VVCHRKQAS.A.SPY’

LAW

14

P()SElAS.AfiFRIEPJD,

I02 LAW 14

OBSERVANCE OF THE LAW

Joseph

^Duveenwas

undoubtedly

^thegreatest^artdealer of his time—from 1904 to 194-0 he almost

single—handedly rnonopolized

America’s million- aire

art-collecting

market. Butone

prize plum

eluded him: the industrialist Andrew Mellon. Beforehe

died,

^{Duveenwasdeterminedto}make Mellon

aclient.

Duveen’s friendssaid thiswas an

impossible

dreani. Mellonwasastiff,

taciturnman.The storieshe had heard about the

congenial,

talkative Du-

veenrubbed him the wrong

way—-he

^{had madeit}clear he hadnodesireto meettheman.Yet Duveen told his

doubting ^friends,

^“Not

only

will Mellon

buy

^frommebut he will

buy only

from me.” For several years he tracked hisprey,

learning

^{the man’s}

^habits,

^tastes,

phobias.

^{To do}

^this,

^he

secretly

put^severalof Mellon’sstaffonhisown

payroll, worming

valuable informa- tionoutof them.

By

^{thetimehe movedintoaction,he}knew Mellon about

aswell^asMellon’swifedid.

In 1921 Mellonwas

visiting London,

^and

staying

^ina

palatial

^suiteon

the third floor of

Claridge’s

Hotel. Duveen booked himselfintothe suite

just

^below

^Mellon’s,

^onthe second floor. He had

arranged

for his valet to befriend Mellon’s

valet,

^andonthe fateful

day

he had chosentomake his move, Mellon’s valet told Duveen’s

valet,

^{who told} Duveen, ^{thathe had}

just helped

^{Mellononwith his}overcoat, and^thatthe industrialistwasmak-

ing

^hisway down^thecorridorto

ring

^{forthe lift.}

Duveen’s valet

hurriedly helped

^{Duveenwith hisownovercoat. Sec»}

onds

later,

Duveen entered the

lift,

^{and lo and}

behold,

^{therewasMellon.}

“Howdo you

do,

^Mr.Mellon?” said

Duveen, introducing

^{himself.“Iam on}

my way^tothe National

Gallery

^tolookatsome

pictures.”

How uncanny- thatwas

precisely

where Mellonwasheaded. Andso Duveenwasableto accompany his prey ^totheonelocation thatwouldensurehis success. He knew Mellon’s taste inside and out, and while the ^{two men} wandered

through

^{the museum,}he dazzled the magnate ^withhis

knowledge.

^Once

again quite uncannily, they

^seemedtohave

remarkably

^{similartastes.}

Mellonwas

pleasantly surprised:

^{Thiswasnotthe Duveenhehadex-}

pected.

^{The man was}

charming

^and

agreeable,

^and

clearly

^had

exquisite

taste.When

they

^{returnedtoNew}

York,

Mellon visited Duveen’s exclusive

gallery

^{and fellin}love with the collection.

Everything, surprisingly enough,

seemedto be

precisely

the kind of work he wantedtocollect. For therest of hislifehewasDuveen’sbestandmostgenerousclient.

Interpretation

A man as ambitious and

competitive

^as

Joseph

^{Duveen left}

nothing

^to

chance.What’sthe

point

^of

winging

ig^of

just hoping

youmaybe ableto charm thisorthat client? It’s like

shooting

ducks blindfolded. Arm

yourself

withalittle

knowledge

and your^aim

improves.

Mellonwasthemost

spectacular

of Duveen’s

catches,

^{but he}

spied

^on

many^amillionaire.

