CHAPTER 7: WHOSE IDENTITY, WHOSE CONSTRUCTS AND WHOSE INTEREST? THE SYNTHESIS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA IN
6.5 The Power of History and Economic Ambition: Impressions of ordinary Zambians on Sino-Zambian relations
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the requisite “capital to engage in about every economic enterprise.” This factor puts Zambian business at a crucial disadvantage. In terms of social consequences, R-3 charges that the rise in the number of Chinese citizens in Zambia is necessitating an inclusion of Chinese culture in Zambia. This is “in form of Chinese schools and infrastructure emblazoned with Chinese script.”
The observation of the respondents from ZCTU that some Zambians who work under Chinese employers are compelled to speak elementary Chinese seems to bear out the argument of the simultaneous rise of China’s population and culture in Zambia. R-3 also expressed the opinion that the influx of Chinese in Zambia is likely to provoke racial confrontation with the Chinese comporting themselves as a superior race.
This section revealed the sentiments of R-3 and Laura Miti. In addition to presenting the thoughts of the respondents in question, the section put them in context and drew the connections that some of R-3’s opinions have with the literature used for this study. Furthermore, the study has noted some similar themes, as expressed in the type of language used between R-3 and other respondents. For example, from at least three respondents, China’s population as a concern in Zambia has been raised though for different reasons. R-3 saw Zambia as an opportunity for China to “offload” some of its citizens.86 Kelly Michelo was of the opinion that the growing presence of the Chinese in Zambia has diminished the intensity of debate on Chinese investment in Zambia. Respondents from ZCTU argued that China’s population explains its labour practice, which some deem as neglectful of safety. From these differing perspectives, the section illustrated how different and similar perspectives can be of Zambia-China relations. One factor, such as population, evokes different opinions from different people. The next subsection presents the information gathered from the focus group discussion comprising five ordinary Zambians.
6.5 The Power of History and Economic Ambition: Impressions of ordinary Zambians on
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the five respondents hail from the Copperbelt Province where the Chinese own most of their mines. The Copperbelt is instructive in appraising China’s investment in Zambia because allegations of China being an oppressive and would-be colonizer have been bolstered by allegations that Chinese employers do not adhere to the safety requirements for miners. In the seventh chapter, these allegations will be tested against some empirical studies done by other researchers to establish the veracity and extent of Chinese investment as oppressive in Zambia.
Mutale Kafwilo attributed the longstanding Sino-Chinese relations to ideologies i.e. socialism which China and Zambia seemed to share historically. The respondent, like R-3, cited Kaunda’s economic inclinations and ideologies that were akin to socialism. Though not overtly professing socialism, Kaunda’s notion of humanism bore a striking resemblance to the tenets of socialism.
Thus, the respondent assumed that Zambia, during Kaunda’s rule, manifested some of China’s economic practice. However, both Zambia and China have changed their economic ideology, in practice if not rhetoric, since the time of the Cold War. The pragmatic leadership after Mao toned down the socialist extremism that characterized Mao’s era. When interviewed Kafwilo noted this change by stating that:
since the death of Chairman Mao there have been more capitalist ideologies introduced in the Chinese way of life, so to that effect we have seen a few businessmen that have established businesses in China using the capitalist models…. We have got guys like the Alibaba guy and a few other guys that have established businesses that have gone multinational. I think they have been encouraged to lean more towards capitalism of late than they were at liberty during Chairman Mao’s reign (Kafwilo, 2017. Scottsville).
The changes that came after Mao were not only consigned to economic transformation. By necessity, the shift towards more liberal economics demands a shift on certain social practices like giving ordinary people the latitude to start private enterprises. Essentially this means people are given leeway to experiment with economic ideologies that they see fit. Mao, according to Kafwilo, had “more or less brainwashed the entire population of” China but after his death Chinese “have been more free to think on their own and not just be influenced by certain ideologies from their leaders.” The immense control that Mao had on the mindset of Chinese, brainwashing to use Kafwilo’s parlance, was observed by Emmanuel Hevi (1963) during his stay
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in China (see also Matambo and Mtshali 2016:220). That non-Chinese are able to note the changes is evident of an apparent evolution of China’s identity.
The record of work that China has done in Zambia, most prominently the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway line, was also mentioned as important to the trustworthy identity/image that China has cultivated in Zambia. This was also noted by a respondent of the first focus group discussion, Shigala Mwamulima. As shown in chapter two, building the TAZARA was not seen in terms of infrastructure and economics only. It was also a symbol of China’s commitment to end southern African dependency on then white ruled Zimbabwe and South Africa. In his determination of what made the Chinese to gradually start heading to Zambia after Zambia’s 1990-1991 reform, French (2014) argues that word of mouth suggested that Zambians were friendly to Chinese and there was “the lingering gratitude in Zambia for the immense gesture of solidarity extended by China with its construction of the TAZARA Railway in the 1970s.”
The research has shown that Tanzania and Zambia had approached prospective sponsors from Western countries for the project, who were more economically able than China in the 1970s.
However, the West ruled that the project was inappropriate and too costly. The fact that China took over the project created an atmosphere that it is a power that can be “trusted” (Kafwilo 2017) by Zambia. The use of the word “trust” by the respondent is important; since the quality of relations by countries comes from what Wendt calls social practice, the conduct of China has impressed on Zambia the picture of a country that can be trusted to help Zambia. From the respondent’s perspective, China’s current involvement in mining and building Zambia’s infrastructure can be understood from the reputation that the construction of the Tanzania- Zambia Railway line nurtured.
