. Kapwepwe came from the Bemba people and in a country where ethnic cleavages were threatening political dynamics, he enjoyed the support of the biggest ethnic group. These external and internal forces compelled Kaunda to take a firm stance on his domestic and foreign policy. To enjoy a free hand, UNIP had to liquidate opposition and the most obvious manner with which to realise this was to institute a single-party polity, an alternative which he chose in 1973 through “the Choma Declaration” headed by the Vice President at the time – Mainza Chona (Musambachime 1991:291).
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Conveniently for him, Kaunda argued that the purely African mode of governance was at variance with political pluralism (multiparty politics as adopted from Western democracies; see Pettman 1974) because tribes that enjoyed unrivalled demographics could exploit such a system to perpetuate their hold on power, to the detriment of tribes that did not have the power of numbers. Kaunda (1966:106) described the Westminster Model of democracy “as a beautiful anachronism – a pattern ideally suited to the genius of the British people but of limited value, without drastic modifications, in Modern Africa.” This line of argument partly formed the rationale for instituting a one party state in Zambia. Though Zambia had not suffered coups that plunged countries like Ghana and Nigeria into chaos shortly after independence, state hegemony under the aegis of one-party politics, and the accretion of power in leaders, what Jackson and Rosberg (1984) described as “personal rule” were almost equally hostile to political debate and opposition, and Zambia manifested these.
The period coinciding with one-party politics (from 1972 to 1991) is referred to as Zambia’s Second Republic. Initially Kaunda had stated that opting for a one-party state was the prerogative of the masses and so was not going to be imposed on the citizenry. In one of his letters to Colin Morris, more than five years prior to the institution of one-party democracy, Kaunda (1966:105) expected “to see the virtual obliteration of the opposition at the next General Election, not by draconian repressive measures, but through that ‘painless killer’ – the ballot box.” Furthermore, Kaunda perceived the institution of one-party states in Africa as a “natural consequence” (Kaunda 1966:107) of post-colonial states. His reasoning was that during the struggle for independence, ordinary people rallied behind a movement that they believed represented their interests. They did not divide their loyalty to a myriad of political organisations.
Ordinary citizens expected liberation movements of their choice to lead the newly-born countries and to meet all the consequent challenges that come with nascent states. In line with his claim that at the centre of his variant of humanism was Man, Kaunda retained, at least for some time, the argument that ordinary people would ultimately decide the turn to a one-party state.
However, the manner with which the Chona commission was established betrays the fact that with the passage of time Kaunda had shifted his vision on how to establish a one-party state (Tordoff 1977). Indeed, calling for a plebiscite would betoken the possibility of continuing with multiparty politics if the citizenry were not inclined to Kaunda’s hopes for a one-party state. In
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lieu of consulting the citizenry, the commission was charged with sounding out the form one- party democracy would take.
The main mandate of the commission was thus to help frame a constitution that would entrench a one-party system. Nine principles, among which were the reaffirmation of humanism as a national ideology, the observance of individual rights, the prohibition of interpersonal exploitation, equality of all human beings and that ultimate power resides in the people, governed the enquiries of those charged to carry out the commission. This notwithstanding, jostling for power between the extant political parties of the time and the resultant, if alleged, emergence of tribal politics, was seminal in forming ground for the Second Republic. The Commission finalized its task in 1972 but the institutions for facilitating a one-party state were established in 1973. It should be noted that the government disregarded some recommendations made by the commission, like limiting presidential terms and powers (Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of One-party Participatory Democracy in Zambia 1972). The years that followed proved that the extension of presidential terms and powers was actually the most obvious characteristic of the one party edifice (Tordoff 1977).
Simon Zukas, perhaps the most significant white figure fighting for Zambia’s independence, refused to aid the UPP because of its alleged tribal leanings.65 While regretting the steps being taken to “contain” the UPP, Zukas was, at the time, still a supporter of the one-party system for Zambia” (Zukas 2002:139). As early as 1966, Kaunda was setting the basis for a future one-party state. One of his arguments was that opposition parties in Africa at the time were a far cry from being prospective governing parties. He accused African opposition of being “a ragbag of disgruntled individuals and tribalists” (Kaunda 1966:107).