By secretly putting

^membersofhis clients’ household staffsonhis own

payroll,

^{he would}

gain

^{constantaccessto valuableinfor-}

mation about their masters’

comings

^and

goings, changes

^{in taste, and}

other such tidbitsofinformationthatwould

put

^{him a}

step

^{ahead.A rival}

of Duveen’swhowantedtomake

Henry

^{Frick a}client noticedthatwhen-

everhe visited this

wealthy

^New

^Yorker,

^Duveenwasthere before

him,

^as

if hehadasixthsense.Toother dealers Duveen seemedtobe

everywhere,

andtoknow

everything

^before

they

^did. His powers

discouraged

^{and dis-}

heartened

them,

_{until many}

simply

gave up

going

^{after the}

wealthy

^clients

who could makeadealer rich.

Such is the power of artful

spying:

^{It makes} you ^seem

all—powerful, clairvoyant.

^Your

knowledge

^ofyour mark^canalsomake you^seemcharm-

ing,

^sowellcanyou

anticipate

his desires. No one seesthesourceofyour power,^andwhat

they

^cannotsee

they

^cannot

fight.

Rulers^see

through spies,

^{as cows}

through

^{smell,Bmhmins}

through scriptures

^{and therest}of^the

people

throughtheir normaleyes.

Kantily/1, ^Indianphilmoplm; ^thirdamtury^3.1:.

KEYSTO POWER

Intherealm ofpower, your

goal

^isa

degree

^{ofcontroloverfuture events.}

Part of the

problem

you

face, then,

^{is that}

people

^won’t tell you all their

thoughts,

^emotions,and

plans. Controlling

^what

they

say,

they

^often

keep

themostcritical

parts

^oftheir character hidden—their

weaknesses,

^ulterior motives,obsessions. The resultisthat_youcannot

predict

^{theirmoves,and}

are

constantly

ⁱⁿthe dark. The trickistofindaway^to

probe ^them,

^tofind

outtheir secrets and hidden intentions, ^without

letting

^{them know what}

you^areup^to.

This isnotasdifficultasyou

might

^think.A

friendly

^{frontwill let}you

secretly gather

information^onfriends and enemies alike. Let others^con- sult the

horoscope,

^orreadtarotcards: You have^{more concretemeans}of

seeing

^intothe future.

The mostcommonway ^of

spying

^{isto use other}

people,

^asDuveen

did. The methodis

simple, powerful,

^but

risky:

^{You will}

certainly gather

^in-

formation,

but you have little ^{controlover the}

people

^{who are}

doing

^the

work.

Perhaps they

^will

ineptly

reveal your

spying,

^{or even}

secretly

^turn

against

you. It^isfarbettertobe the spy

yourself,

^topose^asafriend while

secretly gathering

information.

The French

politician Talleyrand

^{was one of the}

greatest practitioners

of thisart.Hehadanuncanny

ability

^towormsecrets outof

people

ⁱⁿpa- liteconversation. Acontemporary ^of

his,

^{Baron de}

Vitrolles,

wrote, ^“Wit and grace marked hisconversation. He

possessed

^theartof

concealing

^his

thoughts

^or his malice beneath ^a

transparent

^{veil of}insinuations, ^words that

imply something

^morethan

they

express.

Only

when necessary did he

inject

^hisown

personality.”

^The

key

^hereis

Talleyrand’s ability

^tosuppress himselfintheconversation,^{tomakeotherstalk}

endlessly

about themselves and

inadvertently

^{revealtheirintentionsand}

plans.

LAW 14 103

Ifyon^havereaxonto suspect^thata[lemon^:5

Iellingyuu^alie,Io/Ikax (hmzghyoulzzlicved ewry word he said.

Thixwillgive^him

coumgr:^togr;on;he willbecomemore

Vt’/1(,’mI'Nlin Im a.s:m‘ltons, andⁱⁿthe andbetrayhitnreljj Again, ifyou perceive thalaperson^ivtrying

to¢:zmL'ruIso-nmlhing fromyou, but^withonly partialSl.(f‘l‘t?A‘.\',lookas

thoughyou did^not believe him. The uppo»

sitiononyourpart will provoke^{himinto lead-} ing^{outhisre:\‘¢'rve}of mu/1 andbringing^the wholeforce of^itto Imrr uponyour

l'rIcrez1u7r':y.

