CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
5.3 The First Republic (1964-1972)
5.3.1 Zambia against Colonialism and Minority Rule
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Bemba. Thus, Zambia in that situation was more divided between the ‘Bemba’ who held power and other groups.
Along ethnic, tribal or regional lines, the biggest challenge to Zambia’s corporate identity and continued survival as one whole has been the Barotseland question. Barotseland is an area traversing the North-western region of Zambia. For a long time before independence colonialists had treated the area as somewhat independent of the region that came to later be called Zambia.
Thus, the first government of independent Zambia had the task of integrating “an artificial colonial entity into a united and stable state” (Caplan 1970: v). Barotseland is predominated by the Lozi people and so the intermittent resurgence of the Barotse dilemma carries with it ethnic undertones. The Barotseland Agreement of 1964 gave the Litunga, who is King of the region, powers to have his own government and to use customary laws that applied to his subjects (Barotseland Agreement 1964).54 Prior to and immediately after colonialism (some might argue that it continues to this day) there was also a dimension of class to the conflict as the people of Barotseland were more exposed to Western education and mores than the rest of their future compatriots.
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Company. It was in 1924 that this responsibility was taken over by the British Colonial Office, and hence became a protectorate (Zambia Review 2016).
During the period that ensued, the interests of indigenous people were represented mostly by the African Mineworkers Union that was formed in the 1940s. However, anti-colonial sentiment gained more traction in 1951 when there was a proposal to form the Federation of the two Rhodesias (present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The proposal led to the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) which became the main champion for indigenous rule in Zambia (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). However, in 1953 the proposal was pushed through and the Central African Federation was formed, sparking more consternation from the African nationalists. This decision transferred control from the colonial rulers to the settlers in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. For the subsequent years, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress became more militant in its opposition to federation (Rotberg 1964).
The ANC was rent asunder in 1958 when its leader, Harry Mwanga Nkumbula, assented to participating in federal elections with limited suffrage for Africans. More radical members of the ANC left and formed the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). Leaders of ZANC, like Kenneth Kaunda, were subsequently arrested for what were deemed extremist leanings. It was during Kaunda’s incarceration in 1959 that the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was formed and initially led by Mainza Chona. After his release from prison, Kaunda took over as leader of UNIP:
A two-stage election held in October and December 1962 resulted in an African majority in the legislative council, and an uneasy coalition between the two African nationalist parties, the ANC and UNIP. The council passed resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the federation and demanding full internal self-government under a new constitution, as well as a new National Assembly based on a broader, more democratic franchise. On Dec. 31, 1963, the federation was dissolved, and Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia on Oct. 24, 1964 (Zambia Review 2016:9).
The newly independent country had daunting challenges from its conception. Ethnic fissures and their debilitating impact on national unity threatened the existence of Zambia from the moment of its formation. UNIP was dogged by accusations of currying favour with Bemba speaking people and regions. The party was spared an awkward arrangement when the white ruled National Progressive Party (NPP) that had ten seats reserved for settlers in the new government disbanded itself (Burdette 1988:65), leaving UNIP and the ANC to be the main political parties.
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The ANC retained a strong following in Southern Province, where Nkumbula, its leader, hailed from (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). Naturally, UNIP wanted to dominate the political scene because it could justifiably claim to represent the interests of all Zambians. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, a lot of UNIP’s policies and actions were tailor-made to forestall the growth of other political parties. Coupled with these internal dynamics, Zambia also faced problems that were of external provenance.