The allegation of tribalism as the sine qua non for one-party participatory democracy has been contested by those who argue that opting for a one party system was a result of UNIP’s paranoia of opposition views “and its failure to meet popular expectations of social and economic change”
(Larmer 2006:236). McCorley (2013:271) argues that those who established a one-party system,
65Tribal and regional cleavages were discernible when one looks the support bases of the opposition parties of the day. The African National Congress was strong in the Southern region of Zambia among the Tonga people (Giliomee and Simkins 1999) and the United Progressive Party was strong in Northern Zambia. UNIP was bent on presenting itself as a unifying party, representing all Zambians rather than yielding to sectarian sympathies (Pettman 1974).
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were only determined “to crystallise the dominance of UNIP over all areas of social, economic and political life in Zambia.” As early as 1969 Thomas Rasmussen (1969:407) wrote that UNIP and its adherents were agitating for a one-party state because they were loath to let the two minor parties, the African National Congress and the United Party, continue questioning UNIP’s vision for the country and that a multiparty edifice was “a luxury which diverts time, energy, and money away from the important tasks of development.”
However, the timing of initiating a one-party state in Zambia could not have been more opportune for UNIP and Kaunda’s government. Away from rhetoric about tribalism, humanism, Africa’s history against colonialism and the role that UNIP played to gain independence as justifications for one-party politics, UNIP had the onerous task of providing services for Zambians. It should be remembered that Kaunda’s own thought was that by liquidating opposition parties UNIP could forge Zambian interests unencumbered by political opposition.
The country was still decidedly focused on, and interested in, ending minority rule in Africa through peaceful means. After many failed attempts to achieve this ideal, Kaunda tempered his devotion to nonviolent struggle in southern Africa. At the opening of parliament in 1978, Kaunda proclaimed that “intensified armed struggle remains the only credible and effective means by which southern Africa can be liberated” (Kaunda 1978a).
In another speech given in 1978, Kaunda expressed his awareness of Zambia’s invidious situation; Zimbabwe and South Africa were still under settler rule and were more superiorly armed in comparison to majority-ruled frontline states. In the face of these circumstances, Kaunda maintained that Zambians are “peaceful people, peaceful loving” and challenged anyone in his audience to controvert the fact that Zambia was not a warmongering nation. He also charged that Western countries with vested interests were shoring up minority leaderships in Africa (Kaunda 1978).66 For this reason, Kaunda argued that the political changes it took after 1972 were aimed at fighting minority rule and colonialism on the continent and the Western powers that supported these oppressive systems. Apart from this, the preceding information also
66 Kaunda also had made this accusation in the speech that he gave in 1970 when Zambia hosted the non-aligned conference (Kaunda 1970). During a press conference in 1977, Kaunda repeated that “the political support, economic support, social and cultural support, scientific and technological support, military support” which Western Europe gave to the South African government was the source of the southern African Impasse because without this support the apartheid government would have failed to sustain their intransigent hold on power and the country could transform peacefully (Kaunda 1977).
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reveal a pragmatic facet of Zambia’s foreign policy identity. Inasmuch as it remained an adherent of non-violence, it promoted armed struggle in countries where this was deemed the only recourse. That Western capitalist countries were seen as humouring minority leaderships in southern Africa deepened Kaunda’s admiration for non-capitalist powers.
Thus, apart from changes in political identity, “after 1972, the country embraced a socialist path to development and began to rely heavily on aid from the Eastern Bloc” (Ghodsee 2015:115).
However, the 1970s was fraught with crises both political and economic, internal and external.
The period coincided with plummeting copper prices, a body blow to Zambia’s economy. In addition, the effects of the 1973 oil crisis were of momentous dimensions and affected global politics and economics in general (Kepplinger and Roth 1979; Issawi 1978). Zambia was susceptible to the international market and hence was heavily affected by these occurrences. The failure to diversify the economy from copper to other resources compounded Zambia’s economic woes during the reduction of copper prices. As recently as 2016, the ruling Patriotic Front acknowledged that Zambia is dependent on copper and that agriculture offers better prospects for sustainable development if it is made “the mainstay of Zambia’s economy” (PF Manifesto 2016).
