CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
4.2 China’s Political Culture: A Historical Perspective and its Continued Influence
Hui (2004) argues that while theories of international relations presume a check and balances system as the norm of politicking, ancient China had “universal domination.” As will be explained later, Confucian ideas of obeying the status quo and social order influenced political obedience in China and gave leaders seemingly untrammeled dominance over their subjects.
Thus, the style of politics that was customary in Europe (check and balances) should not be taken as the standard and China’s style as an anomaly (see Han 2013). For many people who witnessed or hinted at the manner in which Chinese citizens during Mao had been cowed into submission, the allegedly time-honoured fear or respect that Chinese have for authority could be a partial
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explanation.28 Historically, China had been ruled by a long line of dynasties that emphasized almost absolute fealty to the ruling class from their subjects. The aversion to the encroachment of foreign ideas and indeed to reform China’s society was partly informed by Confucianism.
Confucius (551-479 BC) was persuaded by the idea that bliss in life and in society at large could be attained through order. He “taught that human relations are the foundations on which society is constructed” (Han 2013:110). Confucianism holds that individuals have five fundamental relationships (known as Wu-Lun) that inform all human interaction. These are relations between the emperor and the subject, fathers and their sons, husbands and their wives, older and younger brothers and among friends. The virtues that control these relationships are also five: humanity- benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. The five fundamentals and the attendant virtues regulating them compel individuals to conform to societal values, hence sustaining “social order and stability” (Han 2013:111). This emphasis on submitting to the status quo or social order had the logical consequence of inculcating people with the notion that yielding to society and authority was absolute duty. Naturally, this shored up the support of those in positions of power. Elements that were deemed as attempts to tinker with the natural order could then be condemned with the assurance that the larger society would join in denouncing the errant parties.
Michael Lynch (2004:4) observes that “a notable nature of Chinese history is the severity of the punishment meted out to rebels.” He quickly advises that the cruelty with which rebels were treated was not wanton; it was meant as a deterrent to any other individuals who might entertain aspirations of changing the status quo of society.29 This partly explains why those who managed to assume dynastic positions in China enjoyed a lot of submission from their subjects.
Leadership in China was related to metaphysical fiat; leaders were looked upon as almost having a divine instruction to rule, what Lynch calls the “mandate of heaven” (see also Chai 1997).
28 As a note of fair judgement, revolt against authority was not totally absent in China. Indeed the 1911 revolution that ended dynastic rule was evident of a streak of rebellion in the Chinese psyche against suppressive authority.
The 1949 victory of the communist was another such display of displeasure against authority. Tobin (2014) has actually written about how constructive criticism was an intimate part of the Chinese lifestyle among peers and learners.
29 To this day, though China has changed in terms of integrating itself with the external world, the Chinese leadership retains a harsh antipathy towards those it considers as threats. From Lynch’s (2004) argument, this continued trait could be borne out by the jealousy with which authority guards its power and the determination to forestall any changes.
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Those who successfully managed to wrest power from rulers could claim to have inherited this mandate. The brand of “rebel” was thus reserved for individuals or groups that fought, unsuccessfully, against societal order. Those who successfully gained power were no longer dismissed as rebels. They enjoyed the respect, fear and devotion of their subjects and were thus relied upon to maintain the newly established order. Seen from this perspective, political contestation – whether violent or otherwise - in China had a utilitarian bent; it was used as a means to an end.
Apart from a noted presence of fear or respect for authority, another defining characteristic of China was its confidence in its culture and civilization. China deemed itself to have an unrivalled civilization and a culture that was way more superior than that of foreign lands. China had had relations with foreign powers but these did not undermine the sense of pride in China’s uniqueness. It could be argued that this sense of imperviousness to foreign norms played a huge part in China lagging behind other nations, like Japan, that had adapted to a changing international environment. The nineteenth century, however, brought challenges to China that the Qing dynasty could scarcely cope with. Trade with Western countries grew and China had to adapt or become effete. These were necessities pressed on China from external forces. However, external forces combined with internal forces to cause major upsets in China especially in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. This was the time when the European Scramble for Africa was in full flight and similar incursions were being made in Asia. China also suffered from the Japanese threats of invasion. The capitulation of the Qing dynasty to external force had a strong effect on internal politics. Japan offered refuge to admiring Chinese citizens who saw in it an Asian model for development, especially after its adoption of certain Western mores of economics and culture. The nucleus of the people who sought to end Qing leadership were Chinese based in Japan, the most influential of whom was Sun Yat-sen (Bergère and Lloyd 1998).
