CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
6.3 China-Zambia Relations: From the Perspective of a Single Civil Society
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are there because China like Zambia is a developing country and that its economy has only started to grow recently. This sentiment could possibly allude to the argument that the standards that are expected of economies that have long been strongly established cannot be applied to a power that until recently was a poor country.80 As has been illustrated in the current section, China’s relationship with Zambia has been a mixture of optimism, mutual recognition of identities and persistent attacks, mainly from the media and the West on China’s labour practice.
The following section presents the insights from a civil society perspective.
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centre as well. This section deals with the insights that Fr Michelo gave during the interview; it should be noted that reference will also be used to put some insights from the interview within the context or perspective of convergent or divergent views from other data and literature that pertains to China-Zambia relations. This section will also make use of a short piece that Michelo wrote in 2007 regarding China-Africa relations, but with more emphasis on Chinese investment in Zambia.
As mentioned in the introduction to this part of chapter, certain words and phrases used by the respondent(s) to answer the interview questions will be used to render the respondent’s position clear. Michelo’s position is that Sino-Zambian relations, in their current form “are hinged” on
“trade and investment.” He acknowledges that historically Zambia’s multifaceted relations have mostly been with the West. The increasing attention that China is enjoying in Zambia is because Zambia has “favorable conditions for investment.” However, Michelo later points out what can be interpreted as favourable conditions for Chinese investment. He talks of Zambia’s leniency in its polices on foreign investment, most notably the five-year tax free waiver. The permissive nature of this waiver, according to Michelo, allows investors to establish their institutions in Zambia and after the five-year period lapses, they change the name of their institution in order to appear as a new investor, thus extending the number of years for which they are not compelled to pay tax. The issue of Zambian agency, which has been gleaned from other interviews, finds its way in Michelo’s responses because he categorically says Zambians should “blame” themselves regarding the laws they have that allow trade imbalances and unfair foreign investment.81 He goes on to argue that Zambia has an “open door policy” that does not sift through the quality of investment that the country attracts. This, he concludes, is “very risk for the future of the country.”
The general feeling that Michelo has on China-Zambia relations can be discerned from some of the words and phrases he uses to describe his observations. He describes Chinese investment as
“suspect”, “very questionable”, and that it raises a lot of eyebrows. He is also wary of what he calls the “aggressive” nature of Chinese investment, characterized by “flooding” Zambia with Chinese nationals while paying Zambians who they hire “very low salaries” (see also Michelo
81 The implication of this statement is that Zambians should be assertive in stating the sort of interactions that they want with China and other foreign investors. This is in tandem with the information given by Brian Mwale, one of the respondents, as indicated in one of the ensuing sections.
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2007). Contrary to the mutually beneficial and win-win relations that China claims to promote, Michelo asserts that as Sino-Zambian relations stand in their current form, he can “rightly say”
they neither embody win-win facilities nor promote “self-sustainability” on the part of Zambia and that if there are any benefits that Zambia gets from these relations then these are “very minimal.” However, the respondent conceded that pursing profit at minimal cost, even at “the expense” of Zambia, is common to all investors, whether Chinese or otherwise. He argues that this exposes the capitalist nature of the Chinese even if they still claim to be socialists. The growing number of Chinese personnel, some of whom do jobs that are deemed befitting of ordinary Zambians was also an issue for Michelo.82 As shown in Alden (2007), this issue has been raised by Zambian politicians. Chinese that engage in “micro projects like rearing chickens…. stifle creativity”, according to Michelo. He also argues that apart from crowding out small-scale traders, the Chinese are bringing their own experts and this prevents Zambian experts from accessing job opportunities. In a similar line of reasoning, in his first week of office, Michael Sata (2011) hosted representatives of the Chinese government and urged that “all investors coming to Zambia should bring a limited number of experts” possessing skills that are not found in Zambia.
Apart from the concerns that come with Chinese investment in Zambia, Michelo ventures into the political dimension of Sino-African and Sino-Zambian relations. The current study has shown how China and Africa have used their humiliating and regrettable history with Western imperialism and colonialism as a badge of solidarity. Furthermore, the study has reviewed the works of scholars and politicians (e.g. Moyo and Okonjo-Iweala) who have argued that China and Africa have common circumstances that make China an authority over the West in ascertaining Africa’s priorities. These opinions have lent support to China’s reticence on issues of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Michelo asserts that “China is not a player in terms of the rule of law” and that this characteristic of China is an incentive that gives African governments almost an irresistible reason to forge close ties with China. It forms the crux of China’s no-strings attached policy which has made Africa enamoured of China’s friendship (Michelo 2007). The unqualified relations that China practises provide a relief for African
82 Michelo is of the opinion that multinational corporations that are of Western origin are better than China in this respect because they rely more on Zambian labour even though their top echelons might be staffed with non- Zambians.
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countries that interpret Western conditions and censorship as unfair, high-handed and intolerant of Africa’s specific context.
Finally, one of the concerns raised by Sino-pessimists is that China is working towards transforming Africa into its colony (see Malone 2008). Lumumba-Kasongo (2011:258) argues that colonizing Africa is a farfetched possibility because “to have a neoimperialist system guided and supported by China, it is necessary to have and maintain a monopolistic ruling class in Africa.” This argument goes on to state that apart from forging “strong and cultural alliances with the Africa elite” China would need to have an elite that is conversant in Chinese language in the same manner that the French and English established alliances with now Francophone and Anglophone former colonies (ibid). Among all the respondents interviewed for the current study, Michelo referred to the issue of language. He stated that China is “strongly trying to transfer” its language and that even some Zambian drivers who work for the Chinese are now expected to master the basics of Chinese languages. The swelling numbers of scholarships given to Zambians to study in China could be a preparatory phase for the alliances that Lumumba-Kasongo argues are some of the basis for neoimperialism. Furthermore, this particular study has argued that exploitative or colonial relations are not the preserve of former colonizers.
Not only this, there are subtle ways through which Africa and Zambia can be dominated that, while not taking the form of European colonialism, could engender similar consequences for the continent. For example, Michelo cautions that one “thing that [Zambians] have to be very careful [about] and is becoming more political is the issue of land.” He rued the illiteracy of headmen and local chiefs who are custodians of traditional and customary land, in dealing with Chinese that want to purchase land. Though no further elaboration was given as to why this “will be a problem in the future,” it could be argued that those who purchase land might be planning to be permanently domiciled in Zambia, and that this could raise issues of cultural clashes and the suppression of Zambians who might be presumably poorer than the Chinese. The growing physical presence of the Chinese in all levels of Zambian society is likely to sustain the argument of possible colonization, especially if the fortunes of Zambia and Zambians will remain paltry compared to the sustained growth of China and its citizens. China’s growing diaspora and the possible motives behind it were mentioned by another respondent as expressed in the following section.
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