CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
6.4 China-Zambia Relations: Insights from Political Informers
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preserve of the West cum capitalist powers. From this perspective, R-3’s response suffers a setback not because it is untrue, but because it is incomplete.
The current study has argued that similarities in terms of national identity and interests play a pivotal role in shaping cordial relations between states. The previous paragraph was an attempt to illustrate how an intersecting aspiration to end foreign domination helped Zambia and China to strengthen their relations. One of the questions given to respondents queried the effects that democratization – the reintroduction of multiparty democracy - in Zambia had on Sino-Zambian relations. R-3 gave a curious response, hitherto undiscovered by the researcher. The response was that democratization also came with the liberalization of the economy in Zambia, which in turn ushered in privatization and attracted the inflow of Chinese enterprises. This argument, as the researcher subsequently discovered, was also advanced by Howard French (2014) who stated that the privatization drive on which Zambia embarked coincided with a period when China’s
“go out” policy was gathering momentum. As a country that had hitherto been ignored by the West, Zambia was an opportunity for China’s state and private owned corporations (French 2014). This is instructive in that the changes that Zambia went through could tempt an ordinary observer to predict that it might have driven China and Zambia apart because the latter was changing from a one-party state and was also shedding its socialist inclined economics. Taylor (2006) cites an opinion expressed in China’s newsprint on Zambia’s political transformation, saying that Zambia’s return to multiparty politics was an internal affair of Zambian into which China would not interfere. This was a strict adherence to China’s non-interference policy, which R-3 tellingly called “supposed non-interference in Zambia’s political affairs”83 (emphasis added).
Zambia has also never objected to China’s choice of being a socialist country. Against the seeming post-Cold War shift towards neoliberalism, China has doggedly maintained its adherence to socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the 18th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping asserted that “only socialism can save China, and only Chinese socialism can lead our economy to development” (Zambia Daily Mail, 14 October 2015). The framing of socialism with Chinese characteristics exhibits a change from Mao’s communist dogmatism. As pointed out by
83 The word ‘supposed’ is important in the light of what happened in the build up to the 2006 general election in Zambia. Furthermore, this paper has argued that China would be compelled to abrogate this policy if the political climate of its trade partners threatens China’s interests.
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R-3, “in as much as it denies it, [China] has gradually adopted liberal economic policies.”
Joining the World Trade Organisation was also a sign of China’s willingness to be integrated into the global economy. However, all these developments should not blind one to the internal practical challenges confronting China. These include China’s responsibility to cater for the world’s biggest population, a reality which, as respondents from ZCTU mentioned, has compelled China to be more aggressive in pursuing its interests.84 R-3 also mentioned the search for markets for China’s “cheap products” as another incentive that lures China into relations with Zambia and Africa. Thirdly, China uses its relations to influence opinion, especially of countries of the South that identify with China’s history. This sentiment, as shown in the second chapter, was aired by Guy Scott when he dismissed China’s overtures to Africa as a ploy to buy African support in international fora.
Despite the merit in the argument that China uses its relations and investment to get Zambia’s support, there are opportunities that the two countries can exploit to their mutual benefit. For Zambia, R-3 averred that China has thus far been a stable market for copper, a mineral resource that continues to be the principal cornerstone of Zambia’s economy. However, Zambia could also exploit its trade relations with China to include more goods and resources in addition to copper. R-3 also sees China as an opportunity for Zambia to enhance its technology. The ZCTU respondents stated that this is happening as observed in the new building formulae that Zambians have adopted from the Chinese. The infrastructure that China is poised to construct in Zambia is another benefit that Zambia can get from its relations with China. In her response to what benefits China and Zambia offer each other, Laura Miti stated “that China [helps] Zambia to build its infrastructure at a much faster rate” than would be case without China’s intervention (Miti 2017). Despite the controversy surrounding the quality of Chinese infrastructure, especially roads, China’s contribution to the TAZARA Railway line gives the country a favourable perception in Zambia.85 Like many African countries, Zambia is in desperate need of infrastructure and China’s intervention seems felicitous. R-3 was more pessimistic in the way he presented the opportunities that Zambia offers to China. After pointing out that Zambia offers
84 It should also be noted that respondents from ZCTU explained that China’s stupendous demography gives the country an unparalleled labour force. This availability, the respondents reckon, could explain China’s seemingly casual attitude towards working conditions in Zambia.