The dynastic system was changed, in style if not substance, with the 1911 Revolution that toppled the Qing Dynasty. The culmination of the Revolution had a humiliating build up from which China still reverts in its defense of territorial integrity. The Qing dynasty had suffered
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defeats that cut to the very core of Chinese national, economic, political and social esteem30. External forays into China grew steadily. The two Opium Wars that China fought against Britain resulted in the loss of Hong Kong, an inalienable part of China that to date, even after the transfer back to mainland China in 1997, has been a curious part of the mainland. Foreign incursions and their influence also led to the loss of territories such as Taiwan and Manchuria and ushered in Japan’s claim to certain regions that were hitherto parts of China.
China’s continued touchy attitude towards external influence should partly be seen from the perspective of a proud nation whose march through history was rudely disrupted by foreign influence. Under such circumstances, a climate through which nationalist sentiment could thrive emerged. While some sectors of Chinese society wanted a total transformation of the socio- political order of the dynastic system (revolution as an absolute break with age-old dynasties), and still others wanted the retention of some form of monarchy, there was a general convergence on the yearning to change from a traditional dynastic setup. The 1911 Revolution, led by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) held the promise of a break with what was a humiliating history not only for China as country in relation to foreign powers, but as an end to the subjugation of ordinary Chinese by an age-old dynastic order.
Assessment of the revolution which instituted the Republic of China has been varied. To some, the revolution was “superficial” (Goldman and Lee 2002:110). Jonathan Fenby (2011) argues that the only thing that was certain with the 1911 revolution was that it had effectively ended the oldest imperial court in the world; but its aspiration to change China in any substantial way was not realized and the revolution spawned “issues that persisted through much of China’s 20- Century history and beyond” (Fenby 2011:30). The institutionalization of the Republic of China did not translate into the unification of what had become a fragmented nation. The retreat of the Qing Court precipitated a vacuum in some regions, thus emboldening warlords. Under such circumstances, warlords who laid claim to certain territories as their fiefdoms were disinclined to cede their strength to the Republican government.
30 For the sake of conscientious analysis, the racial dimension to the agitation against the Qing Dynasty has to be noted. Members of the Qin court were from Manchuria and hence were not part of the Han race. It is safe to argue that Sun Yat-sen seized on his heritage as a native from Guangdong to mobilize forces against a dynasty that was foreign (See Fenby 2011).
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These and many other factors created a justification for a more far-reaching revolution. It has been argued that the 1911 revolution was elitist in its manner, mainly led by merchants and military members of the Qing court who had been hired by the dynasty in a last-ditch effort to modernize the army to retain power but had defected to the side of the revolutionaries (see Lynch 2004:29). In terms of humiliation at the hand of foreign forces, like the 1895 defeat of the Qing Dynasty by Japan (Fenby 2011; Wang 2014) (and the subsequent takeover of Manchuria), the suzerainty that the United Kingdom exercised on certain of its territories, and the failure of the post-1911 regimes to hold China as a unified whole coalesced into an intolerable atmosphere for some Chinese. Those who argue with the advantage of hindsight usually refer to China’s history at the hands of foreign domination as the most influential factor in its foreign policy to date.
From Asia, Japan continued harassing the Republic of China, culminating in the war between the two countries from 1937 to the eventual defeat of Japan in 1945 (see Johnstone 1998; Tzu-chin 2016) as the Second World War drew to a close.
The protestations that China continues to make, with significant support from Africa, against foreign censure and interference, has often been viewed from this antipathy to foreign domination.31 Another feature that makes China and Africa argue from the same standpoint is the Chinese rhetoric against capitalism, an ideology which much of Africa and China used to erroneously link with imperialism. The influence of the Chinese Communist Party has been very notable in this attitude. It is noteworthy that most influential members, if not all, who formed the CCP were members or adherents of the GMD and the two organizations formed a formal alliance. Thus during the nascent years of the CCP an intersection of membership existed with the GMD.