CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
3.8 Critique of Constructivism
Despite gaining traction after the end of the Cold War, constructivism has been dogged with numerable concerns and skepticisms (Hopf 1998) that have left both its proponents and detractors with the dilemma of whether or not this approach is worthy of the name “theory”25 of international relations. Others refer to it as a meta-theory (Guzzini 2000; Zehfuss 2002), but many more simply refer to it as an approach rather than theory of IR. Nicholas Onuf avers that
“constructivism is not a theory as such” (1998:58). “It does not offer general explanations for what people do, why societies differ [and] how the world changes” (ibid). Constructivism has also been questioned on its take on ideas in the international system. Palan (2000:575) states that constructivism “asserts, but never proves, the primacy of norms and laws over material considerations, in domestic and international politics.”
The attitude of undermining constructivism is understandable when one looks at the longevity of realism and the global influence of those who support neoliberalism. The retention of certain assumptions by neorealists, neoliberals and idealists has also played into the hands of constructivism’s critics. In Constructing International Politics (1995), Wendt espouses what he calls Mearsheimer’s five realist assumptions: “that international politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be 100 percent certain about others' intentions, wish to survive, and are rational” (Wendt 1995:72). He further shares a realist assumption of states as being units of analysis. This position elicits at least two concerns; the first is that it risks presenting constructivism in an adulterated light; as an approach that simply toes the line of
25 Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that constructivism is an ontology rather than a theory of international relations.
She regards it as “a set of assumptions” about human agency and motivation.
91
realism, with a few cosmetic changes and additions. Secondly, the rising tide of globalization has impacted on how much room states have to pursue their interests. Maintaining the centrality of states in the international system should contend with the fact that “the controllers and owners of the transnational corporations (TNCs), globalising politicians, globalising professionals and the like represent interests which are not national in origin but globally linked” (Moisio 2008:79).
Moisio goes on to say in the era of globalization taken up by capitalists, interests are conceptualised more “in terms of the market rather than in terms of the nation” (Moisio 2008).
To its defense, constructivism has actually given more attention to the role that non-state actors play in international politics than its realist counterparts. As stated elsewhere in the chapter, non- state actors have grown in prominence and cannot be ignored.
Constructivism has also been assailed for manifesting an alleged postmodernist streak and elements of anti-positivism (Hopf 1998). That liberalism and realism are both positivist makes this attitude predictable. Henry Nau (2012) regards constructivism as a welcome approach to IR studies, but that it still falls short of the thoroughness and rigour that realism and liberalism enjoy. Constructivism has also been denied the ranks of other mainstream IR theories because it has been closely associated with idealism (see Wendt 1999 and Nau 2012). Nau states that those who have dismissed constructivism on these lines, especially those of realist inclinations argue
“that reality must be accepted as it is, namely anarchy and power politics, not as we might wish it to be, namely utopian ideas and universal institutions” (2012:46-47).
While others have claimed to draw lines between constructivism and idealism, others have sought to draw lines between constructivism and rationalism (see Checkel 1997). A valid synthesizing of constructivism and rationalism would put paid to the claim that constructivism is treading the via media or the middle ground between contesting approaches to international relations. If constructivists are to religiously follow the claim to tread the middle ground, they must be willing to engage with rationalist theorists on the one hand and reflectivist theorists on the other hand. Zehfuss (2002:5), already doubting the possibility of the middle ground, seems to argue that constructivism is more amenable to building bridges with rationalists than those who are “more radical than the constructivists.”
The foregoing concerns could point to the assumption that readers have a clear idea of what constructivism is. This is not the case and has fuelled controversy on the usage and importance
92
of this approach. Thus, even offering a cogent critique of constructivism risks being an awkward exercise because critiquing something presupposes that it is known (Zehfuss 2002). There is always the temptation of branding any non-rationalist approach to IR as constructivist.
According to Adler (1997:322), constructivism “is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” Adler’s definition brings the debate over the material world to the centre stage of constructivism. The definition reinforces the equal importance and influence that human agency and material reality have of each other. This reinforces Wendt’s (1992:399) earlier arguments on the agent-structure dynamic, attributing to the two entities “equal ontological status.”
