CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
2.6 Theoretical assumptions of China-Zambia relations after the Cold War
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predicted defeat of communism which had swept most of East Europe at the time. China was once again alive to Africa’s importance in international affairs. It made donations towards building medical clinics and upgrading “the Engineering School at the University of Zambia”
(Taylor 2006:172).
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endowed, like coal, gemstones and uranium (The New Yorker 2013). According to Kopinski and Polus (2011:184), “the most important aspect of Sino-Zambian relations during the post-Kaunda era have been Chinese investments in the mining industry.” Kragelund (2014:151) argues that China after the Cold War “sees developmental finance as a central part of its relationship with Zambia.” This shift has superseded ideology and the fight against colonialism and minority rule which were the principal lynchpins of China-Zambia relations during the Cold War.
Despite the stated friendship that China and Zambia have shared, relations between the two countries have not been immune to mutual criticism and suspicion. As stated earlier, even certain sectors of Africa have been critical of growing China-Africa relations. The main point of disenchantment from ordinary Zambians vis-à-vis Chinese presence is centred on labour practices. There have been complaints about China’s labour practice being oppressive or unnecessarily punishing to Zambian workers. Workers at the Chinese owned Collum mine protested against labour violations, leading to the death of one Chinese national (The New Yorker 2013). To those who buckle under what they perceive as China’s oppressive labour ethos, China’s presence in Zambia typifies colonial oppression.
Guy Scott, who was a prominent member of Zambia’s Patriotic Front (PF) political party, argued that China was “out to colonise Africa economically and also to get Africa’s solidarity at United Nations” (Lusaka Times 2007). The Patriotic Front made anti-Chinese sentiment the pith of its campaign rhetoric in 2006. Michael Sata, the once presidential candidate of the PF, went further to threaten that he would sever ties with China and recognize Taiwan if he won the 2006 election. China in turn said it would not have anything to do with Zambia if Sata won the election (Agence France-Press [AFP] 2006; see also Hitchens 2008; Masterson 2011). Arguably, this was one of the very few times when China directly interfered with internal affairs of another country (Kopinski and Polus 2011). Ordinary Zambian citizens, some of whom worked side by side with, or under Chinese, were persuaded by the PF’s rhetoric and riots broke out on the Copperbelt and Lusaka, two regions with the highest Chinese population in Zambia, when the PF lost the election. Incidentally, despite his loss at the polls, Sata dominated the votes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt (Larmer and Fraser 2007).
When eventually in 2011 Sata won the presidential race, he did not cut off ties with China despite what many have termed his relentlessly populist attitude towards China. Hess and Aidoo
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(2014) argue that Sata whipped up anti-Chinese sentiment as a way of gaining votes from disenchanted Zambians who saw the Chinese as occlusions to Zambia’s economic independence.
Furthermore, Negi (2008) has argued that Sata’s electoral success was not so much an indictment on China, but on neoliberal policies that have been blamed for Zambia’s alarming levels of poverty and unemployment. Furthermore, fingering China as the bane of Zambia’s development put a face on what could have been abstract factors hampering Zambia’s advancement.
According to Hess and Aidoo (2015), Sata played “the China card” in order to defeat the MMD in 2011.
There has been an opinion that anti-Chinese sentiment among ordinary people in Zambia betokens the possibility that the Sino-optimism often promoted by the African political elite is not always shared by ordinary Africans. A study done by Mano (2016:163) in Zimbabwe on residents of Harare supports this view by arguing that “while the official view [of China- Zimbabwe relations remains positive], nonofficial perspectives tend to be critical of Beijing’s actions and policies as narrowly benefiting itself and ruling elites.” On her visit to Zambia in 2011, Hilary Clinton warned of outside forces that come to Africa and deal only with the elite to the detriment of ordinary Africans. She went on to say that it was that manner of doing business that led to the European colonisation of Africa. David Cameron has also lent his voice to this sentiment by assailing the Chinese model as a brand of “authoritarian capitalism” (Sautman and Hairong 2014) that is likely to engender neo-colonialism in Africa and undermine Western calls for democracy (Zhao 2014). A 2009 study by Sautman and Hairong offered a different view from that of Western observers. They carried out what they called the first empirical study of how Africans in general think of the rise of China. Their conclusions were that African sentiment on China is not as negative as Western media presents it, and that African perspectives of China are complex and varied. Furthermore, most of the attitudes were shaped by the country where respondents live rather than factors such as “age, education and gender” (Sautman and Hairong 2009:728).