5.4.1 Zambia as Part of the Third World and the Politics of Structural Adjustment
As the Cold War was nearing its end, players in the international system had to decide what path to take in the unfolding era of uncertainty. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was abundantly clear that states that had hitherto nurtured close relations with the socialist bloc had to rethink their policies. The Third World’s importance in international politics was likely to be diminished with the end of the Cold War because much external support that was given to poor countries was done so with the intention of winning a vast section of the international system to either side of the opposing power blocs (Griffin 1991;
Reisman 1990).
The influence of the socialist bloc in Africa manifested itself in the form of one-party adoption, close government control of the economy and the lack of democracy as understood in Western Europe and the United States. The fact that Zambia, and a number of other countries, yielded to liberal democratic demands had different effects on different countries. Some countries, Zambia
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being an arguable example, became somewhat more tranquil with the new changes, while others, like Kenya showed signs of more tension than was present during the era of one-party politics (Phiri 2000). Thus, while the last decade of the twentieth century restored optimism for the triumph of democratic ideals, in Africa the picture was not invariably bright. Zambia did not experience violent struggles that typified politics in other post-Cold War African states, but it had its fair share of problems that threatened economic, political and social survival.
The current section represents the episodes that Zambia has gone through since the end of the Cold War which came a little earlier than the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. The peaceful and nonviolent manner with which Kaunda called for a multiparty election and the readiness with which he accepted defeat have been hailed as exemplary to Africa politics (see Joseph 1992; Panter-Brick 1994:231). It replicated the virtually peaceful manner through which the country had attained independence 27 years earlier. Again, it is politic to note points of continuity from the identity and interests that Zambia had hitherto chosen and been given and points of transformation. This helps in establishing whether or not Zambian identities and interests have changed and whether or not they had any influence on the country’s posturing on the international arena. An even-handed analysis of Zambia’s experiences should reveal that some of the problems confronting Zambia at the time were experienced by other similarly weak and susceptible nations.
The structural adjustment programmes that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United States treasury came up with were originally designed for Latin America but later prescribed for African states too. The disastrous consequences that these adjustments engendered in Zambia stoked more agitation against Kaunda’s leadership in the last decade leading to the end of the Cold War. From 1985 to 1987, the Kaunda government tried to reform its economy.
However, intensifying liberalization was inimical to certain powerful groups that had vested interests and benefitted from the status quo (Simutanyi 1996). This is what caused the UNIP government to backpedal, cancel the IMF’s adjustment programme in 1987 and revert to earlier economic inclinations (Bates and Collier 1995; Smith 1990). Callaghy (1990) argued that structural adjustment policies cannot succeed if states had the capability to implement them without pandering to the demands of interests groups. That the UNIP government could not do this suggests the existence of patronage. However, the tide of international politics and internal
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pressure was clearly on the ascent and the UNIP government “reopened discussions with the IMF” (Smith 1990:284), thereby attracting aid that Britain had drastically reduced after the termination of structural adjustment in 1987. These developments suggested that change was imminent in the Second Republic.
In conclusion, the Second Republic brought about certain visible changes in Zambia’s political and economic identity and outlook. The adoption of a one-party system was one of the most radical transformations. Apart from a shift to a socialist inclined type of economy, Zambia had also vowed its “fullest and irrevocable support for the intensified armed struggle in southern Africa until victory” was secured (Kaunda 1978a). The overt support for armed struggle was a radical shift if the non-violent manner with which Zambia gained its independence and Kaunda’s admiration of Gandhi are taken into consideration. This change also indicates Zambia’s reading of the international system and how it sought to respond to new challenges. Peaceful means to resolve conflict had achieved little and Kaunda’s interaction with South Africa’s Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and Zimbabwe’s Ian Smith were used as evidence that armed struggle was the only resort. The support for armed struggle was more pronounced in the late 1970s. The 1980s ushered in a period of structural adjustment programmes that were prescribed to the Third World and, as shown above, Zambia experimented with these Western-bred prescriptions but with no apparent success, forcing the UNIP government to revert to more state protectionism. However, trade unions, acutely aware of how unsustainable state control of the economy was and how authoritarian the one-party system was, became more radical in challenging the UNIP government and calling for economic changes and a return to multiparty democracy. The attainment of these two demands is what became known as Zambia’s Third Republic.