Politically and strategically, being a landlocked country could be both be an advantage and a disadvantage to Zambia. At the time it gained independence, its physical position exposed Zambia’s vulnerability because much of the subcontinent was still under colonial or minority (i.e. white) rule (Zambia Review 2016). Angola and Mozambique, countries that both share borders with Zambia, were still under their Portuguese colonialists (Sekwat 2000). Crucially, Zambia depended on minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to export its resources and to access its imports (Tordoff 1977). The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime in 1965 compounded Zambia’s quandary (Morris 1966). In 1976, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia formed the original members of the frontline states, “in order to crisis-manage the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe war, and it was considerably strengthened when the resolution of the conflict resulted in an independent Zimbabwe becoming the sixth Front-line State in 1980” (Evans 1984:1).5556
Zambia offered succour to many political movements from Rhodesia (later to be called Zimbabwe), South Africa and South West Africa (later to be called Namibia). Zambia was in a quandary because it needed the sea route to fuel its economy, but at the same time had to denounce the leaderships of the countries providing that crucial route. The fact that Zambia was a survivor of Western domination gave the country a moral obligation to fight Western domination wherever it still lingered on the African continent. This put Zambia on the collision course with Rhodesia and South Africa (Kasrils 1993). This dilemma was very close to defining Zambia as a nation. Would it forfeit its struggle commitments against minority rule and work in concert with minority governments in the countries through which it got its needed imports? Or
55 During the 1979 Commonwealth Conference held in Zambia, “President Kaunda facilitated significant progress towards setting up the Lancaster House negotiations” (Smith 1990:284) that eventually led to the undoing of the Rhodesian stalemate and led the foundation for the independence of Zimbabwe.
56 The Frontline States, joined by Zimbabwe, also formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to minimize economic dependence on South Africa.
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would it chart a moral ground by harbouring liberation movements, and incur the ire of Rhodesia and South Africa, a situation which could be disastrous for Zambia’s economic survival and political stability?
By electing to help other African countries gain independence, Zambia was championing a Pan- Africanist ideal, which tied the fate of the country to that of other African countries.57 Kaunda explained that the fight against foreign or white domination and the furtherance of Pan- Africanism united African nationalists on their stance towards the Cold War and their position on choosing political and economic ideologies. Thus, Kaunda was against communism and the blind following of the communist bloc, however sympathetic it seemed to Africa’s quest for self- governance and the removal of capitalist cum imperialist elements from the continent. His main argument was that pledging fealty to China or Moscow would be tantamount to ejecting one imperialist only to replace it with another. Kaunda (1966:117) actually regarded “the infiltration of foreign ideologies such as Marxist Communism as a threat to African Unity.” Thus, the often expressed fear that Africa could be swept into the communist orbit was regarded as the imperialist “spectre of their own making” (Kaunda 1966:118).
However, Kaunda regarded China’s communist propaganda in Africa with more respect because China knew the experience of colonial domination and racial segregation. Curiously, he concludes that China’s “propaganda offensive is worthy of greater respect and calls for special vigilance because” (Kaunda 1966:121) China was not a member of the United Nations and hence did not adhere to the strictures of international diplomacy and the attendant moral expectations that come with that membership. He still cautioned that of utmost importance in Africa’s pursuit should be Pan-Africanism, and hence Africa was correct in not siding with either of the ideological and power blocs (Kaunda 1966). Ghodsee (2015) also affirms Zambia’s initial identity as a nonaligned state. It can be deduced from Kaunda’s arguments that he did not envision the possibility of Africa being a communist outpost. It was tactical to imperialists and minority rulers, desperately trying to retain their power, to dismiss their detractors as
57 Zambia was one of the many African countries that boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics on grounds that the Olympics Committee allowed New Zealand to participate in the games. The boycott came about because New Zealand still held sporting events with apartheid South Africa and at the time the games were commencing, the All Black Rugby team from New Zealand was visiting Australia. Announcing the withdrawal of Kenya from the Olympics, the then foreign minister James Osogo averred that “principles are more important than medals” (BBC 1976). Zambia’s boycott could be interpreted as premised on this position.
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communists. For Kaunda, it was nationalism that held African bonds and solidarity, rather than communism. It was nationalism that restored African optimism and sense of worth and it is this influence that shaped Zambia’s stance against minority rule, especially in Southern Africa.
The behaviour of the UNIP government seemed to have been more inclined towards a more radical stance against minority rule. This is not an easy conclusion to arrive at. Susan Herlin Broadhead argues that though Kaunda was identified as an idealist58 (driven by principle), he exuded political realism by understanding the complexity of the challenges that faced him at home and externally. The geographical interdependence he shared with the governments of the minority ruled south prior to the establishment of the TAZARA rail line, made “him a moderate in the council of the Pan African organizations based to the North” (Broadhead 1973:698). Thus, the argument of whether Zambia was radical or idealistic in its foreign policy, especially in the first eight years after independence, needs concrete examples to buttress either line of argument.
It is clear, though, that by choosing humanism, Kaunda’s government was effecting a veneer of high principles, non-violence and Christian influence as the main dimensions of national ideology.