In a 2014 doctoral dissertation, Chang (2014) seeks “to challenge generalizations made in the media about a unified and neo-colonial ‘China’ and a cohesive and victimized ‘Africa.’” Chang sampled three types of work places in Zambia to get an idea of how ordinary Zambians and Chinese interact in the sampled workplaces and how trust between the two groups can grow and
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benefit both sides of the workforce. One of Chang’s defining points is that unlike what is often presented in Western media, she notes that Africans are not invariable victims in the Sino- African nexus. China’s dependence on African resources has provided “opportunities for resource-rich countries on the continent” (Naidu and Davies 2006). Africa has benefits to derive from Chinese investment in terms of infrastructure, resource exportation and the improvement of agriculture (ibid).
The preceding information is shaped by the theoretical assumptions of those appraising China- Zambia relations. The African elite is wont to be influenced by the liberalist perspective that looks at China-Zambia relations as mutually beneficial if the two countries maintain cordial and stable relations. Furthermore, the liberalist perspective looks at the importance of values in shaping relations among nations. China-Zambia relations have been historically influenced by values such as political equality and the fight against domination – especially of a colonial or imperial type. Furthermore, pragmatism has also been central to maintaining China-Zambia relations, especially after Zambia’s Patriotic Front came to power in 2011. This will be tackled in detail in the seventh chapter. Realism has been central to Western and media perceptions of China-Zambia relations. The warnings given to Zambia and Africa by Western representatives such as Hilary Clinton and David Cameron smack of realist leanings that do not allow for the possibility of a peaceful rise of a player with requisite influence to change the international political landscape. Thus, depending on the theoretical framework influencing one’s political and economic views, there is bound to be different and conflicting interpretations of China-Zambia relations and the main idea behind them.
2.7 China, Africa, and the allure of the policy of non-interference
China is a controversial state. Its self-perception as the “Middle Kingdom”, its demographics and its long history of civilization are justifications for China’s claim to be counted as a global superpower (Shiping 2008). Thus, China is expected to take on an officious demeanour in its relations with other players. With its current economic status and resultant political influence, China has become more of what it envisioned for itself before it was as powerful as it currently
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is. It has adhered more to the “go out” policy wherein it seeks opportunities in foreign countries while claiming not to interfere with their political make-up.6
China-Africa relations have arrested global attention for at least two reasons: the first is that Africa has often been treated as an economic fiefdom of former colonialists and hence the emergence of a new competitor has been met with paranoia and suspicion from the West (Mutambara 2013). As Okonjo-Iweala says, much criticism against China emanating from the West is driven by the fear that Western monopoly over African resources is slipping (Okonjo- Iweala 2006; see also Breslin and Taylor 2008). Carmody and Owusu (2007) argue that deepening China-Africa relations have roused US anxiety over its role in Africa, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Thrall 2015). This has caused the US to augment its involvement on the continent, like the increase in purchasing oil from Africa, and has become more involved in African security. To Carmody and Owusu (2007:505), this prefigures a “new scramble for Africa.” Mearsheimer (2010:382) bluntly argues that “China cannot rise peacefully.” This opinion is informed by what Verhoeven (2014:57) calls the “power-transition paradigm” which analyses China’s rise in negative terms as the “clash between the established hegemon, (the US) and the rising (China) power” and that Africa is the arena for this tussle.
The second reason that Western opinion has lamented China’s growing footprint in Africa is that many African countries are still developing and a number of states are under Western censure for human rights abuse and lack of good governance. This condition bears two fold incentives for anti-Chinese sentiment, especially from the West: the first is that by being underdeveloped and hence less influential in global affairs, Africa is pliable and can easily be turned into China’s lackey, outpost or colony. Secondly, Western countries have been prescribing the adoption of neoliberalism in Africa and the observance of human rights (Okonjo-Iweala 2006). That China (through its so-called “Beijing Consensus”) does not use these conditions as benchmarks for trade with Africa has been interpreted as aiding and abetting Africa’s authoritarian states.
In Africa, China’s vowed regard for national sovereignty has been greeted with more favour than policies of Western origin (Thompson 2005). This has given controversial regimes alternatives to
6 As will be shown in this research, China’s vow of non-interference in the internal affairs of its partner nations has been contested. For example, Verhoeven (2014) argues that China “is slowly but surely giving up its controversial policy of non-interference.”
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Western economic ties when the West demands certain reforms from African countries. To this effect, China-Africa relations have offended those who profess commitment to democracy, human rights and neolibralism. On the other hand, Carmody and Taylor (2010:508) have argued that certain Western corporations, “with the tacit approval of their home governments” have employed an assortment of methods of striking oil deals with African regimes while circumventing democracy and regard for human rights as conditions (Shaxson 2007). Downs (2007:52) puts this in another way by saying that “American policy makers and pundits exaggerate the differences between Chinese and American oil policies.” This counterargument supports the view that the West is not leery of China’s intervention in Africa for the sake of Africa.