AR Fl II ;x S\"llOPl-INlIAI.‘l£R, l78X»lX6(l

104 LAW 14

Throughout Talleyrand’s life, people

^{saidhe was a}

superb

^conversa-

tionalist—yet

^he

actually

said very little. He ^nevertalked about hisown

ideas;^he

got

^otherstoreveal theirs. He would

organize friendly

^{games of}

charades for

foreign diplomats,

^social

gatherings where, however,

^he would

carefully weigh

^{their words,}

cajole

confidences out of them, ^and

gather

informationinvaluable tohis work^asFrance’s

foreign

^minister.At

the

Congress

^ofVienna

(1814-1815)

^{he did his}

spying

^{inotherways: He} would blurt out what seemedto be a secret

(actually something

^{he had}

made

up),

^thenwatch his listeners’ reactions. He

might

^tella

gathering

^of

diplomats,

^forinstance, that^areliable sourcehad revealedtohimthatthe

czarofRussiawas

planning

^toarresthis

top general

^fortreason.

By

^watch-

ing

^the

diplomats’

^{reactions to this}

madealp story,

he would know which

oneswere mostexcited

by

^the

weakening

^ofthe Russian

army—~perhaps

their

goverments

^had

designs

^{on Russia? As Baron Von Stetten}

^said,

“Monsieur

Talleyrand

^firesa

pistol

^{intotheairtoseewho will}

jump

^outthe

window.”

During

^social

gatherings

^and innocuous encounters, pay ^attention.

Thisiswhen

people’s guards

^aredown.

By suppressing

your^own

personal- ity,

you^canmake them reveal

things.

^Thebrilliance ofthe maneuver is that

they

^willmistake yourinterest inthemfor

friendship,

^sothat you^not

only

^learn,you malce allies.

Nevertheless,

_you ^should

practice

^{this tactic}with caution and^care. If

people begin

^to

suspect

you^are

worming

secrets out ofthem under the

cover of conversation,

they

^will

strictly

^avoid you.

Emphasize friendly

chatter,^notvaluableinformation.Your search for gems of information^can-

notbetoo

obvious,

^or_your

probing ^questions

will revealmoreabout your self and your^intentionsthan about theinformationyou

hope

^tofind.

A trickto try ⁱⁿ

spying

^{comes from La}

Rochefoucauld,

who wrote,

“Sincerity

^{isfound in} very fewmen, and^is often the cleverestofruses——

oneis sincere inordertodrawouttheconfidence andsecretsofthe other.”

By pretending

^tobare your^heartto another person, ^{in other}

words,

you make them^more

likely

^{toreveal theirownsecrets. Give thema}

^false

^con‘

fessionand

they

^will

give

you^arealone. Another trickwasidentified

by

the

philosopher

^Arthur

Schopenhauer,

^who

suggested vehemently

^contra-

dicting people you’re

in conversation with^{as a}way^of

irritating them,

^stir—

ring

^themup^sothat

they

^losesomeof the controlovertheirwords.In their emotionalreaction

they

will reveal all kinds of truths about

themselves,

truths you^canlater^use

against

^them.

Another method ofindirect

spying

^{isto test}

people,

^to

lay

^little

traps

that make themreveal

things

about themselves. ChosroesII,^a

notoriously

clever

seventlrcentury king

^{of the Persians, had} many ways of

seeing through

^his

subjects

^without

raising suspicion.

^Ifhe

noticed,

for instance, thattwo ofhis couruers had become

particularly friendly,

he would call

oneofthem aside and say he had information that the other^{was a}traitor, and wouldsoonbe killed. The

king

would tell the courtierhetmstedhim

morethan anyone, and that he^must

keep

^thisinformationsecret. Then he

wouldwatchthetwomen

carefully.

