CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
1.11 Structure of Dissertation
2.2.5 Theoretical Interpretations of China’s Foreign Policy
Added to the Marxist explanation of China’s foreign policy are the realist and liberalist interpretations. From the realist perspective, China has always been seen as a threat to its perceived competitors and hence must be contained (see Wang 2000). This perspective stems from the fact that in realist terms, a rising or an aspiring rising power becomes more assertive and competitive in its demeanour and hence could disrupt prevailing forms of international order.
States that are more powerful, according to realists, will always hanker for instituting hegemony in their region and at the same time forestall other powerful states from doing the same in other regions. The final aim of states, according to political realism, is the realization of national interest and the maximization of power in order to control the international system. It follows, thus, that China is likely to dominate and control its region with the aim of curtailing other powers, mostly the United States, from gaining more ground in the international system (Ikenberry 2008). What should also be borne in mind is that at the core of their analysis, realists argue that national identity and interests are enduring and unchangeable irrespective of specific
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contexts. Even though China underwent certain changes after the 1949 revolution, “the sense of [its] identity remains and continuities … reappear, mixed in with discontinuities” (Fairbank 1969:461).
The end of the Cold War facilitated the emergence of the unipolar system with the United States of America as the sole superpower. However, the prevalent unipolar system, Waltz (2000:32) argues, is a fleeting arrangement and the development of the multipolar world order is “all-but- inevitable” and is already underway, though it is not being led by erstwhile dominant powers of Europe but Asia. Arguing from a realist perspective, Waltz is persuaded to write that China and Japan manifest more potential among the Asian countries of assuming the role of great powers in the coming multipolar disorder (see Waltz 1993). However, he goes on to argue that China shows more willingness to assume this role than does Japan and with its outstanding economic growth and military advancement, Waltz seems convinced that China will increasingly provoke concern from the United States and will rise to the status of a great power if it is able to remain a united polity. Mearsheimer (2006:160) argues that his theory of international politics submits that mighty powers seek “to establish hegemony” in their regions while curtailing the chances of rival powers to establish hegemony in other regions. From this he draws the conclusion that this is what is likely to happen between the United States and China as China continues to rise. This argument is supported by Carmody and Owusu (2007:505) who write that China’s “desire to become a global economic powerhouse and a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the international system is now clear.” Hurrell (2006:2) asserts that China, and other emerging powers like Brazil, Russia and India, believes it is entitled “to a more influential role in world affairs.”
Shiping’s (2008) analysis of China’s identity ascertains that China is a realist state even though the analysis ascribes different types of realism to China. This analysis describes China under Mao as an offensive realist state that was ready to engage in radical confrontation with those it deemed as its political and/or ideological foes and those who threatened China’s security. This conclusion is drawn from the conviction with which Mao hoped for a radical change of the international system. China after Mao, according to Shiping’s argument, could be described as a defensive realist state which manifests signs of restraint in its international behaviour (see also Foot and Walter 2010). China after Mao is thus not expected to be bellicose in its demeanour,
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though there is an argument that the Taiwan question (reintegration of the Republic of China into mainland China) is the only preoccupation on which China seems reluctant to temper its desire.
For Shiping and others who argue in this line, defensive realism is helpful to China’s international status because an offensive realist states could attract “containment” (Shiping 2008:152) from other powerful international players.
Glaser (2001:304) argues that China, while essentially seeing itself “as inherently a great power by virtue of its history, culture, territory, and population”, usually presents contradictory identities to suit its “parochial” and Sino-centric interests. He goes on to argue that China reckons that it can best realise its interests by posturing itself as a “great power” but at other times identifies itself as a poor and developing country,4 with the latter identity aimed at gaining benefits from the international system. The argument goes that taking up the status of a superpower will encumber China with more responsibility in regional and international issues. Li (2011:331) suggests that factors such as China’s identity as a developing country on the one hand, and siding with the developed world on the other hand are likely to constrain China from tinkering with “the multilateral architecture at the global level.” Thus, “pragmatism rather than grand vision” is likely to shape a growing China’s international presence. In almost a similar fashion, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a prominent Polish-American political scientist of the realist school, has said that China’s rise does not necessarily portend war. He goes on to say that
“China’s leadership is not inclined to challenge the United States militarily, and its focus remains on economic development and winning acceptance as a great power” (Brzezinski 2005:46).
Furthermore, a more “confrontational foreign policy” is likely to disrupt China’s economic growth trajectory which might actually aggravate ordinary Chinese and threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power (Brzezinski 2005).
This argument counters that of adherents of the reapolitik who express alarm at the growth of China and its possible interference with the prevalent status quo. Indeed, China, as Wohlforth (1999:25) writes, has no alternative to bandwagon with the United State. It also might be compelled not to disrupt the prevalent world order. Kang affirms that there is little evidence that China’s rise has caused “undue alarm” in its region or that other Asian powers seek to balance
44 Kerry Brown (2007:161) argues “that China does not already classify itself as a middle country” because of the alarmingly high number of people in the countryside of China that still in what is internationally accepted as absolute poverty.
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against China’s rise. The argument is supported by the assertion that China has been rising for more than three decades and that if “the pessimistic argument view that states prepare for future contingencies today” is universally applicable then East Asian states would have been jolted into reacting against China’s rise (Kang 2005:551).
Realists argue that the economic growth that China currently enjoys gives certain scholars reason to argue that China is likely to be a great power in the near future because it combines the factors needed for such a status. These include “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz 1993:50).
Taylor (2006) suggests that China rues being deprived of great power status in the international system which seems to overlook the country’s longstanding civilization and huge population.
From these perspectives, a China that is growing in all necessary dimensions is an inevitable great power in the making and could hence cause certain changes in international politics, some of which are likely to be disruptive. Zhu (2008) avers that, contrary to the opinion of realpolitik devotees, China’s rise is unlikely to stoke conflict because the United States has made its global leadership unchallengeable and has “compelled China to bandwagon with the United States.” In other words, China is a follower, albeit a grudging one, of the status quo (see Hurrell 2006). Li (2011:331) calls this “rising from within the international order.” Those who toe this line have hinted that China lacks “revisionist ambitions” (Verhoeven 2014) because “attempting to dislodge the United States would be futile” (Brzezinski 2005:47).