In Social Theory (1999:189) Wendt reiterates the argument that he does not undermine the presence and influence of “material elements in the structure of social systems.” By this argument, Wendt avoids Sørensen’s (2008:5) criticism that constructivism does not sufficiently address “how material forces impact with the social world in IR.” Indeed, players who comprise social systems are biological (hence material) entities endowed with manifold capabilities and properties. However, left on their own, material elements “explain relatively little” (Wendt 1999:189). A variant of knowledge is needed to render meaning to material conditions. Thus, while the material world impinges on human agency, the same could be said of how human agency attaches meaning to material objects. However, this clarity of the mutual constitution of the agent (human action) and structure (material world) in shaping behaviour is more comprehensible when one strand of constructivism (i.e. Wendt’s variant) is under discussion.
Whether or not it represents all analysis claiming to be constructivist is a moot point.
Taking an extreme stand on social constructivism is a temptation to which adherents of social constructions can be vulnerable. By extreme here is meant the argument that there can never be stability in the social realm; that everything happens at the break-neck speed of flux. The sharp linguistic turn (of which constructivism is a subset) in the study of IR has often been blamed for putting social practice and human habit at bay (see Neumann 2002). The argument that the material world does not make sense outside of language runs the risk of disregarding the current of practised and unreflective conduct or behaviour among states.
93
Wendt concedes the fact that given unchanging circumstances, identities and interests within, between and among states, can remain stable and unchanging. Actors mostly remain stable in the way they perceive their identity and interests over a long period of time. It would be near impossible for actors to interact if they did not have any prediction on the behaviour of fellow actors. This is tantamount to habitual human behaviour. The caveat, however, is not to take this behaviour as innately given. Practice should not be mistaken with inherent nature. For example, that states often act in egoistic ways cannot be gainsaid; however, it is logically erroneous to then take this particular practice for a natural property (Wendt 1994).
One of the major challenges of this study was to use constructivism in a way that would not indicate an endorsement of extreme relativism; the argument that all knowledge is context- specific, that truth cannot be universalized, and that ultimately the mind is the arbiter of all knowledge, external and internal (Crotty 1998). The variant of knowledge and behaviours under discussion in this study is that of a social nature. Therefore, wherever it is said that knowledge of one’s and others’ ideas is not imposed exogenously on interaction, it is social knowledge that is under discussion. It is this type of knowledge that comes with experience and social learning (Hendry, Frommer, and Walker 1999).
The study should thus guard against traversing other realms or approaches to knowledge in which it does not have authority. Furthermore, theories of knowledge, by the mere fact of bearing the name theory, harbour no pretentions of being universally applicable (Mashele and Qobo 2017). In Karl Popper’s (2002:80) words, “all theories are trials; they are tentative hypotheses” tested to see if they could work and that they can be rejected if new evidence is discovered that debunks them. The popularity of constructivism after the Cold War is on the ascendant not because constructivism has finally found the answers to the questions that have hitherto confounded international relations theory. The emergence of this approach has been supported by the Kuhnian26 idea of pointing out anomalies and puzzles that proved insoluble to formerly dominant theories, in this case realism, idealism and liberalism. Constructivism,
26 The word was coined by Thomas Kuhn, an influential philosopher of science who gained prominence especially through his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argues that knowledge develops through specific circumstances and is adopted as the norm for specific epochs. However, when the prevailing knowledge encounters problems it cannot easily solve, people start agitating for a paradigm that can be more effective in addressing those anomalies and puzzles. It is through this process that paradigm shifts are made. With respect to the research underway, the author uses Kuhn’s insights to demonstrate the rise of constructivism and how it came about in the aftermath of the Cold War.
94
therefore, may point out what has eluded the grasp of other theories of international relations.
Other theories might emerge to challenge constructivism and proffer more clarity on what this approach ignores or is incapable of solving. There could also be events that could revive the strength of extant theories to challenge constructivism.27 Indeed, it is this process that sponsors the growth and dynamism of knowledge.