CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
5.5 The Third Republic (1991 – present)
5.5.4 Zambia as a Christian Nation
Chiluba declared Zambia a Christian nation on Christmas day in 1991, less than two months after acceding to the presidency. The move was arguably political in that it was partly aimed at winning the support of the majority of Zambian citizens who profess Christianity. Secondly, it also aimed at attracting the favour of three major church bodies in Zambia: the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC) of the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia and the Christian Council of Zambia.71 It is noteworthy, however, that the Christian Council of Zambia and ZEC have been openly against the declaration (Gifford 2008) because it does not represent their interests (Olapdipo 2000). The 2011-2016 Manifesto of the Patriotic Front, while not dismissing the Christian nation declaration, inveighed against how the MMD “has continued
70 Posner and Simon (2002) argue that another factor that possibly kept the MMD in power in addition to vote abstention was ethnic voting. This argument could be justified by the fact that Chiluba was mostly linked to the Bemba speaking people of Northern Zambia. Though Kaunda grew up in Northern Zambia, the fact that his parents were originally from Malawi gives the general impression that he should be associated with Eastern Zambia, bordering Malawi. When Chiluba won the 1991 election, the only place where Kaunda still enjoyed massive support was Eastern Zambia, thus bolstering the argument that ethnic voting was at play.
71 In the 1980s the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions that Chiluba led worked very close with the Christian Council of Zambia to publicise the blemishes of UNIP governance (Sklar 1983). The 1991 Christian nation declaration could possibly be viewed from this perspective, though many other motives have been suggested.
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to antagonise the church and marginalize it in matters of governance and national development”
(Patriotic Front Manifesto 2011:5).
The ZEC argued that human rights of all citizens, Christian or otherwise, could be safely upheld without a religious declaration. Furthermore, there was fear that this declaration could lead to the abuse of religion for purely political ends, a charge which was justified. Thirdly, there is a multiplicity of religions in Zambia and declaring it a Christian nation indicates an intolerance to other religions72 and could lead to “non-Christian Zambians being regarded as second-class citizens, or even being excluded from public office” (Quoted in Gilford 1999:2010). The negative potential that the declaration had on Zambia could actually bring discredit on the Christian religion. In 2012 when the PF government was inviting proposals for the new constitution, the Zambia Episcopal Conference called for the excision of the Christian nation declaration from the current constitution’s preamble (Lusaka Times 2012). They argued that Zambia cannot observe Christian principles through a mere declaration. Their appeal was rejected and the Constitution, as amended in 2016, has the Christian nation declaration as one of its first inscriptions (Constitution of Zambia 2016).
The corrupt excesses that became characteristic of the MMD government under Chiluba put paid to many doubts that the declaration was a hollow red herring. Chiluba’s stated intentions of declaring Zambia a Christian nation were to instill Christian principles in government and to fight corruption. It should strike one as surprising that this declaration was not made during the Kaunda era when Christian values were part of national ideology and Kaunda himself was a devout believer. The move by Chiluba could possibly be interpreted as a political gambit, as alluded to above. His critics, including some evangelicals, argued that there was a glaring discrepancy between Chiluba’s rhetoric about Christianity and his political conduct. Indeed, the subsequent years of his presidency revealed corruption, intolerance to opposition and a crude pursuit for power. It is thus understandable why some influential Christian organizations were emphatically against the declaration. “This is because no one wanted to identify Christianity with corruption and incompetence” (Oladipo 2000:376).
72 This could lead to fundamentalism and, in the event that Zambia comes under the leadership of people who swear by other religions, be used against Christianity.
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Phiri (1998) observed that Christian organizations that supported Chiluba’s rule did so because they enjoyed financial backing from the government. Furthermore, some prominent evangelicals were even issued with diplomatic passports by the government. Those, like Nevers Mumba, who had criticized Chiluba’s rule as antithetical to Christian precepts had their passports revoked.
Apart from the rampant corruption which became the most popular legacy of the Chiluba years, the treatment of former president, Kaunda, seemingly contradicted Chiluba’s continued reference to Christian leadership. Before the 1996 elections, the MMD government amended the constitution, adding that only third generation Zambians would be eligible to stand as presidents of Zambia. This rule was expressly crafted to preclude Kaunda, whose parent were missionaries from Malawi, from contesting the polls. Subsequently, UNIP boycotted the 1996 election (Posner and Simon 2002). This amendment signified at least two things: Chiluba’s vindictiveness towards a leader who had previously jailed him for his stance against UNIP.
Secondly, the first five years of Chiluba’s rule had possibly made it obvious that the new government was not very different from the previous one and that the conduct of the new leaders, especially as regards corruption and misappropriation of resources, was possibly worse than that witnessed during the Kaunda years. For this reason, there was a chance that Kaunda’s popularity could be resurrected in the wake of the new government’s excesses. It was with this in mind that Chiluba sought to debar Kaunda from representing UNIP at the 1996 polls, an action which would have been almost pointless had Chiluba not discerned a palpable threat in Kaunda.
On matters of corruption, the possible roots were sown when decisions were made to privatize state controlled institutions. Allegations were legion about how politically connected individuals had enriched themselves through this process. Chiluba was also accused of unreasonable leniency towards dealing with those in his cabinet who were accused of corruption (Phiri 1995).
It was partly because of the general restiveness of the population that on 28 October 1997, a group of soldiers attempted to foment a coup against Chiluba’s government. The plotters cited massive corruption in Chiluba’s government as the main reason for their attempt to topple it (McNeil 1997). The coup was foiled within three hours, but its consequences were far-reaching and gave Chiluba reasons to be more highhanded towards his opponents. A series of arrests was made which saw Kaunda being put in jail, but later released without trial. Out of the total of 59 soldiers who were arrested in connection with the coup, 44 were found guilty and sentenced to death in 2003. Their sentences were commuted and the leader of the soldiers, Steven Lungu, was
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released in 2010. Even after his sentencing, Lungu was adamant that though he had endangered the life of many people, he remained convinced that attempting to end Chiluba’s leadership was morally defensible because the leadership was “riddled with corruption” (BBC News 2003).