Judging from the longevity of China’s commitment to Zambia’s infrastructural development, Kafwilo stated that China’s role has been “immense.” Currently, however, Kafwilo mentioned that China’s relations and investment are more tailored towards material benefits such as building infrastructure, an allusion that ideological identity is playing a less role in cementing Sino-Zambian relations. Taylor (2006) argues that Zambia’s own political and economic changes after 1991 did not have a telling influence, at least in the negative sense, on China-Zambia relations. Zambia opened up its political space to allow for multiparty democracy at the time
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when China was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crisis, whence the CCP actually augmented its monopolistic hold on power. One of the respondents conceded the fact that he was not sufficiently confident of his understanding of what the changes in Zambia’s identity did to China-Zambia relations but nonetheless opined that it might have taken China a bit of time to adjust to the changes that Zambia was undergoing. In the pursuit of veracity, the opinions of the respondent on this matter are not authoritative enough.
At the time when Zambia was moving to its current political landscape, there was also the rising tide of synergy in the countries of what has become to be known as the global South. The United States and its neoliberal ideologies had seemingly emerged the victors of the Cold War but the new era also gave impetus to the development of regional powers like China that sought more influence on international politics. Emerging powers were also seeking to be economically involved in countries that had hitherto nationalized major parastatals but were now opening up for foreign investment. These circumstances gave China more prospects for success in courting African countries. The Chiluba government that came after Kaunda exploited their relationship with China while initiating its economic reforms that were interpreted as being influenced by Western ideologies. This study has argued that a country at any particular time can have multiple, sometimes contradictory identities and interests, subject to who it is relating with. This explains the tenacity of China-Zambia relations despite the points of divergence in their identity after the Cold War.
One of the most threatening divergence that the two countries share is their understanding and practice of labour ethics. Thus, apart from the political and ideological questions that characterize the current research, it is sensible to tackle labour disputes between Chinese investors and Zambians as these have the potential to shake political and ideological relations.
Evans Zulu, one of the participants in the focus group discussion, averred that relations between Zambians and Chinese are exploitative in favour of China. Coming from a mining town where the BGRIMM disaster happened, Zulu stated that Zambians working in Chinese corporations are enduring poor working conditions and very low wages. One of the most difficult episodes of China-Zambia relations came in 2006 and it was not linked to any ideological positions. It was rather provoked by a confluence of factors. One of these was Michael Sata’s charge that Chinese investment was abusive. In addition, the number of cases on which Chinese employers have
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flouted labour laws further fueled anti-Chinese sentiment in Zambia. Thus, for a smoother run of relations between the two countries, the research undertook to find out possible measures that could be taken to ensure that relations between Zambia and China are stable and free of conflict with regards to labour disputes.
Kafwilo argued that the “onus” to rectify disputes in terms of work ethics between China and Zambia resides with Zambians. This position is interpreted in this research as arguing for Zambia’s agency in its relations with China. As will be shown later from Mohan and Lampert (2012) and Odoom (2013), the tendency to perennially depict African countries as passive victims in their relations with China denies African countries an opportunity to mutually construct identities and ideas with the countries they relate to. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, as gathered from its representatives, has made strides in forcing China’s adherence to what they call Zambia’s “strict” labour laws. Bolstering Zambia’s say in shaping and influencing the Sino-Zambian nexus could result in a realistic assessment of how relations between the two countries are mutually beneficial and test the veracity of identities that the two countries apparently share. Thus far, Kafwilo asserts that he has:
not been impressed with the way the Zambian authorities have been laxed about the way foreign employers treat local employees.
I think the officials need to wake up and need to make sure they are closely monitoring how the labour force is being treated. That is the only way I feel the situation can be helped (Kafwilo, 2017.
Scottsville).
Respondents from ZCTU also stated that despite their advocacy and the existence of well stated labour laws, there are still concerns regarding adherence to the laws by Chinese employers.
When asked on what he thought the general feeling is among Zambians working for Chinese employers, Kafwilo noted that there is a sense of resignation. While they may not be happy with Chinese work ethics, Zambians that work for the Chinese reckon that they do not have an option but to work for the Chinese, irrespective of the conditions under which they work and the
“peanuts” they earn. As will be shown in the next section when information from respondents who have worked as casual employees for a Chinese firm is analysed, the feeling of resignation is notable. Apart from helping their casual workers, Mwale, one of the respondents, stated that
“there will not be any form of development” if Zambia decides to do away with the Chinese and the investment that they come with. Navigating the necessity of Chinese investment and at the
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same time not letting it endanger Zambians requires a deft method of manoeuvring on the part of the Zambian government; in other words, it demands a thoroughly crafted framework of exercising Zambia’s agency but at the same time retaining the beneficial parts of China’s relations and investment.
Kafwilo stated that there have been occasions when the Zambian government has stepped in to condemn China’s more controversial labour practices. The representatives from ZCTU referred to the Sinazongwe incident where two Chinese nationals were arrested for shooting at Zambian workers who were protesting against what they termed poor working conditions and an unjust remuneration. Sinazongwe District Commissioner (DC) Oliver Pelete decried the conduct of the Chinese nationals and demanded their arrest (Lusaka Times 16 October 2010).87 In addition to China’s labour practices, the aggressive nature with which China is seeking resources has on occasion led to arrests. One of the more recent examples was the arrest of four Chinese nationals who resorted to offering bribes in order to sway the position of farmers who had rejected the intent of Tiang Mining Zambia Limited to start a quarry mine in Shimabala. The Anti-Corruption Commission of Zambia carried out a sting operation in which top members of the said firm were arrested (Times of Zambia, 10 January 2015). These and some other examples give the indication that, though to a limited extent, Zambian officials have tried to limit China’s carte blanche in