85 China’s contribution towards building the TAZARA Rail was a common feature during interviews; it was referred to even in one of the focus group discussions.
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China a beneficial destination for China’s goods and services, he reiterates the old African lamentation of African countries being the exporters of raw material to more industrialised countries. Embedded in this sentiment is the feeling that Africa’s potential to industrialise is perpetually occluded by powers that continue to import the continent’s resources without nurturing the development of industries in Africa. In this manner, more industrialised countries export their finished products to Africa. Thus, China finds in Zambia a readily available market for its finished goods. For this reason, R-3 calls Zambia “a dumping site” for China’s goods.
Another ‘opportunity’ that Zambia offers to China is that the country is not only the destination for China’s services but its citizens as well. The respondent goes thus:
Zambia is a destination of what I call ‘China’s Offloading Policy’; a policy through which Chinese contract workers and investors do not return home. It’s an inconspicuous measure designed to lower China’s population and the burdens bred by that, by ‘offloading’ to other countries as many Chinese citizens as possible (R-3, 14 February, 2017.
Ndola, Zambia).
This argument seems to be expressing the sentiment of people like Michelo from the JCTR who, in his words said “the Chinese are all over the place” in Zambia. Miti expressed a concern raised by respondents from ZCTU that China also brings “unskilled labour to fill positions that can be filled by Zambians” (Miti 2017). The fear of China taking over Africa with its physical presence partly informs this sentiment. In some quarters, China’s physical presence has been judged to be the precursor to China’s physical takeover of the continent. Andrew Malone, whose 2008 article has been cited in this research was categorical in his appraisal of China’s increasing physical presence in Africa:
With little fanfare, a staggering 750,000 Chinese have settled in Africa over the past decade. More are on the way. The strategy has been carefully devised by officials in Beijing, where one expert has estimated that China will eventually need to send 300 million people to Africa to solve the problems of over- population and pollution. The plans appear on track (Malone 2008).
R-3 cited some concerns that come with the growing number of Chinese citizens in Zambia. The concerns are economic as well as social. Economically, R-3 argues that Chinese in Zambia have
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the requisite “capital to engage in about every economic enterprise.” This factor puts Zambian business at a crucial disadvantage. In terms of social consequences, R-3 charges that the rise in the number of Chinese citizens in Zambia is necessitating an inclusion of Chinese culture in Zambia. This is “in form of Chinese schools and infrastructure emblazoned with Chinese script.”
The observation of the respondents from ZCTU that some Zambians who work under Chinese employers are compelled to speak elementary Chinese seems to bear out the argument of the simultaneous rise of China’s population and culture in Zambia. R-3 also expressed the opinion that the influx of Chinese in Zambia is likely to provoke racial confrontation with the Chinese comporting themselves as a superior race.
This section revealed the sentiments of R-3 and Laura Miti. In addition to presenting the thoughts of the respondents in question, the section put them in context and drew the connections that some of R-3’s opinions have with the literature used for this study. Furthermore, the study has noted some similar themes, as expressed in the type of language used between R-3 and other respondents. For example, from at least three respondents, China’s population as a concern in Zambia has been raised though for different reasons. R-3 saw Zambia as an opportunity for China to “offload” some of its citizens.86 Kelly Michelo was of the opinion that the growing presence of the Chinese in Zambia has diminished the intensity of debate on Chinese investment in Zambia. Respondents from ZCTU argued that China’s population explains its labour practice, which some deem as neglectful of safety. From these differing perspectives, the section illustrated how different and similar perspectives can be of Zambia-China relations. One factor, such as population, evokes different opinions from different people. The next subsection presents the information gathered from the focus group discussion comprising five ordinary Zambians.
6.5 The Power of History and Economic Ambition: Impressions of ordinary Zambians on