Zambia’s foreign policy has historically been shaped by prevailing structures in international affairs. From its independence to 1990, Zambia’s foreign policy was shaped by the need to emancipate (especially) southern African countries that were under colonialism or minority rule.
China proved a dependable partner in this undertaking. China’s commitment to help end hegemonism and imperialism resonated with Zambia’s goals. However, relations between the two countries have evolved over time because of the shift in international affairs. The end of the Cold War and the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Zambia had bearing on the new terms or motivations for Sino-Zambian relations. South-South cooperation took increasing importance.
Despite Zambia’s democratization, it still saw in China a fellow country of the South and a protester against what are perceived as Western imperialist tendencies.
Despite these identifications, China-Zambia relations present a unique scenario on China’s engagement with Africa. Only in Zambia has there been so much anti-Chinese resentment as to escalate into physical violence that has left some individuals dead, and only in Zambia has anti- Chinese rhetoric been so tactfully exploited as to initiate political change as was the case when Michael Sata’s PF eventually won the general election in 2011 toppling the incumbent MMD.
China-Zambia relations refute much of hitherto literature on China-Africa relations that has
“describe[d] China’s rise in Africa in terms of a monolithic Chinese dragon in an un-variegated African bush stripped of historical and political content” (Large 2008:46).
55 2.8 Conclusion
This research aimed at entangling the interpretation of “China in Africa” from over generalized opinion and overused theories using an underutilised theoretical terrain and with reference to China’s relations with a particular African country - Zambia. Constructivism was the theoretical approach used. This was not the first time constructivism was used to interpret China’s foreign policy posture. Qin (2010) applied constructivism to analyse China’s identity and interests in global affairs. Peter Ferdinand (2007:655) interpreted China’s quest to improve relations with Russia through “a transformation of the traditional identities that… dominated bilateral relations” between the two countries for four decades as fitting constructivist analysis. In constructivist terms, China “is not a self-enclosed, self-contained entity. Rather, it is a process, an open process of complex social relations in motion” (Qin 2010:138). This assertion bears a resemblance to those who reckon that China can be socialized into the international system. This position argues that "states are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in the world. States are socialized to want certain things by the international society in which they, and the people in them, live” (Finnemore 1996:2). Constructivism accentuates the social fabric of international relations and avers that state identity and interests are forged according to specific social contexts and are impinged upon by the different social structures in which they feature. From the foregoing, the usage of constructivism to interpret China’s posturing is not new; what is new is the application of constructivism in analysing China-Zambia relations.
What is germane for this research is how the process of evolving identities and interests has shaped China’s relations with Zambia. Yu (1977) offered an analysis of China’s motives and involvement in Africa by putting the issue of identity at the centre of China-Africa relations. He avers that China’s role in Africa during the Cold War was driven by three factors: the first was China’s ideology, the second being the struggle against the superpowers and the third was China’s perceived role in the Third World. China, Yu argues, identified itself with the Third World and this leaves “no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy”
(Yu 1977:96). China still evokes its experience with privation as hope that Africa can also overcome its woes. Thus, Africa is not a hopeless case in China’s eyes, but a continent that “is
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on the verge of developmental take-off” (Gill, Huang and Morrison 2007:8). This optimism
“resonates powerfully with [China’s] African counterparts” (ibid).
The current research also aspired to show how strong the evocation of intersecting identities (e.g.
Third World identification) and interests (fighting hegemony and superpowers), whether real or contrived, has helped to sustain China-Zambia relations despite episodes that have threatened to undo these relations. Zambia is arguably the only country in Africa where anti-Chinese sentiment has been more radical and has occasionally led to death of both the Chinese and Zambians.
Sautman and Hairong (2014:1084) argue that “There is much online racist abuse… against the Chinese in Zambia” who are often referred to with the pejorative term ‘Choncholi.’ Against such a gloomy backdrop, relations between the two countries have continued in earnest and Taylor (2006) wrote that Zambia has enjoyed one of the most enduring and stable relations with China compared to many other African states. Constructivism is thus apposite for this particular research. Much literature has used realism (e.g. see Taylor 2006; Botha 2006; Ampiah and Naidoo) to explain China-Africa relations. Constructivism argues that there have been certain moments in China-Zambia relations when realist arguments could hold true, but it recoils from arguing that those conditions are immutable, irrespective of changes in international political conditions. From the literature presented in this chapter, it is clear that constructivism has not been thoroughly used as an approach to understand China’s international relations with Africa, and Zambia in particular. This research identified, and intended to fill, that gap in the international relations discourse. The following chapter is mainly dedicated towards giving an overview of the brand of constructivism to be used for this study.
57 CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTIVISM AS AN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ANALYSIS