^{Ifhesawthatthesecond}courtier had not

changed

^inhis behavior towardthe

king,

he would conclude that the firstcourtierhad

kept

the secret, and he would

quickly promote

^{the man,} later

taking

^{him aside to}

^confess,

^{“Imeant to} kill your friend because ^of certaininformation that had reached_me,

but,

^whenI

investigated

^themat-

ter,^Ifounditwasuntrue.”

If,

^ontheother

hand,

^thesecondcourtier started toavoidthe

king, acting

aloof and tense, Chosroes would know that the^se crethad been revealed. He would ban the secondcourtierfrom his court,

letting

him know that the whole business had

only

^{been a test, butthat}

even

though

^{theman had done}

nothing

wrong, he could^no

longer

^trust

him. The firstcourtier,

however,

had revealedasecret, and him Chosroes would ban from hisentire

kingdom.

It may^{seem an}odd form of

spying

that revealsnot

empirical

^informa:

tionbuta

person’s

^character.

^Often, however,

^{it is}the best way^of

solving problems

^before

they

^arise.

By tempting people

into certain acts, you learn about their

loyalty,

their

honesty,

^{and so on.} And this kind of

knowledge

^{is often the most}

valuable of all: Armed withit,you^can

predict

^{theiractions in}the future.

[ m ag^{e :} The Third

Eye

^of

the

Spy.

^{In the land of}

the

two-eyed,

the third eye

gives

you ^the omniscience ofa

god.

^{Youseefurtherthan}

others,

_{and you} ^see

deeper

into them.

Nobody

^is

safe from the eye butyou.

Authority: ^Now,

^{thereason abrilliant}

sovereign

^{and awise}

general

conquer ^the enemy whenever

they

^{move, and their} achievements surpass ^{those of}

ordinary

^{men, istheir}

foreknowledge

^ofthe enemy situation. This

“foreknowledge”

^cannotbe elicited from

spirits,

^nor from

gods,

^nor

by analogy

^with

past

^events,not

by astrologic

^calcu

lations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy ^sit- uati0n—-from

spies. (Sun-tzu,

^{The Art}

if ^War,

^fourth

century B.C.)

LAW 14 I05

106 LAW H

REVERSAL

Informationis criticaltopower, but

just

^asyou spy^on other

people,

you mustbe

prepared

^forthemtospy^onyou.Oneof themost

potent

weapons inthe battle forinformation,

then,

^is

giving

^outfalseinformation. As Mn- ston Churchill

said,

^{“Truth is so}

precious

that she should

always

^{be at»}

tended

by

^a

bodyguard

^{oflies.”You mustsurround}

yourself

^{with such a}

bodyguard,

^sothat your truth^cannotbe

penetrated. By planting

^{the infor-}

mationof_your

choice,

_youcontrol the game.

In 1944 the Nazis’rocket-bombattacksonLondon

suddenly

^escalated.

OvertwothousandV-1

flying

^{bombs fellonthe}

city, killing

^{morethan five}

thousand

people

^and

wounding

many^more,

Somehow, however,

^{the Ger-}

mans

consistently

^{missed their} targets. ^{Bombs that were intended for} Tower

Bridge,

^or

Piccadilly,

would fall wellshort of the

city, landing

^inthe

less

populated

suburbs. This was

because,

ⁱⁿ

fixing

^theirtargets,^{the Ger-}

mans reliedon secretagents

they

^had

planted

ⁱⁿ

England. They

^{did not}

know that these agents ^{had been}

discovered,

and that in their

place, English—c0ntrolled agents

^were

feeding

^them

subtly deceptive

information.

The bombswouldhitfarther and fartherfrom theirtargetsevery^time

they

^fell.

By

^{the end ofthe}

campaign they

^were

landing

^{on cows in the}

country. By feeding people

wrong

information, then,

you

gain

^a

potent

^ad vantage.^While

spying gives

you^athird eye, disinformation

puts

^outoneof your

enemy’s

eyes. A

cyclops,

^he

always

^misseshis

target.

LAW

15

(ZRIJSEIYNDLH